Copyright © 2020 W3C® (MIT, ERCIM, Keio, Beihang). W3C liability, trademark and permissive document license rules apply.
Decentralized identifiers (DIDs) are a new type of identifier that enables verifiable, decentralized digital identity. A DID identifies any subject (e.g., a person, organization, thing, data model, abstract entity, etc.) that the controller of the DID decides that it identifies. These new identifiers are designed to enable the controller of a DID to prove control over it and to be implemented independently of any centralized registry, identity provider, or certificate authority. DIDs are URLs that associate a DID subject with a DID document allowing trustable interactions associated with that subject. Each DID document can express cryptographic material, verification methods, or service endpoints, which provide a set of mechanisms enabling a DID controller to prove control of the DID. Service endpoints enable trusted interactions associated with the DID subject. A DID document might contain semantics about the subject that it identifies. A DID document might contain the DID subject itself (e.g. a data model).
This document specifies a common data model, a URL format, and a set of operations for DIDs, DID documents, and DID methods.
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C technical reports index at https://www.w3.org/TR/.
This specification is under active development and implementers are advised against implementing the specification unless they are directly involved with the W3C DID Working Group. There are use cases [DID-USE-CASES] in active development that establish requirements for this document.
At present, there exist 40 experimental implementations and a preliminary test suite that will eventually determine whether or not implementations are conformant. Readers are advised that Appendix § A. Current Issues contains a list of concerns and proposed changes that will most likely result in alterations to this specification.
Comments regarding this document are welcome. Please file issues directly on GitHub, or send them to public-did-wg@w3.org ( subscribe, archives).
Portions of the work on this specification have been funded by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate under contracts HSHQDC-16-R00012-H-SB2016-1-002 and HSHQDC-17-C-00019. The content of this specification does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the U.S. Government and no official endorsement should be inferred.
Work on this specification has also been supported by the Rebooting the Web of Trust community facilitated by Christopher Allen, Shannon Appelcline, Kiara Robles, Brian Weller, Betty Dhamers, Kaliya Young, Kim Hamilton Duffy, Manu Sporny, Drummond Reed, Joe Andrieu, and Heather Vescent.
This document was published by the Decentralized Identifier Working Group as a Working Draft. This document is intended to become a W3C Recommendation.
GitHub Issues are preferred for discussion of this specification. Alternatively, you can send comments to our mailing list. Please send them to public-did-wg@w3.org (archives).
Publication as a Working Draft does not imply endorsement by the W3C Membership. This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as other than work in progress.
This document was produced by a group operating under the W3C Patent Policy. W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in connection with the deliverables of the group; that page also includes instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has actual knowledge of a patent which the individual believes contains Essential Claim(s) must disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy.
This document is governed by the 1 March 2019 W3C Process Document.
This section is non-normative.
As individuals and organizations, many of us use globally unique identifiers in a wide variety of contexts. They serve as communications addresses (telephone numbers, email addresses, usernames on social media), ID numbers (for passports, drivers licenses, tax IDs, health insurance), and product identifiers (serial numbers, barcodes, RFIDs). Resources on the Internet are identified by globally unique identifiers in the form of MAC addresses; URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers) are used for resources on the Web and each web page you view in a browser has a globally unique URL (Uniform Resource Locator).
The vast majority of these globally unique identifiers are not under our control. They are issued by external authorities that decide who or what they identify and when they can be revoked. They are useful only in certain contexts and recognized only by certain bodies (not of our choosing). They may disappear or cease to be valid with the failure of an organization. They may unnecessarily reveal personal information. And in many cases they can be fraudulently replicated and asserted by a malicious third-party ("identity theft").
The Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) defined in this specification are a new type of globally unique identifier designed to enable individuals and organizations to generate our own identifiers using systems we trust, and to prove control of those identifiers (authenticate) using cryptographic proofs (for example, digital signatures, privacy-preserving biometric protocols, and so on).
Because we control the generation and assertion of these identifiers, each of us can have as many DIDs as we need to respect our desired separation of identities, personas, and contexts (in the everyday sense of these words). We can scope the use of these identifiers to the most appropriate contexts. We can interact with other people, institutions or systems that require us to identify ourselves (or things we control) while maintaining control over how much personal or private data should be revealed, and without depending on a central authority to guarantee the continued existence of the identifier.
This specification does not require any particular technology or cryptography to underpin the generation, persistence, resolution or interpretation of DIDs. Rather, it defines: a) the generic syntax for all DIDs, and b) the generic requirements for performing the four basic CRUD operations (create, read, update, deactivate) on the metadata associated with a DID (called the DID document).
This enables implementers to design specific types of DIDs to work with the computing infrastructure they trust (e.g., blockchain, distributed ledger, decentralized file system, distributed database, peer-to-peer network). The specification for a specific type of DID is called a DID method. Implementers of applications or systems using DIDs can choose to support the DID methods most appropriate for their particular use cases.
This specification is for:
DID methods can also be developed for identifiers registered in federated or centralized identity management systems. Indeed, almost all types of identifier systems can add support for DIDs. This creates an interoperability bridge between the worlds of centralized, federated, and decentralized identifiers.
This section is non-normative.
A DID is a simple text string consisting of three parts, the:
did
)
did:example:123456789abcdefghi
The example DID above resolves to a DID document. A DID document contains information associated with the DID, such as ways to cryptographically authenticate the DID controller, as well as services that can be used to interact with the DID subject.
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "authentication": [{ // used to authenticate as did:...fghi "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" }], "service": [{ // used to retrieve Verifiable Credentials associated with the DID "id":"did:example:123456789abcdefghi#vcs", "type": "VerifiableCredentialService", "serviceEndpoint": "https://example.com/vc/" }] }
This section is non-normative.
Decentralized Identifiers are a component of larger systems, such as the Verifiable Credentials ecosystem [VC-DATA-MODEL], which drove the design goals for this specification. This section summarizes the primary design goals for this specification.
Goal | Description |
---|---|
Decentralization | Eliminate the requirement for centralized authorities or single point failure in identifier management, including the registration of globally unique identifiers, public verification keys, service endpoints, and other metadata. |
Control | Give entities, both human and non-human, the power to directly control their digital identifiers without the need to rely on external authorities. |
Privacy | Enable entities to control the privacy of their information, including minimal, selective, and progressive disclosure of attributes or other data. |
Security | Enable sufficient security for relying parties to depend on DID documents for their required level of assurance. |
Proof-based | Enable DID controllers to provide cryptographic proof when interacting with other entities. |
Discoverability | Make it possible for entities to discover DIDs for other entities, to learn more about or interact with those entities. |
Interoperability | Use interoperable standards so DID infrastructure can make use of existing tools and software libraries designed for interoperability. |
Portability | Be system- and network-independent and enable entities to use their digital identifiers with any system that supports DIDs and DID methods. |
Simplicity | Favor a reduced set of simple features to make the technology easier to understand, implement, and deploy. |
Extensibility | Where possible, enable extensibility provided it does not greatly hinder interoperability, portability, or simplicity. |
This section provides a basic understanding of the major elements of DID architecture. Formal definitions of terms are provided in § 2. Terminology .
id
property. The generic properties
supported in a DID document are specified in § 5. Core Properties.
The properties present in a DID document may be updated according to the
applicable operations outlined in § 7. Methods.
Conceptually, the relationship between this specification and a DID method specification is similar to the relationship between the IETF generic URI specification ([RFC3986]) and a specific URI scheme ([IANA-URI-SCHEMES] (such as the http: and https: schemes specified in [RFC7230]). It is also similar to the relationship between the IETF generic URN specification ([RFC8141]) and a specific URN namespace definition, (such as the UUID URN namespace defined in [RFC4122]). The difference is that a DID method specification, as well as defining a specific DID scheme, also specifies the methods creating, resolving, updating, and deactivating DIDs and DID documents using a specific type of verifiable data registry.
As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.
The key words MAY, MUST, MUST NOT, RECOMMENDED, REQUIRED, SHOULD, and SHOULD NOT in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This document contains examples that contain JSON, CBOR, and JSON-LD content.
Some of these examples contain characters that are invalid, such as inline
comments (//
) and the use of ellipsis (...
) to denote
information that adds little value to the example. Implementers are cautioned to
remove this content if they desire to use the information as valid JSON, CBOR,
or JSON-LD.
Interoperability of implementations for DIDs and DID documents will be tested by evaluating an implementation's ability to create and parse DIDs and DID documents that conform to the specification. Interoperability for producers and consumers of DIDs and DID documents is provided by ensuring the DIDs and DID documents conform. Interoperability for DID method specifications is provided by the details in each DID method specification. It is understood that, in the same way that a web browser is not required to implement all known URI schemes, conformant software that works with DIDs is not required to implement all known DID methods (however, all implementations of a given DID method must be interoperable for that method).
A conforming DID is any concrete expression of the rules specified in Section § 3. Identifier and MUST comply with relevant normative statements in that section.
A conforming DID Document is any concrete expression of the data model described in this specification and MUST comply with the relevant normative statements in Sections § 4. Data Model and § 5. Core Properties. A serialization format for the conforming document MUST be deterministic, bi-directional, and lossless as described in Section § 6. Core Representations. The conforming DID document MAY be transmitted or stored in any such serialization format.
A conforming DID Method is any specification that complies with the relevant normative statements in Section § 7. Methods.
A producer is any algorithm realized as software and/or hardware and conforms to this specification if it generates conforming DIDs or conforming DID Documents. A producer that is conformant with this specification MUST NOT produce non-conforming DIDs or DID Documents.
A consumer is any algorithm realized as software and/or hardware and conforms to this specification if it consumes conforming DIDs or conforming DID Documents. A consumer that is conformant with this specification MUST produce errors when consuming non-conforming DIDs or DID Documents.
This section is non-normative.
This document attempts to communicate the concepts outlined in the decentralized identifier space by using specialized terms to discuss specific concepts. This terminology is included below and linked to throughout the document to aid the reader:
controller
property on the top level of the DID
document. Note that the DID controller(s) might include the
DID subject.
#
). DID fragment syntax is identical to the URI fragment syntax.
/
). DID path syntax is identical to the URI path
syntax.
?
). DID query syntax is identical to the URI query syntax.
?
character
followed by a DID query, and optional #
character followed
by a DID fragment.
A set of parameters that can be used to independently verify a proof according to a particular method. For example, a public key can be used as a verification method with respect to a digital signature; in such usage, it verifies that the signer possessed the associated private key.
"Verification" and "proof" in this definition are intended to apply broadly. A public key might be used during Diffie-Hellman key exchange to negotiate a shared symmetric key for encryption. This guarantees the integrity of the key agreement process. It is thus another type of verification method, even though descriptions of the process might not use the words "verification" and "proof."
A verification relationship expresses the relationship between the DID subject and a verification method. An example of a verification relationship is § 5.3.3.1 authentication.
This section describes the formal syntax for DIDs and DID URLs. The term "generic" is used to differentiate the syntax defined here from syntax defined by specific DID methods in their respective specifications.
The generic DID scheme is a URI scheme conformant with [RFC3986].
A DID always identifies the DID subject.
The following is the ABNF definition using the syntax in [RFC5234], which
defines ALPHA
and DIGIT
. All other rule names not
defined in this ABNF are defined in [RFC3986].
did = "did:" method-name ":" method-specific-id method-name = 1*method-char method-char = %x61-7A / DIGIT method-specific-id = *( ":" *idchar ) 1*idchar idchar = ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-" / "_"
The grammar currently allows an empty method-specific-id
, e.g.,
did:example:
would be a valid DID that could identify the
DID method itself.
A DID method specification MUST further restrict the generic DID
syntax by defining its own method-name
and its own
method-specific-id
syntax. For more information, see Section
§ 7. Methods.
For the broadest interoperability, make DID normalization as simple and universal as possible:
method-specific-id
rule in Section
§ 3.1.1 Generic DID Syntax MUST be defined by the governing
DID method specification.
A DID is expected to be persistent and immutable. That is, a DID is bound exclusively and permanently to its one and only subject. Even after a DID is deactivated, it is intended that it never be repurposed.
Ideally, a DID would be a completely abstract decentralized identifier (like a UUID) that could be bound to multiple underlying verifiable data registries over time, thus maintaining its persistence independent of any particular system. However, registering the same identifier on multiple verifiable data registries introduces extremely hard entityship and start-of-authority (SOA) problems. It also greatly increases implementation complexity for developers.
To avoid these issues, developers should refer to the Decentralized Characteristics Rubric [DID-RUBRIC] to decide which DID method best addresses the needs of the use case.
Although not included in this version, future versions of this specification
might support a DID document equivID
property to establish
verifiable equivalence relations between DIDs representing the same
subject on multiple verifiable data registries. Such equivalence relations can
produce the practical equivalent of a single persistent abstract DID.
A DID URL always identifies a resource to be located. It can be used, for example, to identify a specific part of a DID document.
This following is the ABNF definition using the syntax in [RFC5324]. It
builds on the did
scheme defined in § 3.1.1 Generic DID Syntax. The path-abempty
and
fragment
components are identical to the ABNF rules defined in
[RFC3986], and the did-query
component is derived from the
query
ABNF rule.
did-url = did path-abempty [ "?" did-query ] [ "#" fragment ] did-query = param *( "&" param ) param = param-name "=" param-value param-name = 1*pchar param-value = *pchar
This specification reserves the semicolon (;
) character for
possible future use as a sub-delimiter for parameters as described in
[MATRIX-URIS].
The DID URL syntax supports a simple, generalized format for parameters
based on the query component (See § 3.2.5 Query). The ABNF above
specifies the basic syntax (the param
rule) but does not specify
any concrete parameter names.
Some generic DID parameter names (for example, for service selection) are completely independent of any specific DID method and MUST always function the same way for all DIDs. Other DID parameter names (for example, for versioning) MAY be supported by certain DID methods, but MUST operate uniformly across those DID methods that do support them.
Parameter names that are completely method-specific are described in Section § 3.1.2 Method-Specific Syntax.
The following table defines a set of generic DID parameter names.
Generic DID Parameter Name | Description |
---|---|
hl
|
A resource hash of the DID document to add integrity protection, as specified in [HASHLINK]. |
service
|
Identifies a service from the DID document by service ID. |
version-id
|
Identifies a specific version of a DID document to be resolved (the version ID could be sequential, or a UUID, or method-specific). Note that this parameter might not be supported by all DID methods. |
version-time
|
Identifies a certain version timestamp of a DID document to be resolved. That is, the DID document that was valid for a DID at a certain time. Note that this parameter might not be supported by all DID methods. |
Additional considerations for processing these parameters are discussed in [?DID-RESOLUTION].
Two example DID URLs using the service
and
version-time
generic DID parameters are shown below.
did:foo:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp?service=agent
did:foo:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp?version-time=2002-10-10T17:00:00Z
Adding a DID parameter to a DID URL means that the parameter becomes part of an identifier for a resource (the DID document or other). Alternatively, the DID resolution and the DID URL dereferencing functions can also be influenced by passing input metadata to a DID resolver that are not part of the DID URL. (See § 8.3 Metadata Structure ). Such options could for example control caching or the desired encoding of a resolution result. This is comparable to HTTP, where certain parameters could either be included in an HTTP URL, or alternatively passed as HTTP headers during the dereferencing process. The important distinction is that DID parameters that are part of the DID URL should be used to specify what resource is being identified, whereas DID resolution options that are not part of the DID URL should be use to control how that resource is resolved or dereferenced.
DID parameters MAY be used if there is a clear use case where the parameter needs to be part of a URI that can be used as a link, or as a resource in RDF / JSON-LD documents.
DID parameters SHOULD NOT be used if there are already other, equivalent ways of constructing URIs that fulfill the same purpose (for example, using other syntactical constructs such as URI query strings or URI fragments).
DID parameters SHOULD NOT be used if the same functionality can be expressed by passing options to a DID resolver, and if there is no need to construct a URI for use as a link, or as a resource in RDF / JSON-LD documents.
A DID method specification MAY specify additional method-specific
parameter names. A method-specific parameter name MUST be prefixed by the method
name, as defined by the method-name
rule.
For example, if the method did:foo:
defines the parameter bar, the
parameter name must be foo:bar
. An example DID URL using
this method and this method-specific parameter would be as shown below.
did:foo:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp?foo:bar=high
A method-specific parameter name defined by one DID method MAY be used by other DID methods.
did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp?foo:bar=low
Method-specific parameter names MAY be combined with generic parameter names in any order.
did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp?service=agent&foo:bar=high
Both DID method namespaces and method-specific parameter namespaces MAY include colons, so they might be partitioned hierarchically, as defined by a DID method specification. The following example DID URL illustrates both.
did:foo:baz:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp?foo:baz:hex=b612
A DID path is identical to a generic URI path and MUST conform to the
path-abempty
ABNF rule in [RFC3986]. A DID path SHOULD be
used to address resources available through a service endpoint.
For more information, see Section § 5.4 Service Endpoints.
A specific DID scheme MAY specify ABNF rules for DID paths that are more restrictive than the generic rules in this section.
did:example:123456/path
A DID query is derived from a generic URI query and MUST conform to the
did-query
ABNF rule in Section §
3.2.1 Generic DID URL Syntax. If a DID query is present, it MUST be used
as described in Sections § 3.2.2 Generic DID URL Parameters and
§ 3.2.3 Method-Specific DID URL Parameters.
A specific DID scheme MAY specify ABNF rules for DID queries that are more restrictive than the generic rules in this section.
did:example:123456?query=true
A DID fragment is used as method-independent reference into the DID document to identify a component of the document (for example, a unique public key description or service endpoint). DID fragment syntax and semantics are identical to a generic URI fragment and MUST conform to RFC 3986, section 3.5. To dereference a DID fragment, the complete DID URL including the DID fragment MUST be used as input to the DID URL dereferencing function for the target component in the DID document object. For more information, see § 8.2 DID URL Dereferencing .
A specific DID scheme MAY specify ABNF rules for DID fragments that are more restrictive than the generic rules in this section.
did:example:123456#public-key-1
In order to maximize interoperability, implementers are urged to ensure that DID fragments are interpreted in the same way across representations (as described in § 6. Core Representations). For example, while JSON Pointer [RFC6901] can be used in a DID fragment, it will not be interpreted in the same way across representations.
Additional semantics for fragment identifiers, which are compatible with and layered upon the semantics in this section, are described for JSON-LD representations in Section § B.2 application/did+ld+json.
A relative DID URL is any URL value in a DID document that does not start
with did:<method-name>:<method-specific-id>
. More
specifically, it is any URL value that does not start with the ABNF defined in
Section § 3.1.1 Generic DID Syntax. The contents of the URL typically
refers to a resource in the same DID document. Relative DID URLs
MAY contain relative path components, query parameters, and fragment
identifiers.
When resolving a relative DID URL reference, the algorithm specified in RFC3986 Section 5: Reference Resolution MUST
be used. The base URI value is the DID that is
associated with the DID subject, see Section § 5.2 DID Subject.
The scheme is did
. The authority
is a combination of <method-name>:<method-specific-id>
, and
the path, query, and fragment
values are those defined in Section § 3.2.4 Path, Section § 3.2.5 Query, and Section § 3.2.6 Fragment, respectively.
Relative DID URLs are often used to identify verification methods and services in a DID Document without having to use absolute URLs, which tend to be more verbose than necessary.
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKey": [{ "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" }, ...], "authentication": [ // a relative DID URL used to reference a verification method above "#key-1" ] }
In the example above, the relative DID URL value will be transformed to an
absolute DID URL value of did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1
.
This specification defines an abstract data model for DID documents, independent of any specific representation. This section provides a high-level description of the data model, a set of requirements for representations, and a set of requirements for extensibility.
A DID document consists of a collection of property-value pairs. The definitions of each of these properties are specified in section § 5. Core Properties. Specific representations are defined in section § 6. Core Representations.
Following are the requirements for representations.
The core representations are specified in section § 6. Core Representations.
The data model supports two types of extensibility.
It is always possible for two specific implementations to agree out-of-band to use a mutually understood extension or representation that is not recorded in the DID Core Registries [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES]; interoperability between such implementations and the larger ecosystem will be less reliable.
A DID points to a DID document. DID documents are the serialization of the data model outlined in Section § 4. Data Model. The following sections define the properties in a DID document, including whether these properties are required or optional.
Identifiers are used in the data model to identify specific instances of people, organizations, devices, keys, services, and things in general. Identifiers are typically URLs, or more generally, URIs. Non-URI-based identifiers are not advised because, while the data model supports them, they are not easy to use with other Internet-based identifiers.
The DID subject is denoted with the id
property. The
DID subject is the entity that the DID document is about. That is,
it is the entity identified by the DID and described by the
DID document.
DID documents MUST include the id
property.
id
MUST be a single valid DID.
{ "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYp" }
DID method specifications can create intermediate representations of a
DID document that do not contain the id
key, such as when a
DID resolver is performing DID resolution. However, the fully
resolved DID document always contains a valid id
property.
The value of id
in the resolved DID document is expected to
match the DID that was resolved.
A DID document can express verification methods, such as cryptographic keys, which can be used to authenticate or authorize interactions with the DID subject or associated parties. The information expressed often includes globally unambiguous identifiers and public key material, which can be used to verify digital signatures. For example, a public key can be used as a verification method with respect to a digital signature; in such usage, it verifies that the signer possessed the associated private key.
Verification methods might take many parameters. An example of this is a set of five cryptographic keys from which any three are required to contribute to a threshold signature. Methods need not be cryptographic. An example of this might be the contact information for a biometric service provider that compares a purported DID controller against a candidate biometric vector.
A DID document MAY include a verificationMethod
property.
verificationMethod
property,
the value of the property MUST be an array of verification method objects.
Each verification method object MUST have the id
, type
,
controller
, and specific verification method properties. The
verification method objects MAY include additional properties.
The value of the id
property MUST be a URI. The array of
verification methods MUST NOT contain multiple entries with the same
id
. If the array of verification methods contains multiple
entries with the same id
, a DID document processor MUST
produce an error.
The value of the type
property MUST be exactly one verification
method type. In order to maximize global interoperability, the
verification method type SHOULD be registered in the
[DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
The value of the controller
property, MUST be a valid DID.
In order to maximize global interoperability, the verification method properties SHOULD be registered in the [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "https://w3id.org/security/v1"],
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
...
"verificationMethod": [{
"id": ...,
"type": ...,
"controller": ...,
...
]}
}
A public key is a verification method. Public keys are used for digital signatures, encryption and other cryptographic operations, which in turn are the basis for purposes such as authentication (see Section § 5.3.3.1 authentication) or establishing secure communication with service endpoints (see Section § 5.4 Service Endpoints). As well, public keys can play a role in authorization mechanisms of DID method operations (see Section § 7.2 Method Operations), which can be defined by DID method specifications.
Public keys can be included in a DID document using the
publicKey
or authentication
properties, depending on
what they are to be used for. Each public key has an identifier (id
)
of its own, a type
, and a controller
, as well as
other properties that depend on the type of key it is.
This specification strives to limit the number of formats for expressing public key material in a DID Document to the fewest possible, to increase the likelihood of interoperability. The fewer formats that implementers have to implement, the more likely it will be that they will support all of them. This approach attempts to strike a delicate balance between ease of implementation and supporting formats that have historically had broad deployment. The specific types of key formats that are supported in this specification are listed below.
A DID document MAY include a publicKey
property.
publicKey
property, the value
of the property MUST be an array of public key objects. Each public key object
MUST have the type
, controller
, and specific public
key properties, and MUST have an id
property. The public key
objects MAY include additional properties.
The value of the id
property MUST be a URI. The array of
public keys MUST NOT contain multiple entries with the same id
. In
this case, a DID document processor MUST produce an error.
The value of the type
property MUST be exactly one public key type.
For a registry of available key types and formats, see [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
The value of the controller
property, which identifies the
controller of the corresponding private key, MUST be a valid DID.
The semantics of the controller
property are the same when the
subject of the relationship is the DID document as when the subject
of the relationship is a key. Since a key can't control itself, and the
key controller cannot be inferred from the DID document, it is
necessary to explicitly express the identity of the controller of the key
(which may be the DID controller or DID subject). The
difference is that the value of controller
on a key is not
necessarily a DID controller. DID controller(s) are
expressed using the controller
property on the top level of
the DID document; see Section
§ 5.3.2
Authorization and Delegation
.
The value of the id
property MAY be structured as a
compound key. This is
especially useful for integrating with existing key management systems and key
formats such as JWK. It is
RECOMMENDED that JWK
kid
values are set to the
public key fingerprint. It is
RECOMMENDED that verification methods that use JWKs to represent their public
keys utilize the value of kid
as their fragment identifier. See the
first key in EXAMPLE 15 for an
example of a public key with a compound key identifier.
All public key properties MUST be registered in the [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
If a public key does not exist in the DID document, it MUST be assumed the key was revoked or is invalid. The DID document MUST NOT express revoked keys using a verification relationship. Each DID method specification is expected to detail how revocation is performed and tracked.
Public keys of all types MUST be expressed in either JSON Web Key (JWK) format
using the publicKeyJwk
property or one of the formats listed in the
table below. Public key expression MUST NOT use any other key format.
The Working Group is still debating whether the base encoding format used will be Base58 (Bitcoin) [BASE58], base64url [RFC7515], or base16 (hex) [RFC4648]. The entries in the table below currently assume PEM and Base58 (Bitcoin), but might change to base64url and/or base16 (hex) after the group achieves consensus on this particular issue.
The Working Group is still debating whether secp256k1 Schnorr public key values will be elaborated upon in this specification and if so, how they will be expressed and encoded.
Key Type | Support |
---|---|
RSA |
RSA public key values MUST either be encoded as a JWK or be encoded in
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format using the publicKeyPem property.
|
ed25519 |
Ed25519 public key values MUST either be encoded as a JWK or be encoded as
the raw 32-byte public key value in Base58 Bitcoin format using the
publicKeyBase58 property.
|
secp256k1-koblitz |
Secp256k1 Koblitz public key values MUST either be encoded as a JWK or be
encoded as the raw 33-byte public key value in Base58 Bitcoin format using the
publicKeyBase58 property.
|
secp256r1 |
Secp256r1 public key values MUST either be encoded as a JWK or be encoded as
the raw 32-byte public key value encoded in Base58 Bitcoin format using the
publicKeyBase58 property.
|
Curve25519 |
Curve25519 (also known as X25519) public key values MUST either be encoded as
a JWK or be encoded as the raw 32-byte public key value in Base58 Bitcoin format
using the publicKeyBase58 property.
|
Example:
{ "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "https://w3id.org/security/v1"], "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", ... "publicKey": [{ "id": "did:example:123#_Qq0UL2Fq651Q0Fjd6TvnYE-faHiOpRlPVQcY_-tA4A", "type": "JwsVerificationKey2020", "controller": "did:example:123", "publicKeyJwk": { "crv": "Ed25519", "x": "VCpo2LMLhn6iWku8MKvSLg2ZAoC-nlOyPVQaO3FxVeQ", "kty": "OKP", "kid": "_Qq0UL2Fq651Q0Fjd6TvnYE-faHiOpRlPVQcY_-tA4A" } }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:pqrstuvwxyz0987654321", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-2", "type": "Secp256k1VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyHex": "02b97c30de767f084ce3080168ee293053ba33b235d7116a3263d29f1450936b71" }], ... }
A key MAY be embedded or referenced in a DID document.
For example, the authentication
property might refer to keys in
both ways, as shown in the example below.
{ ... "authentication": [ // this key is referenced, it may be used with more than one verification relationship "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", // this key is embedded and may *only* be used for authentication { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-2", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" } ], ... }
The steps to use when processing a publicKey
property in a
DID document are:
publicKey
property and initialize result to null
.
publicKey
properties
associated with the URL. For example, process the publicKey
property at the top-level of the dereferenced document.
id
property of the
object matches value, set result to the object.
id
,
type
, and controller
properties, as well as any
mandatory public cryptographic material, as determined by the type
property of result, throw an error.
Caching and expiration of the keys in a DID document is entirely the responsibility of DID resolvers and other clients. For more information, see Section § 8. Resolution .
A verification relationship expresses the relationship between the DID subject and a verification method.
A DID document MAY include a property expressing a specific verification relationship. In order to maximize global interoperability, the property SHOULD be registered in [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
A DID controller MUST be explicit about the verification relationship between the DID subject and the verification method. Verification methods that are not associated with a particular verification relationship MUST NOT be used for that verification relationship. See the sections below for more detailed examples of a verification relationship.
Authentication is a verification relationship which an entity can use to prove it is the DID subject or acting on behalf of the DID Subject as a DID Controller. The verifier of an authentication attempt can check if the authenticating party is presenting a valid proof of authentication, that is, that they are who they say they are. Note that a successful authentication on its own might or might not confer authority; that is up to the verifying application.
If authentication is established, it is up to the DID method or other application to decide what to do with that information. A particular DID method could decide that authenticating as a DID controller is sufficient to, for example, update or delete the DID document. Another DID method could require different keys, or a different verification method entirely, to be presented in order to update or delete the DID document than that used to authenticate. In other words, what is done after the authentication check is out of scope for the DID data model, but DID methods and applications are expected to define this themselves.
A DID document MAY include an authentication
property.
The authentication
property is an example of a verification
relationship.
authentication
property is a relationship between the DID
subject and a set of verification methods (such as, but not limited to,
public keys). It means that the DID subject has authorized some set of
verification methods (per the value of the authentication
property) for the purpose of authentication. The value of the
authentication
property SHOULD be an array of verification
methods. Each verification method MAY be embedded or referenced. An
example of a verification method is a public key
(see Section § 5.3.1 Public Keys).
This statement is useful to any authentication verifier that needs
to check to see if an entity that is attempting to authenticate is, in fact,
presenting a valid proof of authentication. When a verifier receives
some data (in some protocol-specific format) that contains a proof that was
made for the purpose of "authentication", and that says that an entity is
identified by the DID, then that verifier checks to ensure
that the proof can be verified using a verification method (e.g.,
public key) listed under authentication
in the
DID Document.
The verification method indicated by the authentication
property of a DID document can only be used to authenticate the
DID subject. To authenticate the DID controller (in cases
where the DID controller is not also the DID subject)
the entity associated with the value of controller
(see
Section § 5.3.2
Authorization and Delegation
) needs to
authenticate itself with its own DID document and attached
authentication
verification relationship.
Example:
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", ... "authentication": [ // this method can be used to authenticate as did:...fghi "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", // this method can be used to authenticate as did:...fghi "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#biometric-1", // this method is *only* authorized for authentication, it may not // be used for any other proof purpose, so its full description is // embedded here rather than using only a reference { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-2", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" } ], ... }
The assertionMethod
property is used to express a verification
relationship which indicates that a verification method can be
used to assert a statement on behalf of the DID subject. The
verifier of an assertionMethod
attempt can check proof
of a statement asserted on behalf of the DID subject by checking if
the verification method used with the proof is contained in the
assertionMethod
of the DID Document.
If assertionMethod
is established, it is up to the
verifier to validate that the verification method used for
providing proof of an assertion is valid and is associated with the
assertionMethod
verification relationship. An example of
when this property is useful is during the processing of a verifiable
credential by a verifier. During validation, a verifier
checks to see if a verifiable credential has been signed by the DID
Subject by checking that the verification method used to
assert the proof is associated with the assertionMethod
property
in the corresponding DID Document.
A DID document MAY include an assertionMethod
property.
The assertionMethod
property is an example of a verification
relationship.
Example:
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", ... "assertionMethod": [ // this method can be used to assert statements as did:...fghi "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", // this method is *only* authorized for assertion of statements, it may not // be used for any other verification relationship, so its full description is // embedded here rather than using only a reference { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-2", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" } ], } ...
The keyAgreement
property is used to express a
verification relationship which an entity can use to engage in key
agreement protocols on behalf of the DID subject. The
counterparties in a key agreement protocol can use the
keyAgreement
verification relationship to check whether a
party performing a key agreement protocol on behalf of the DID subject
is authorized by checking if the verification method used during the
key agreement protocol is associated with the keyAgreement
property contained in the DID Document.
It is up to a verifier to validate that the verification method
used during a key agreement exchange is valid and is associated with the
keyAgreement
property. An example of when this property is useful
is during the establishment of a TLS session on behalf of the DID
Subject. In this case, the counterparty checks that the verification
method used during the protocol handshake is associated with the
keyAgreement
property in the DID Document.
A DID document MAY include an keyAgreement
property.
The keyAgreement
property is an additional example of a
verification relationship.
Example:
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", ... "keyAgreement": [ // this method can be used to perform key agreement as did:...fghi "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", // this method is *only* authorized for key agreement usage, it may not // be used for any other verification relationship, so its full description is // embedded here rather than using only a reference { "id": "did:example:123#zC9ByQ8aJs8vrNXyDhPHHNNMSHPcaSgNpjjsBYpMMjsTdS", "type": "X25519KeyAgreementKey2019", "controller": "did:example:123", "publicKeyBase58": "9hFgmPVfmBZwRvFEyniQDBkz9LmV7gDEqytWyGZLmDXE" } ], } ...
The capabilityInvocation
property is used to express a
verification relationship which an entity can use to invoke
capabilities as the DID subject or on behalf of the DID subject.
A capability is an expression of an action that the DID subject is
authorized to take. The verifier of a capability invocation attempt
can check the validity of a capability by checking if the
verification method used with the proof is contained in the
capabilityInvocation
property of the DID Document.
It is the responsibility of a verifier to ensure that the
verification method used when presenting a capability is invoked and is
associated with the capabilityInvocation
property. An example of
when this property is useful is when a DID subject chooses to invoke
their capability to start a vehicle through the combined usage of a
verification method and the StartCar
capability. In this
example, the vehicle would be the verifier and would need to verify
that the verification method exists in the
capabilityInvocation
property.
A DID document MAY include an capabilityInvocation
property. The capabilityInvocation
property is an additional
example of a verification relationship.
Example:
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", ... "capabilityInvocation: [ // this method can be used to invoke capabilities as did:...fghi "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", // this method is *only* authorized for capability invocation usage, it may not // be used for any other verification relationship, so its full description is // embedded here rather than using only a reference { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-2", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" } ], } ...
The capabilityDelegation
property is used to express a
verification relationship which an entity can use to grant capabilities
as the DID subject or on behalf of the DID subject to other
capability invokers. The verifier of a
capabilityDelegation
attempt can check the validity of a
capability to grant invocation of a capability by checking if the
verification method used with the proof is contained in the
capabilityDelegation
section of the DID Document.
It is up to a verifier to validate that the verification method
used when presenting a capability is valid and is associated with the
capabilityDelegation
property. An example of when this property
is useful is when a DID Subject chooses to grant their capability to
start a vehicle through the combined usage of a verification method and
the StartCar
capability to a capability invoker.
A DID document MAY include an capabilityDelegation
property. The capabilityDelegation
property is an additional
example of a verification relationship.
Example:
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", ... "capabilityDelegation": [ // this method can be used to perform capabilty delegation as did:...fghi "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1", // this method is *only* authorized for granting capabilities it may not // be used for any other verification relationship, so its full description is // embedded here rather than using only a reference { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-2", "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2018", "controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi", "publicKeyBase58": "H3C2AVvLMv6gmMNam3uVAjZpfkcJCwDwnZn6z3wXmqPV" } ], } ...
Service endpoints are used in DID documents to express ways of communicating with the DID subject or associated entities. Services listed in the DID document can contain information about privacy preserving messaging services, or more public information, such as social media accounts, personal websites, and email addresses although this is discouraged. See § 10.1 Keep Personally-Identifiable Information (PII) Private for additional details. The metadata associated with services are often service-specific. For example, the metadata associated with an encrypted messaging service can express how to initiate the encrypted link before messaging begins.
Pointers to services are expressed using the service
property.
Each service has its own id
and type
, as well as a
serviceEndpoint
with a URI or other properties describing
the service.
One of the primary purposes of a DID document is to enable discovery of service endpoints. A service endpoint can be any type of service the DID subject wants to advertise, including decentralized identity management services for further discovery, authentication, authorization, or interaction.
A DID document MAY include a service
property.
service
property, the value of
the property SHOULD be an array of service endpoint objects. Each
service endpoint MUST have id
, type
, and
serviceEndpoint
properties, and MAY include additional properties.
The value of the id
property MUST be a URI.
The array of service endpoints MUST NOT contain multiple entries
with the same id
. In this case, a DID document processor
MUST produce an error.
The value of the serviceEndpoint
property MUST be a JSON-LD object
or a valid URI conforming to [RFC3986] and normalized according to the
rules in section 6 of [RFC3986] and to any normalization rules in its
applicable URI scheme specification.
It is expected that the service endpoint protocol is published in an open standard specification.
{ "service": [{ "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#openid", "type": "OpenIdConnectVersion1.0Service", "serviceEndpoint": "https://openid.example.com/" }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#vcr", "type": "CredentialRepositoryService", "serviceEndpoint": "https://repository.example.com/service/8377464" }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#xdi", "type": "XdiService", "serviceEndpoint": "https://xdi.example.com/8377464" }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#agent", "type": "AgentService", "serviceEndpoint": "https://agent.example.com/8377464" }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#hub", "type": "IdentityHub", "publicKey": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1", "serviceEndpoint": { "@context": "https://schema.identity.foundation/hub", "type": "UserHubEndpoint", "instances": ["did:example:456", "did:example:789"] } }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#messages", "type": "MessagingService", "serviceEndpoint": "https://example.com/messages/8377464" }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#inbox", "type": "SocialWebInboxService", "serviceEndpoint": "https://social.example.com/83hfh37dj", "description": "My public social inbox", "spamCost": { "amount": "0.50", "currency": "USD" } }, { "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#authpush", "type": "DidAuthPushModeVersion1", "serviceEndpoint": "http://auth.example.com/did:example:123456789abcdefg" }] }
For more information about security considerations regarding authentication service endpoints see Sections § 7.1 Method Schemes and § 5.3.3.1 authentication.
A DID document SHOULD include a created
property.
created
property, the value of
the property MUST be a valid XML datetime value, as defined in section 3.3.7 of
W3C XML Schema Definition
Language (XSD) 1.1 Part 2: Datatypes [XMLSCHEMA11-2]. This datetime value
MUST be normalized to UTC 00:00, as indicated by the trailing "Z".
{ "created": "2002-10-10T17:00:00Z" }
Standard metadata for identifier records includes a timestamp of the most recent change.
A DID document SHOULD include an updated
property.
updated
property, the value of
the property MUST follow the same formatting rules as the created
property, as outlined in Section § 5.5 Created.
{ "updated": "2016-10-17T02:41:00Z" }
All concrete representations of a DID document MUST be serialized using a deterministic mapping that is able to be unambiguously parsed into the data model defined in this specification. All serialization methods MUST define rules for the bidirectional translation of a DID document both into and out of the representation in question. As a consequence, translation between any two representations MUST be done by parsing the source format into a DID document model (described in Sections § 4. Data Model and § 5. Core Properties) and then serializing the DID document model into the target representation. An implementation MUST NOT convert between representations without first parsing to a DID document model.
Although syntactic mappings are provided for JSON, JSON-LD, and CBOR here, applications and services MAY use any other data representation syntax that is capable of expressing the data model, such as XML or YAML.
Producers MUST indicate which representation of a document has been used via a
media type in the document's metadata. Consumers MUST determine which
representation a document is in via the content-type
DID resolver
metadata field. (See § 8.1
DID Resolution
). Consumers MUST NOT
determine the representation of a document through its content alone.
This requirement depends on the return of DID document metadata that still needs to be defined by this specification. Once defined, that should be linked from here.
The production and consumption rules in this section apply to all implementations seeking to be fully compatible with independent implementations of the specification. Deployments of this specification MAY use a custom agreed-upon representation, including localized rules for handling properties not listed in the registry. See section § 4.3 Extensibility for more information.
A link to a section on extensibility and conformance as it applies to data representations should be added here once that section has been written.
When producing and consuming DID documents that are in plain JSON (as indicated
by a content-type
of application/did+json
in the
resolver metadata), the following rules MUST be followed.
A DID document MUST be a single JSON object conforming to [RFC8259]. All top-level properties of the DID document MUST be represented by using the property name as the name of the member of the JSON object. The values of properties of the data model described in Section § 4. Data Model, including all extensions, MUST be encoded in JSON [RFC8259] by mapping property values to JSON types as follows:
In this section we use the term "property name" to refer to the string that represents the property itself, but this specification still needs to define a concrete term for such aspects of a property of a DID document.
An "empty" value is not specified by this document. It seems to imply a null value, but this is unclear.
All properties of the DID document MUST be included in the root object. Properties MAY define additional data sub structures subject to the value representation rules in the list above.
The member name @context
MUST NOT be used as this property is
reserved for JSON-LD producers.
In this section and we use the term "property name" to refer to the string that represents the property itself, but this specification still needs to define a concrete term for such aspects of a property of a DID document. We also need a concrete term for "the document itself" as opposed to "the collection or properties of the document".
The top-level element MUST be a JSON object. Any other data type at the top level is an error and MUST be rejected. The top-level JSON object represents the DID document, and all members of this object are properties of the DID document. The object member name is the property name, and the member value is interpreted as follows:
An "empty" value is not specified by this document. It seems to imply a null value, but this is unclear.
The value of the @context
object member MUST be ignored as this is
reserved for JSON-LD consumers.
Unknown object member names MUST be ignored as unknown properties.
This specification needs to define clear and consistent rules for how to handle unknown data members on consumption, and this section needs to be updated with that decision.
[JSON-LD] is a JSON-based format used to serialize Linked Data.
When producing and consuming DID documents that are in JSON-LD (as indicated by
a content-type
of application/did+ld+json
in the
resolver metadata), the following rules MUST be followed.
@id
and @type
keywords are aliased to
id
and type
respectively, enabling developers to use
this specification as idiomatic JSON.
id
MUST be a valid DID and not any other kind of IRI.
The DID document is serialized following the rules in the JSON processor,
with one addition: DID documents MUST include the @context
property.
@context
property MUST be one or more URIs,
where the value of the first URI is
https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1
. All members of the
@context
property MUST exist be in the DID properties extension
registry.
This specification defines globally interoperable documents, and the requirement that the context value be in the verifiable data registry means that different JSON-LD processors can consume the document without having to dereference anything in the context field. However, a pair of producers and consumers can have local extension agreements. This needs to be clarified in a section on extensibility and linked here when available.
The top-level element MUST be a JSON object. Any other data type at the top
level is an error and MUST be rejected. This top-level JSON object is
interpreted using JSON-LD processing under the rules of the defined
@context
fields.
@context
property MUST be one or more URIs,
where the value of the first URI is
https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1
. If more than one URI is
provided, the URIs MUST be interpreted as an ordered set. It is
RECOMMENDED that dereferencing each URI results in a document containing
machine-readable information about the context.
Unknown object member names MUST be ignored as unknown properties.
This specification needs to define clear and consistent rules for how to handle unknown data members on consumption, and this section needs to be updated with that decision.
Like Javascript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259], Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] defines a set of formatting rules for the portable representation of structured data. CBOR is a more concise, machine-readable, language-independent data interchange format that is self-describing and has built-in semantics for interoperability. With specific constraints, CBOR can support all JSON data types (including JSON-LD) for translation between the DID document model (described in Data Model and DID Documents) and other core representations.
Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610] is a notation used to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and by extension JSON Data Structures. The following notation expresses the DID Document model in CBOR representation with specific constraints for deterministic mappings between other core representations.
DID-document = { ? @context : uri id : did ? publicKey : [* publicKey ] ? authentication : [ *did // *publicKey // *tstr ] ? service : [ + service ] ? controller : did / [ *did ] ? created : time ? updated : time proof : any } publicKey = { id : did type : text controller : uri } did = tstr .pcre "^did\\:(?<method-name>[a-z0-9]{2,})\\:(?<method-specific-id>[A-Za-z0-9\\.\\-\\:\\_]+)" did-url = tstr .pcre "^did\\:(?<method-name>[a-z0-9]{2,})\\:(?<method-specific-id>[A-Za-z0-9\\.\\-\\:\\_]+)\\;(?<path>[A-Za-z0-9\\/)(?<query>\\?[a-z0-9\\=\\&])#(?<fragment>.+)" service = { id : did-url type : text serviceEndpoint : uri ? description : text * tstr => any }
When producing DID Documents that are represented as CBOR, in addition to the suggestions in section 3.9 of the CBOR [RFC7049] specification for deterministic mappings, the following constraints of the DID Document model MUST be followed:
a7 # map(7) 62 # text(2) 6964 # "id" 78 40 # text(64) 6469643a6578616d706c653a31324433 # "did:example:12D3" 4b6f6f574d4864727a6377706a626472 # "KooWMHdrzcwpjbdr" 5a733547477145524176636771583362 # "Zs5GGqERAvcgqX3b" 3564707550745061396f743639796577 # "5dpuPtPa9ot69yew" 65 # text(5) 70726f6f66 # "proof" a4 # map(4) 64 # text(4) 74797065 # "type" 74 # text(20) 656432353531395369676e617475726532303138 # "ed25519Signature2018" 67 # text(7) 63726561746564 # "created" 74 # text(20) 323032302d30352d30315430333a30303a30325a # "2020-05-01T03:00:02Z" 67 # text(7) 63726561746f72 # "creator" 78 8c # text(140) 6469643a6578616d706c653a31324433 # "did:example:12D3" 4b6f6f574d4864727a6377706a626472 # "KooWMHdrzcwpjbdr" 5a733547477145524176636771583362 # "Zs5GGqERAvcgqX3b" 3564707550745061396f743639796577 # "5dpuPtPa9ot69yew" 3b206578616d706c653a6b65793d6964 # "; example:key=id" 3d626166797265696375627478357771 # "=bafyreicubtx5wq" 6f336e6f73633463617a726b63746668 # "o3nosc4cazrkctfh" 776436726577657a6770776f65347377 # "wd6rewezgpwoe4sw" 69726c733465626468733269 # "irls4ebdhs2i" 6e # text(14) 7369676e617475726556616c7565 # "signatureValue" 78 58 # text(88) 6f3972364c78676f474e38466f616565 # "o9r6LxgoGN8Foaee" 554136456444637631324776447a4645 # "UA6EdDcv12GvDzFE" 6d43676a577a76707572325953517941 # "mCgjWzvpur2YSQyA" 3857327230535357554b2b6e4835744d # "8W2r0SSWUK+nH5tM" 717a61464c756e3677775a31456f7433 # "qzaFLun6wwZ1Eot3" 37616d4744673d3d # "7amGDg==" 67 # text(7) 63726561746564 # "created" 74 # text(20) 323031382d31322d30315430333a30303a30305a # "2018-12-01T03:00:00Z" 67 # text(7) 75706461746564 # "updated" 74 # text(20) 323032302d30352d30315430333a30303a30305a # "2020-05-01T03:00:00Z" 68 # text(8) 40636f6e74657874 # "@context" 78 1c # text(28) 68747470733a2f2f7777772e77332e6f # "https://www.w3.o" 72672f6e732f6469642f7631 # "rg/ns/did/v1" 69 # text(9) 7075626c69634b6579 # "publicKey" 81 # array(1) a5 # map(5) 62 # text(2) 6964 # "id" 78 85 # text(133) 6261667972656963756274783577716f # "bafyreicubtx5wqo" 336e6f73633463617a726b6374666877 # "3nosc4cazrkctfhw" 6436726577657a6770776f6534737769 # "d6rewezgpwoe4swi" 726c7334656264687332693b6578616d # "rls4ebdhs2i;exam" 706c653a6b65793d6964626166797265 # "ple:key=idbafyre" 6963756274783577716f336e6f736334 # "icubtx5wqo3nosc4" 63617a726b6374666877643672657765 # "cazrkctfhwd6rewe" 7a6770776f6534737769726c73346562 # "zgpwoe4swirls4eb" 6468733269 # "dhs2i" 64 # text(4) 74797065 # "type" 6e # text(14) 45644473615075626c69634b6579 # "EdDsaPublicKey" 65 # text(5) 6375727665 # "curve" 67 # text(7) 65643235353139 # "ed25519" 67 # text(7) 65787069726573 # "expires" 74 # text(20) 323031392d31322d30315430333a30303a30305a # "2019-12-01T03:00:00Z" 6f # text(15) 7075626c69634b6579426173653634 # "publicKeyBase64" 78 2c # text(44) 716d7a3774704c4e4b4b4b646c376344 # "qmz7tpLNKKKdl7cD" 375062656a4469425670374f4e706d5a # "7PbejDiBVp7ONpmZ" 62666d633763454b396d673d # "bfmc7cEK9mg=" 6e # text(14) 61757468656e7469636174696f6e # "authentication" 81 # array(1) 78 83 # text(131) 6469643a6578616d706c653a31324433 # "did:example:12D3" 4b6f6f574d4864727a6377706a626472 # "KooWMHdrzcwpjbdr" 5a733547477145524176636771583362 # "Zs5GGqERAvcgqX3b" 3564707550745061396f743639796577 # "5dpuPtPa9ot69yew" 3b6b65792d69643d6261667972656963 # ";key-id=bafyreic" 756274783577716f336e6f7363346361 # "ubtx5wqo3nosc4ca" 7a726b63746668776436726577657a67 # "zrkctfhwd6rewezg" 70776f6534737769726c733465626468 # "pwoe4swirls4ebdh" 733269 # "s2i"
When consuming DID Documents that are represented as CBOR, in addition to the suggestions in section 3.9 of the CBOR [RFC7049] specification for deterministic mappings the following constraints of the DID Document model MUST be followed:
In CBOR, one point of extensibility is with the use of CBOR tags. [RFC7049] defines a basic set of data types, as well as a tagging mechanism that enables extending the set of data types supported via the CBOR Tag Registry. This allows for tags to enhance the semantic description of the data that follows.
DagCBOR is a further restricted subset of CBOR for representing the DID Document as a Directed Acyclic Graph model using canonical CBOR encoding as noted above with additional constraits. DagCBOR requires that there exist a single way of encoding any given object, and that encoded forms contain no superfluous data that may be ignored or lost in a round-trip decode/encode. When producing and consuming DID Documents representing in DagCBOR the following rules MUST be followed
{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "authentication": [ "did:example:12D3KooWMHdrzcwpjbdrZs5GGqERAvcgqX3b5dpuPtPa9ot69yew;key-id=bafyreicubtx5wqo3nosc4cazrkctfhwd6rewezgpwoe4swirls4ebdhs2i" ], "created": "2018-12-01T03:00:00Z", "id": "did:example:12D3KooWMHdrzcwpjbdrZs5GGqERAvcgqX3b5dpuPtPa9ot69yew", "proof": { "created": "2020-05-01T03:00:02Z", "creator": "did:example:12D3KooWMHdrzcwpjbdrZs5GGqERAvcgqX3b5dpuPtPa9ot69yew; example:key=id=bafyreicubtx5wqo3nosc4cazrkctfhwd6rewezgpwoe4swirls4ebdhs2i", "signatureValue": "o9r6LxgoGN8FoaeeUA6EdDcv12GvDzFEmCgjWzvpur2YSQyA8W2r0SSWUK+nH5tMqzaFLun6wwZ1Eot37amGDg==", "type": "ed25519Signature2018" }, "publicKey": [ { "curve": "ed25519", "expires": "2019-12-01T03:00:00Z", "id": "bafyreicubtx5wqo3nosc4cazrkctfhwd6rewezgpwoe4swirls4ebdhs2i;example:key=idbafyreicubtx5wqo3nosc4cazrkctfhwd6rewezgpwoe4swirls4ebdhs2i", "publicKeyBase64": "qmz7tpLNKKKdl7cD7PbejDiBVp7ONpmZbfmc7cEK9mg=", "type": "EdDsaPublicKey" } ], "updated": "2020-05-01T03:00:00Z" }
A DID Document proof may be constructed using CBOR semantic tagging, such as tag 98 for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152]
D8 62 # tag(98) 67 # text(7) 7061796c6f6164 # "payload" d8 2a # tag(42) 58 25 # bytes(37) 00017112206c8fdc5c3d2302dda95034 # "\x00\x01q\x12 l\x8f\xdc\\=#\x02\xdd\xa9P4" f9de57a8591918ecb7d7789387c547f7 # "\xf9\xdeW\xa8Y\x19\x18\xec\xb7\xd7x\x93\x87\xc5G\xf7" a89d05e72f # "\xa8\x9d\x05\xe7/" 69 # text(9) 70726f746563746564 # "protected" a0 # map(0) 6a # text(10) 7369676e617475726573 # "signatures" 81 # array(1) a3 # map(3) 69 # text(9) 70726f746563746564 # "protected" 66 # text(6) 613130313236 # "a10126" 69 # text(9) 7369676e6174757265 # "signature" 78 80 # text(128) 65326165616664343064363964313964 # "e2aeafd40d69d19d" 66653665353230373763356437666634 # "fe6e52077c5d7ff4" 65343038323832636265666235643036 # "e408282cbefb5d06" 63626634313461663265313964393832 # "cbf414af2e19d982" 61633435616339386238353434633930 # "ac45ac98b8544c90" 38623435303764653165393062373137 # "8b4507de1e90b717" 63336433343831366665393236613262 # "c3d34816fe926a2b" 39386635336166643266613066333061 # "98f53afd2fa0f30a" 6b # text(11) 756e70726f746563746564 # "unprotected" a1 # map(1) 63 # text(3) 6b6964 # "kid" 78 85 # text(133) 6469643a697069643a313244334b6f6f # "did:ipid:12D3Koo" 574d4864727a6377706a6264725a7335 # "WMHdrzcwpjbdrZs5" 47477145524176636771583362356470 # "GGqERAvcgqX3b5dp" 7550745061396f7436397965773b6970 # "uPtPa9ot69yew;ip" 69643a6b65792d69643d626166797265 # "id:key-id=bafyre" 6963756274783577716f336e6f736334 # "icubtx5wqo3nosc4" 63617a726b6374666877643672657765 # "cazrkctfhwd6rewe" 7a6770776f6534737769726c73346562 # "zgpwoe4swirls4eb" 6468733269 # "dhs2i" 6b # text(11) 756e70726f746563746564 # "unprotected" a0 # tag(0)
A DID method specification MUST define exactly one method-specific
DID scheme, identified by exactly one method name. For more information,
see the method-name
rule in Section
§ 3.1.1 Generic DID Syntax.
Because the method name is part of the DID, short method names are preferred; the method name SHOULD be five characters or less. The method name might reflect the name of the verifiable data registry to which the DID method specification applies. For more information, see Section § 7.1 Method Schemes.
The DID method specification for the method-specific DID scheme
MUST specify how to generate the method-specific-id
component of a
DID. The method-specific-id
value MUST be able to be
generated without the use of a centralized registry service. The
method-specific-id
value SHOULD be globally unique by itself. The
DID, as defined by the did
rule in Section
§ 3.1.1 Generic DID Syntax, MUST be globally unique.
If needed, a method-specific DID scheme MAY define multiple
method-specific-id
formats. It is RECOMMENDED that a
method-specific DID scheme define as few method-specific-id
formats as possible.
The method-specific-id
format MAY include colons, which might be
used by DID methods for various purposes, such as establishing
hierarchically partitioned namespaces, or identifying specific instances or
parts of the verifiable data registry. The use of colons MUST comply
syntactically with the method-specific-id
ABNF rule and their use
is entirely method-specific. Implementers are advised to avoid
assuming any meanings or behaviors associated with a colon that are
generically applicable to all DID methods.
The authors of a new DID method specification SHOULD use a method name that is unique among all DID method names known to them at the time of publication.
Because there is no central authority for allocating or approving DID method names, there is no way to know for certain if a specific DID method name is unique. To help with this challenge, a non-authoritative list of known DID method names and their associated specifications is maintained in the DID Methods Registry, which is part of [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
The DID Methods Registry is a tool for implementors to use when coming to consensus on a new method name, as well as an informative reference for software developers implementing DID resolvers for different DID methods. For more information about DID resolvers see Section § 8. Resolution . The DID Method Registry is not a definitive or official list of DID methods. Nonetheless, adding DID method names to the DID Method Registry is encouraged so that other implementors and members of the community have a place to see an overview of existing DID methods. The lightweight criteria for inclusion are documented in [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES].
To enable the full functionality of DIDs and DID documents on a particular verifiable data registry, a DID method specification MUST specify how a client might be used to perform the create, read, update, and deactivate operations. Each operation ought to be specified to the level of detail necessary to build and test interoperable client implementations. In the event that an operation is not supported, such as update or deactivate, then it is RECOMMENDED that the DID Method specification state that it is not supported. These operations can be used to perform all the operations required of a cryptographic key management system (CKMS), e.g.: key registration, key replacement, key rotation, key recovery, and key expiration.
Determining the authority of a party to carry out the operations is method-specific. For example, a DID method MAY:
The DID method specification MUST specify how a client creates a DID and its associated DID document on the verifiable data registry, including all cryptographic operations necessary to establish proof of control.
The DID method specification MUST specify how a client uses a DID to request a DID document from the verifiable data registry, including how the client can verify the authenticity of the response.
The DID method specification MUST specify how a client can update a DID document on the verifiable data registry, including all cryptographic operations necessary to establish proof of control, or state that updates are not possible.
An update to a DID is any change, after creation, in the data used to produce a DID document. DID Method implementers are responsible for defining what constitutes an update, and what properties of the DID document are supported by a given DID method. For example, an update operation which replaces key material without changing it could be a valid update that does not result in changes to the DID document.
The DID method specification MUST specify how a client can deactivate a DID on the verifiable data registry, including all cryptographic operations necessary to establish proof of deactivation, or state that deactivation is not possible.
Interoperability for DID methods will be determined by evaluating each DID method specification to determine, at a minimum, that the:
DID method specifications MUST include their own Security Considerations sections. This section MUST consider all the requirements mentioned in section 5 of [RFC3552] (page 27) for the DID operations defined in the specification.
At least the following forms of attack MUST be considered: eavesdropping, replay, message insertion, deletion, modification, and man-in-the-middle. Potential denial of service attacks MUST be identified as well.
If the protocol incorporates cryptographic protection mechanisms, the DID method specification MUST clearly indicate which portions of the data are protected and what the protections are, and SHOULD give an indication to what sorts of attacks the cryptographic protection is susceptible. For example, integrity only, confidentiality, endpoint authentication, and so on.
Data which is to be held secret (keying material, random seeds, and so on) SHOULD be clearly labeled.
If the technology involves authentication, particularly user-host authentication, the security of the authentication method MUST be clearly specified.
This section MUST discuss, per Section 5 of [RFC3552], residual risks (such as the risks from compromise in a related protocol, incorrect implementation, or cipher) after threat mitigation was deployed.
This section MUST provide integrity protection and update authentication for all operations required by Section § 7.2 Method Operations.
Where DID methods make use of peer-to-peer computing resources, such as with all known DLTs, the expected burdens of those resources SHOULD be discussed in relation to denial of service.
Method-specific endpoint authentication MUST be discussed. Where DID methods make use of DLTs with varying network topology, sometimes offered as light node or thin client implementations to reduce required computing resources, the security assumptions of the topology available to implementations of the DID method MUST be discussed.
DID methods MUST discuss the policy mechanism by which DIDs are proven to be uniquely assigned. A DID fits the functional definition of a URN, as defined in [RFC8141]. That is, a DID is a persistent identifier that is assigned once to a resource and never reassigned to a different resource. This is particularly important in a security context because a DID might be used to identify a specific party subject to a specific set of authorization rights.
DID methods that introduce new authentication service endpoint types (see Section § 5.4 Service Endpoints) SHOULD consider the security requirements of the supported authentication protocol.
DID method specifications MUST include their own Privacy Considerations sections, if only to point to § 10. Privacy Considerations .
The DID method specification's Privacy Considerations section MUST discuss any subsection of section 5 of [RFC6973] that could apply in a method-specific manner. The subsections to consider are: surveillance, stored data compromise, unsolicited traffic, misattribution, correlation, identification, secondary use, disclosure, exclusion.
This section defines the inputs and outputs of DID resolution and DID URL dereferencing. These functions are defined in an abstract way. Their exact implementation is out of scope for this specification, but some considerations for implementors are discussed in [DID-RESOLUTION].
All conformant DID resolvers MUST implement the DID resolution function for at least one DID method and MUST be able to return a DID document in at least one conformant representation.
The DID resolution function resolves a DID into a DID document by using the "Read" operation of the applicable DID method. (See § 7.2.2 Read/Verify .) The details of how this process is accomplished are outside the scope of this specification, but all conformant implementations MUST implement a function which has the following abstract form:
resolve ( did, did-resolution-input-metadata )
-> ( did-resolution-metadata, did-document-stream, did-document-metadata )
The input variables of this function MUST be as follows:
resolve
function in addition to the did
itself. This input is REQUIRED, but the structure MAY be empty.
The output variables of this function MUST be as follows:
resolve
function as it represents data about the
resolution process itself.
resolve
function
into a DID document abstract data model, which can in turn be validated
and processed. If the resolution is unsuccessful, this value MUST be an empty
stream.
did-document-stream
. This metadata typically does not change
between invocations of the resolve
function unless the DID
document changes, as it represents data about the DID document. If
the resolution is unsuccessful, this output MUST be an empty metadata structure.
DID resolver implementations MUST NOT alter the signature of this
function in any way. DID resolver implementations MAY map the
resolve
function to a method-specific internal function to perform
the actual DID resolution process. DID resolver implementations
MAY implement and expose additional
functions with different signatures in addition to the resolve
function specified here.
This section is non-normative.
During the Working Draft stage, this section focuses on security topics that should be important in early implementations. The editors are seeking feedback on threats and threat mitigations that should be reflected in this section or elsewhere in the spec. DIDs are designed to operate under the general Internet threat model used by many IETF standards. We assume uncompromised endpoints, but anticipate that messages could be read or corrupted on the network. Protecting against an attack when a system is compromised requires external key-signing hardware (see Section § 9.7 Key Revocation and Recovery ).
The DID Method Registry (see [DID-SPEC-REGISTRIES] is an informative list of DID method names and their corresponding DID method specifications. Implementors need to bear in mind that there is no central authority to mandate which DID method specification is to be used with any specific DID method name, but can use the DID Method Registry to make an informed decision when choosing which DID resolver implementations to use.
The following sections describe binding identities to DIDs and DID documents.
Signatures and verifiable timestamps allow DID documents to be cryptographically verifiable.
By itself, a verified signature on a self-signed DID document does not prove control of a DID. It only proves that the:
Proving control of a DID, that is, the binding between the DID and the DID document that describes it, requires a two step process:
id
property of the resulting DID document
matches the DID that was resolved.
It should be noted that this process proves control of a DID and DID document regardless of whether the DID document is signed.
Signatures on DID documents are optional. DID method specifications SHOULD explain and specify their implementation if applicable.
There are two methods for proving control of the private key corresponding to a public key description in the DID document: static and dynamic.
The static method is to sign the DID document with the private key. This proves control of the private key at a time no later than the DID document was registered. If the DID document is not signed, control of a public key described in the DID document can still be proven dynamically as follows:
A DID and DID document do not inherently carry any PII (personally-identifiable information). The process of binding a DID to something in the real world, such as a person or a company, for example with credentials with the same subject as that DID, is out of scope for this specification. For more information, see the [VC-DATA-MODEL] instead.
If a DID document publishes a service endpoint intended for authentication or authorization of the DID subject (see Section § 5.4 Service Endpoints), it is the responsibility of the service endpoint provider, subject, or relying party to comply with the requirements of the authentication protocols supported at that service endpoint.
Non-repudiation of DIDs and DID document updates is supported under the assumption that the subject:
Non-repudiation is further supported if timestamps are included (see Sections § 5.5 Created and § 5.6 Updated) and the target DLT system supports timestamps.
One mitigation against unauthorized changes to a DID document is monitoring and actively notifying the DID subject when there are changes. This is analogous to helping prevent account takeover on conventional username/password accounts by sending password reset notifications to the email addresses on file.
In the case of a DID, there is no intermediary registrar or account provider to generate such notifications. However, if the verifiable data registry on which the DID is registered directly supports change notifications, a subscription service can be offered to DID controllers. Notifications could be sent directly to the relevant service endpoints listed in an existing DID.
If a DID controller chooses to rely on a third-party monitoring service (other than the verifiable data registry itself), this introduces another vector of attack.
In a decentralized identifier architecture, there are no centralized authorities to enforce key or signature expiration policies. Therefore DID resolvers and other client applications need to validate that keys were not expired at the time they were used. Because some use cases might have legitimate reasons why already-expired keys can be extended, make sure a key expiration does not prevent any further use of the key, and implementations of a resolver ought to be compatible with such extension behavior.
Section § 7.2 Method Operations specifies the DID operations to be supported by a DID method specification, including deactivation of a DID document by replacing it with an updated DID document. It is also up to the DID method to define how revocation of cryptographic keys might occur. Additionally, DID method specifications are also expected to enable support for a quorum of trusted parties to enable key recovery. Some of the facilities to do so are suggested in Section § 5.3.2 Authorization and Delegation . Not all DID method specifications will recognize control from DIDs registered using other DID methods and they might restrict third-party control to DIDs that use the same method. Access control and key recovery in a DID method specification can also include a time lock feature to protect against key compromise by maintaining a second track of control for recovery. Further specification of this type of control is a matter for future work.
DIDs achieve global uniqueness without the need for a central registration authority. This comes, however, at the cost of human memorability. The algorithms capable of generating globally unique identifiers automatically produce random strings of characters that have no human meaning. This demonstrates the axiom about identifiers described in Zooko's Triangle: "human-meaningful, decentralized, secure — pick any two".
There are of course many use cases where it is desirable to discover a DID when starting from a human-friendly identifier. For example, a natural language name, a domain name, or a conventional address for a DID controller, such as a mobile telephone number, email address, Twitter handle, or blog URL. However, the problem of mapping human-friendly identifiers to DIDs (and doing so in a way that can be verified and trusted) is outside the scope of this specification.
Solutions to this problem (and there are many) should be defined in separate specifications that reference this specification. It is strongly recommended that such specifications carefully consider the:
Many cybersecurity abuses hinge on exploiting gaps between reality and the assumptions of rational, good-faith actors. Like any ecosystem, the DID ecosystem has some potential for this to occur. Because this specification is focused on a data model instead of a protocol, it offers no opinion about many aspects of how that model is put to use. However, individual DID methods might want to consider constraints that would eliminate behaviors or semantics they do not need. The more locked down a DID method is, while providing the same set of features, the less it can be manipulated by malicious actors.
As an example, consider the flexibility that the data model offers with respect
to updating. A single edit to a DID document can change anything and
everything except the root id
property of the document. And any
individual JSON object in the data model can change all of its properties except
its id
. But is it actually desirable for a service endpoint
to change its type
after it is defined? Or for a key to change its
value? Or would it be better to require a new id
when certain
fundamental properties of an object change? Malicious takeovers of a web site
often aim for an outcome where the site keeps its identifier (the host name),
but gets subtle, dangerous changes underneath. If certain properties of the site
were required by the specification to be immutable (for example, the
ASN
associated with its IP address), such attacks might be much harder and more
expensive to carry out, and anomaly detection would be easier.
The notion that immutability provides some cybersecurity benefits is particularly relevant because of caching. For DID methods tied to a global source of truth, a direct, just-in-time lookup of the latest version of a DID document is always possible. However, it seems likely that layers of cache might eventually sit between a client and that source of truth. If they do, believing the attributes of an object in the DID document to have a given state, when they are actually subtly different, might invite exploits. This is particularly true if some lookups are of a full DID document, and others are of partial data, where the larger context is assumed.
DID documents are typically publicly available. Encryption algorithms have been known to fail due to advances in cryptography and computing power. Implementers are advised to assume that any encrypted data placed in a DID document might eventually be made available in clear text to the same audience to which the encrypted data is available.
Encrypting all or parts of DID documents is not an appropriate means to protect data in the long term. Similarly, placing encrypted data in DID documents is not an appropriate means to include personally identifiable information.
Given the caveats above, if encrypted data is included in a DID document, implementers are advised to not encrypt with the public keys of entities that do not wish to be correlated with the DID.
This section is non-normative.
It is critically important to apply the principles of Privacy by Design to all aspects of the decentralized identifier architecture, because DIDs and DID documents are, by design, administered directly by the DID controller(s). There is no registrar, hosting company, or other intermediate service provider to recommend or apply additional privacy safeguards. The authors of this specification have applied all seven Privacy by Design principles throughout its development. For example, privacy in this specification is preventative not remedial, and privacy is an embedded default. Furthermore, the decentralized identifier architecture by itself embodies principle #7, "Respect for user privacy — keep it user-centric."
This section lists additional privacy considerations that implementers, delegates, and DID subjects should keep in mind.
If a DID method specification is written for a public verifiable data registry where all DIDs and DID documents are publicly available, it is critical that DID documents contain no personal data. All personal data should be kept behind service endpoints under the control of the DID subject. Additional due diligence should be taken around the use of URLs in service endpoints as well to prevent leakage of unintentional personal data or correlation within a URL of a service endpoint. For example, a URL that contains a username is likely dangerous to include in a DID Document because the username is likely to be human-meaningful in a way that can unintentionally reveal information that the DID subject did not consent to sharing. With this privacy architecture, personal data can be exchanged on a private, peer-to-peer basis using communications channels identified and secured by public key descriptions in DID documents. This also enables DID subjects and relying parties to implement the GDPR right to be forgotten, because no personal data is written to an immutable distributed ledger.
Like any type of globally unique identifier, DIDs might be used for correlation. DID controllers can mitigate this privacy risk by using pairwise unique DIDs, that is, sharing a different private DID for every relationship. In effect, each DID acts as a pseudonym. A pseudonymous DID need only be shared with more than one party when the DID subject explicitly authorizes correlation between those parties. If pseudonymous DIDs are the default, then the only need for a public DID (a DID published openly or shared with a large number of parties) is when the DID subject explicitly desires public identification.
The anti-correlation protections of pseudonymous DIDs are easily defeated if the data in the corresponding DID documents can be correlated. For example, using same public key descriptions or bespoke service endpoints in multiple DID documents can provide as much correlation information as using the same DID. Therefore the DID document for a pseudonymous DID also needs to use pairwise unique public keys. It might seem natural to also use pairwise unique service endpoints in the DID document for a pseudonymous DID. However, unique endpoints allow all traffic between two DIDs to be isolated perfectly into unique buckets, where timing correlation and similar analysis is easy. Therefore, a better strategy for endpoint privacy might be to share an endpoint among thousands or millions of DIDs controlled by many different subjects.
When a DID subject is indistinguishable from others in the herd, privacy is available. When the act of engaging privately with another party is by itself a recognizable flag, privacy is greatly diminished. DIDs and DID methods need to work to improve herd privacy, particularly for those who legitimately need it most. Choose technologies and human interfaces that default to preserving anonymity and pseudonymity. To reduce digital fingerprints, share common settings across client implementations, keep negotiated options to a minimum on wire protocols, use encrypted transport layers, and pad messages to standard lengths.
The list of issues below are under active discussion and are likely to result in changes to this specification.
This section will be submitted to the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) for review, approval, and registration with IANA when this specification becomes a W3C Proposed Recommendation.
Fragment identifiers used with application/did+json are treated according to the rules defined in DID Core v1.0, Fragment [DID-CORE].
Fragment identifiers used with application/did+ld+json are treated according to the rules associated with the JSON-LD 1.1: application/ld+json media type [JSON-LD11].
Fragment identifiers used with application/did+cbor are treated according to the rules defined in DID Core v1.0, Fragment [DID-CORE].
Fragment identifiers used with application/did+cbor are treated according to the rules defined in DID Core v1.0, Fragment [DID-CORE].