ECDSA Cryptosuite v2019

Achieving Data Integrity using ECDSA with NIST-compliant curves

W3C Working Draft

More details about this document
This version:
https://www.w3.org/TR/2023/WD-vc-di-ecdsa-20230603/
Latest published version:
https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-di-ecdsa/
Latest editor's draft:
https://w3c.github.io/vc-di-ecdsa/
History:
https://www.w3.org/standards/history/vc-di-ecdsa
Commit history
Editors:
Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar)
Marty Reed (RANDA Solutions)
Authors:
Dave Longley (Digital Bazaar)
Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar)
Feedback:
GitHub w3c/vc-di-ecdsa (pull requests, new issue, open issues)

Abstract

This specification describes a Data Integrity Cryptosuite for use when generating a digital signature using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).

Status of This Document

This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C technical reports index at https://www.w3.org/TR/.

This is an experimental specification and is undergoing regular revisions. It is not fit for production deployment.

This document was published by the Verifiable Credentials Working Group as a Working Draft using the Recommendation track.

Publication as a Working Draft does not imply endorsement by W3C and its Members.

This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as other than work in progress.

This document was produced by a group operating under the W3C Patent Policy. W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in connection with the deliverables of the group; that page also includes instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has actual knowledge of a patent which the individual believes contains Essential Claim(s) must disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy.

This document is governed by the 2 November 2021 W3C Process Document.

1. Introduction

This specification defines a cryptographic suite for the purpose of creating, and verifying proofs for ECDSA signatures in conformance with the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification. ECDSA signatures are specified in [FIPS-186-5] with elliptic curves P-256 and P-384 specified in [NIST-SP-800-186]. [FIPS-186-5] includes the deterministic ECDSA algorithm which is also specified in [RFC6979].

This specification uses either the RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] or the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] to transform the input document into its canonical form. It uses one of two mechanisms to digest and sign: SHA-256 [RFC6234] as the message digest algorithm and ECDSA with Curve P-256 as the signature algorithm, or SHA-384 [RFC6234] as the message digest algorithm and ECDSA with Curve P-384 as the signature algorithm.

Note

The elliptic curves P-256 and P-384 of [NIST-SP-800-186] are referred to as secp256r1 and secp384r1 respectively in [SECG2]. In addition, this notation is sometimes used in ECDSA software libraries.

1.1 Terminology

This section defines the terms used in this specification. A link to these terms is included whenever they appear in this specification.

data integrity proof
A set of attributes that represent a digital proof and the parameters required to verify it.
private key
Cryptographic material that can be used to generate digital proofs.
challenge
A random or pseudo-random value used by some authentication protocols to mitigate replay attacks.
domain
A string value that specifies the operational domain of a digital proof. This could be an Internet domain name like example.com, an ad-hoc value such as mycorp-level3-access, or a very specific transaction value like 8zF6T8J34qP3mqP. A signer could include a domain in its digital proof to restrict its use to particular target, identified by the specified domain.
cryptographic suite
A specification defining the usage of specific cryptographic primitives in order to achieve a particular security goal. These documents are often used to specify verification methods, digital signature types, their identifiers, and other related properties.
decentralized identifier (DID)
A globally unique persistent identifier that does not require a centralized registration authority and is often generated and/or registered cryptographically. The generic format of a is defined in [DID-CORE]. Many—but not all—methods make use of distributed ledger technology (DLT) or some other form of decentralized network.
controller
An entity that has the capability to make changes to a controller document.
controller document
A set of data that specifies one or more relationships between a controller and a set of data, such as a set of public cryptographic keys.
subject
The entity identified by the id property in a controller document. Anything can be a subject: person, group, organization, physical thing, digital thing, logical thing, etc.
distributed ledger (DLT)
A non-centralized system for recording events. These systems establish sufficient confidence for participants to rely upon the data recorded by others to make operational decisions. They typically use distributed databases where different nodes use a consensus protocol to confirm the ordering of cryptographically signed transactions. The linking of digitally signed transactions over time often makes the history of the ledger effectively immutable.
verification method

A set of parameters that can be used together with a process to independently verify a proof. For example, a cryptographic public key can be used as a verification method with respect to a digital signature; in such usage, it verifies that the signer possessed the associated cryptographic private key.

"Verification" and "proof" in this definition are intended to apply broadly. For example, a cryptographic public key might be used during Diffie-Hellman key exchange to negotiate a shared symmetric key for encryption. This guarantees the integrity of the key agreement process. It is thus another type of verification method, even though descriptions of the process might not use the words "verification" or "proof."

1.2 Conformance

As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.

The key words MAY, MUST, and MUST NOT in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

A conforming proof is any concrete expression of the data model that complies with the normative statements in this specification. Specifically, all relevant normative statements in Sections 2. Data Model and 3. Algorithms of this document MUST be enforced.

A conforming processor is any algorithm realized as software and/or hardware that generates or consumes a conforming proof. Conforming processors MUST produce errors when non-conforming documents are consumed.

This document also contains examples that contain JSON and JSON-LD content. Some of these examples contain characters that are invalid JSON, such as inline comments (//) and the use of ellipsis (...) to denote information that adds little value to the example. Implementers are cautioned to remove this content if they desire to use the information as valid JSON or JSON-LD.

2. Data Model

The following sections outline the data model that is used by this specification for verification methods and data integrity proof formats.

2.1 Verification Methods

The cryptographic material used to verify a data integrity proof is called the verification method. This suite relies on public key material represented using [MULTIBASE] and [MULTICODEC]. This suite supports public key use for both digital signature generation and verification, according to [FIPS-186-5].

This suite MAY be used to verify Data Integrity Proofs [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] produced by ECDSA public key material encoded as a Multikey. Loss-less key transformation processes that result in equivalent cryptographic material MAY be utilized.

2.1.1 Multikey

Issue 1

This definition should go in the Data Integrity specification and referenced from there.

The type of the verification method MUST be Multikey.

The controller of the verification method MUST be a URL.

The publicKeyMultibase property of the verification method MUST be a public key encoded according to [MULTICODEC] and formatted according to [MULTIBASE]. The multicodec encoding of a P-256 public key is the two-byte prefix 0x1200 followed by the 33-byte compressed public key data. The 35 byte value is then encoded using base58-btc (z) as the prefix. The multicodec encoding of a P-384 public key is the two-byte prefix 0x1201 followed by the 49-byte compressed public key data. The 51 byte value is then encoded using base58-btc (z) as the prefix. Any other encodings MUST NOT be allowed.

Developers are advised to not accidentally publish a representation of a private key. Implementations of this specification will raise errors in the event of a [MULTICODEC] value other than 0x1200 or 0x1201 being used in a publicKeyMultibase value.

Example 1: An P-256 public key encoded as a Multikey
{
  "id": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-0",
  "type": "Multikey",
  "controller": "https://example.com/issuer/123",
  "publicKeyMultibase": "zDnaerx9CtbPJ1q36T5Ln5wYt3MQYeGRG5ehnPAmxcf5mDZpv"
}
Example 2: An P-384 public key encoded as a Multikey
{
  "id": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-0",
  "type": "Multikey",
  "controller": "https://example.com/issuer/123",
  "publicKeyMultibase": "z82LkvCwHNreneWpsgPEbV3gu1C6NFJEBg4srfJ5gdxEsMGRJ
    Uz2sG9FE42shbn2xkZJh54"
}
Example 3: Two public keys (P-256 and P-384) encoded as Multikeys in a controller document
{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/security/data-integrity/v1"
  ],
  "id": "did:example:123",
  "verificationMethod": [{
    "id": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-1",
    "type": "Multikey",
    "controller": "https://example.com/issuer/123",
    "publicKeyMultibase": "zDnaerx9CtbPJ1q36T5Ln5wYt3MQYeGRG5ehnPAmxcf5mDZpv"
  }, {
    "id": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-2",
    "type": "Multikey",
    "controller": "https://example.com/issuer/123",
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z82LkvCwHNreneWpsgPEbV3gu1C6NFJEBg4srfJ5gdxEsMGRJ
      Uz2sG9FE42shbn2xkZJh54"
  }],
  "authentication": [
    "did:example:123#key-1"
  ],
  "assertionMethod": [
    "did:example:123#key-2"
  ],
  "capabilityDelegation": [
    "did:example:123#key-2"
  ],
  "capabilityInvocation": [
    "did:example:123#key-2"
  ]
}
Issue 2: Refer normatively to a Multikey specification

This specification should not specify multikey formats. It should, instead, point to a multikey registry and/or specification. Examples of these sorts of documents include the DID Specification Registries for Verification Method Types, the key types in the Multikey2021 JSON-LD Context, and key definitions in the Security Vocabulary. Ideally, the specification that this one points to would define all possible multikeys listed in the Multicodec Registry and define how to encode them as multibase values in fields such as publicKeyMultibase and secretKeyMultibase. The referenced specification should also include an extensibility mechanism and registry for new values as they are added to the Multicodec Registry.

2.2 Proof Representations

This suite relies on detached digital signatures represented using [MULTIBASE] and [MULTICODEC].

2.2.1 DataIntegrityProof

The verificationMethod property of the proof MUST be a URL. Dereferencing the verificationMethod MUST result in an object containing a type property with the value set to Multikey.

The type property of the proof MUST be DataIntegrityProof.

The cryptosuite property of the proof MUST be ecdsa-2019.

The created property of the proof MUST be an [XMLSCHEMA11-2] formatted date string.

The proofPurpose property of the proof MUST be a string, and MUST match the verification relationship expressed by the verification method controller.

The proofValue property of the proof MUST be a detached ECDSA produced according to [FIPS-186-5], encoded according to [MULTIBASE] using the base58-btc base encoding.

Example 4: An ECDSA P-256 digital signature expressed as a DataIntegrityProof
{
  "@context": [
    {"title": "https://schema.org/title"},
    "https://w3id.org/security/data-integrity/v1"
  ],
  "title": "Hello world!",
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-2019",
    "created": "2020-11-05T19:23:24Z",
    "verificationMethod": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-2",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z4oey5q2M3XKaxup3tmzN4DRFTLVqpLMweBrSxMY2xHX5XTYVQeVbY8nQA
      VHMrXFkXJpmEcqdoDwLWxaqA3Q1geV6"
  }
}

3. Algorithms

The following section describes multiple Data Integrity cryptographic suites that utilize the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS-186-5].

3.1 ecdsa-2019

The ecdsa-2019 cryptographic suite takes an input document, canonicalizes the document using the Universal RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON], and then cryptographically hashes and signs the output resulting in the production of a data integrity proof. The algorithms in this section also include the verification of such a data integrity proof.

3.1.1 Add Proof (ecdsa-2019)

To generate a proof, the algorithm in Section 4.1: Add Proof in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification MUST be executed. For that algorithm, the cryptographic suite specific transformation algorithm is defined in Section 3.1.3 Transformation (ecdsa-2019), the hashing algorithm is defined in Section 3.1.4 Hashing (ecdsa-2019), and the proof serialization algorithm is defined in Section 3.1.6 Proof Serialization (ecdsa-2019).

3.1.2 Verify Proof (ecdsa-2019)

To verify a proof, the algorithm in Section 4.2: Verify Proof in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification MUST be executed. For that algorithm, the cryptographic suite specific transformation algorithm is defined in Section 3.1.3 Transformation (ecdsa-2019), the hashing algorithm is defined in Section 3.1.4 Hashing (ecdsa-2019), and the proof verification algorithm is defined in Section 3.1.7 Proof Verification (ecdsa-2019).

3.1.3 Transformation (ecdsa-2019)

The following algorithm specifies how to transform an unsecured input document into a transformed document that is ready to be provided as input to the hashing algorithm in Section 3.1.4 Hashing (ecdsa-2019).

Required inputs to this algorithm are an unsecured data document (unsecuredDocument) and transformation options (options). The transformation options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A transformed data document is produced as output. Whenever this algorithm encodes strings, it MUST use UTF-8 encoding.

  1. If options.type is not set to the string DataIntegrityProof and options.cryptosuite is not set to the string ecdsa-2019 then a PROOF_TRANSFORMATION_ERROR MUST be raised.
  2. Let canonicalDocument be the result of applying the Universal RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] to the unsecuredDocument.
  3. Set output to the value of canonicalDocument.
  4. Return canonicalDocument as the transformed data document.

3.1.4 Hashing (ecdsa-2019)

The following algorithm specifies how to cryptographically hash a transformed data document and proof configuration into cryptographic hash data that is ready to be provided as input to the algorithms in Section 3.1.6 Proof Serialization (ecdsa-2019) or Section 3.1.7 Proof Verification (ecdsa-2019).

The required inputs to this algorithm are a transformed data document (transformedDocument) and canonical proof configuration (canonicalProofConfig). A single hash data value represented as series of bytes is produced as output.

  1. Let transformedDocumentHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the transformedDocument. transformedDocumentHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
  2. Let proofConfigHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the canonicalProofConfig. proofConfigHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
  3. Let hashData be the result of joining proofConfigHash (the first hash) with transformedDocumentHash (the second hash).
  4. Return hashData as the hash data.

3.1.5 Proof Configuration (ecdsa-2019)

The following algorithm specifies how to generate a proof configuration from a set of proof options that is used as input to the proof hashing algorithm.

The required inputs to this algorithm are proof options (options). The proof options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MUST contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A proof configuration object is produced as output.

  1. Let proofConfig be an empty object.
  2. Set proofConfig.type to options.type.
  3. If options.cryptosuite is set, set proofConfig.cryptosuite to its value.
  4. If options.type is not set to DataIntegrityProof and proofConfig.cryptosuite is not set to ecdsa-2019, an INVALID_PROOF_CONFIGURATION error MUST be raised.
  5. Set proofConfig.created to options.created. If the value is not a valid [XMLSCHEMA11-2] datetime, an INVALID_PROOF_DATETIME error MUST be raised.
  6. Set proofConfig.verificationMethod to options.verificationMethod.
  7. Set proofConfig.proofPurpose to options.proofPurpose.
  8. Set proofConfig.@context to unsecuredDocument.@context.
  9. Let canonicalProofConfig be the result of applying the Universal RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] to the proofConfig.
  10. Return canonicalProofConfig.

3.1.6 Proof Serialization (ecdsa-2019)

The following algorithm specifies how to serialize a digital signature from a set of cryptographic hash data. This algorithm is designed to be used in conjunction with the algorithms defined in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification, Section 4: Algorithms. Required inputs are cryptographic hash data (hashData) and proof options (options). The proof options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MAY contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A single digital proof value represented as series of bytes is produced as output.

  1. Let privateKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the private key bytes associated with the options.verificationMethod value as described in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification, Section 4: Retrieving Cryptographic Material.
  2. Let proofBytes be the result of applying the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS-186-5], with hashData as the data to be signed using the private key specified by privateKeyBytes. proofBytes will be exactly 64 bytes in size for a P-256 key, and 96 bytes in size for a P-384 key.
  3. Return proofBytes as the digital proof.

3.1.7 Proof Verification (ecdsa-2019)

The following algorithm specifies how to verify a digital signature from a set of cryptographic hash data. This algorithm is designed to be used in conjunction with the algorithms defined in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification, Section 4: Algorithms. Required inputs are cryptographic hash data (hashData), a digital signature (proofBytes) and proof options (options). A verification result represented as a boolean value is produced as output.

  1. Let publicKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the public key bytes associated with the options.verificationMethod value as described in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification, Section 4: Retrieving Cryptographic Material.
  2. Let verificationResult be the result of applying the verification algorithm Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS-186-5], with hashData as the data to be verified against the proofBytes using the public key specified by publicKeyBytes.
  3. Return verificationResult as the verification result.

4. Security Considerations

The following section describes security considerations that developers implementing this specification should be aware of in order to create secure software.

4.1 Split Key Formats From Cryptosuites

Issue 3

Ensuring that cryptographic suites are versioned and tightly scoped to a very small set of possible key types and signature schemes (ideally one key type and size and one signature output type) is a design goal for most Data Integrity cryptographic suites. Historically, this has been done by defining both the key type and the cryptographic suite that uses the key type in the same specification. The downside of doing so, however, is that there might be a proliferation of different key types in multikey that result in different cryptosuites defining the same key material differently. For example, one cryptosuite might use compressed Curve P-256 keys while another uses uncompressed values. If that occurs, it will harm interoperability. It will be important in the coming months to years to ensure that this does not happen by fully defining the multikey format in a separate specification so cryptosuite specifications, such as this one, can refer to the multikey specification, thus reducing the chances of multikey type proliferation and improving the chances of maximum interoperability for the multikey format.

5. Privacy Considerations

The following section describes privacy considerations that developers implementing this specification should be aware of in order to avoid violating privacy assumptions.

Issue 4

This cryptography suite does not provide for selective disclosure or unlinkability. If signatures are re-used, they can be used as correlatable data.

A. References

A.1 Normative references

[DID-CORE]
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0. Manu Sporny; Amy Guy; Markus Sabadello; Drummond Reed. W3C. 19 July 2022. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/
[FIPS-186-5]
FIPS PUB 186-5: Digital Signature Standard (DSS). U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology. 3 February 2023. National Standard. URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
[MULTIBASE]
Multibase. URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-multiformats-multibase-01
[MULTICODEC]
Multicodec. URL: https://github.com/multiformats/multicodec/
[NIST-SP-800-186]
Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. Lily Chen; Dustin Moody; Karen Randall; Andrew Regenscheid; Angela Robinson. National Institute of Standards and Technology. February 2023.
[RDF-CANON]
RDF Dataset Canonicalization. Dave Longley; Gregg Kellogg; Dan Yamamoto. W3C. 24 May 2023. W3C Working Draft. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-canon/
[RFC2119]
Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. S. Bradner. IETF. March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119
[RFC3986]
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax. T. Berners-Lee; R. Fielding; L. Masinter. IETF. January 2005. Internet Standard. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986
[RFC6234]
US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF). D. Eastlake 3rd; T. Hansen. IETF. May 2011. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234
[RFC6979]
Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). T. Pornin. IETF. August 2013. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979
[RFC8174]
Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words. B. Leiba. IETF. May 2017. Best Current Practice. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174
[RFC8785]
JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). A. Rundgren; B. Jordan; S. Erdtman. IETF. June 2020. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785
[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]
Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0. Manu Sporny; Dave Longley. W3C. 28 May 2023. W3C Working Draft. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-integrity/
[XMLSCHEMA11-2]
W3C XML Schema Definition Language (XSD) 1.1 Part 2: Datatypes. David Peterson; Sandy Gao; Ashok Malhotra; Michael Sperberg-McQueen; Henry Thompson; Paul V. Biron et al. W3C. 5 April 2012. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema11-2/

A.2 Informative references

[SECG2]
SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. Certicom Research. January 27, 2010. URL: http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]
Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0. Manu Sporny; Orie Steele; Michael Jones; Gabe Cohen; Oliver Terbu. W3C. 20 May 2023. W3C Working Draft. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/