Strong Authentication and Identity, day 2

11 Dec 2018



jfontana, JoeAndrieu, burn, Brent_Zundel, ChristopherA, kimhd, weiler, hober, aaronpk, achughes, Karen, Shigeya, Suzuki


<wseltzer> Slides compendium: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1vnlhkrLUe7yap6g7-cBvkQIHL_NphUr7

Introduction, Day 2

<scribe> scribe: manu

wseltzer: Welcome back everyone, we're tracking all input, we're going to start our day 2 of the workshop.
... We have taken cards from yesterday into questions/statements and we're going to do dot voting on those... Kaliya will explain what we're doing next.
... Great agenda of additional talks/breakouts - exploring cultural perspectives, avoiding mistakes/minefields, breakouts discussing ideas, one of our goals it to help W3C figure out what we should do next.
... That might be community groups, to incubate work, it might be working groups to standardize work, it might be work to be sent to other organizations, or input to other W3C WGs.
... A key takeaway here becomes the next directions of what we'd like to collectively do next with all of this input.
... Lots of place for discussion in the roadmap, where we see the future and how to get there. We wrap up at 4pm today so folks can catch flights.
... I heard lots of great ideas and still lots of tension, concerns from folks focused on authentication that the identity isn't necessarily tied into authentication, concerns on identifiers (work being characterized wrongly, misunderstood) - if we're not looking at the right use cases, people come to different conclusions. We have time to work out differences in understanding, where is the agreement on the components of the stack?
... One outcome could be that we're trying to solve different problems, perhaps the technologies can coexist... we can offer insights to one another even if we're not working on the same piece of the problem.
... If we have issues with things others are working on - let's focus on constructive criticism, how can we all help to make the Web work better by building the right components around authentication and identity.

Dot Voting on concerns and potential work items.

Kaliya: We took output from conversation yesterday and crystalized them into some statements and put them on these forms.
... This is what the form looks like -- https://mit.webex.com/wbxmjs/joinservice/mtg/4e2f2c8c6aa2499fa4ff57e9e961581e?siteurl=mit&token=QUhTSwAAAARf3CNiSOA6s0HZ3erSbDBOP66rOlYCkn5W7aVxIveavX38e6v4v69VBCfgpENyvFVQSicO77PRbxUj8ULyazR0saTn9WaL%2BsFLlct6mYbYIKS2tGVk%2B0dpO%2FVA%2FxN5OlqHo05BvR1oGcR9ZJ%2BV9FpYjl96PBCjjqgN%2FXFT8bt4df2qFGns%2FHVmEwxreObvVxc%3D&userName=Manu%20Sporny&userEmail=msporny%40digitalbazaar.com&CSRF=9e99ffe4-85ca-46c2-bd28-17a6b6b8ee10&t


Kaliya: Write your initials and then put a dot -- one dot only -- agree or disagree, add comments, and signatures - do not vote twice.

achughes: Do we vote on all cards?

Kaliya: Please vote on each card, we need to gather input - even if it's "I'm confused."
... Go around and vote - right now.

Scribe notes 55 people in the room doing the dot voting.

Scribe notes lots of discussion around voting/input.

wseltzer: Ok, thanks for the input on the proposals... the Program Committee is going to take a look at the feedback and try to synthesize items moving forward.
... Next up are presentations on Cultural and Economic Perspectives... followed by avoiding mistakes/minefields discussion.

Current Situation of Japanese Fragmented ID Platforms

Slides -- https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1hhcDys1nrHtBeAX89RQiWvYWB4bwojVOKH0aIaPXaIM/edit

Takashi: Hi, Takashi from JCB -- before starting presentation, just noting that I am not a native English speaker.

Slide 2

Slide 4

<wseltzer> slide 5

Takashi: In ecommerce - in B2C - Amazong is close to Rakuten.
... There are a number of fragmented identity platforms iN Japan.
... Also, differnet payment methods.

slide 7

Takashi: Big Japanese companies have siloed solutions - six big companies - user has to know timetable... but just redirects to companies website.
... Driving license has a dominant position in Japan... as an identity mechanism.

<wseltzer> slide 9

Takashi: Japanese government want to expand usage of "My Number" card for Japanese Social ID System... but most Japanese people don't use this card - only 10%.
... We have a strong need for loose ID federation in Japanese Market...

Slide 10

Takashi: Large companies seem to want to take a dominant position on Social ID...
... Governments seem to want Drivers license style approaches.
... To achieve this, we need a scheme for DIDs and Self Sovereign identity especially consent management.
... Thank you for your attention.

MikeJones: Mike Jones from Microsoft, I know that Yahoo Japan and KDDI implement OpenID Connect. Are they using that to interoperably login at other Japanese sites, or is it mostly silos even though they are using that federation protocol?

Takashi: Interop is not so great, in Japan, every company uses Social ID using Yahoo, ??, Facebook, and NTTDoCoMo...

Automatic Identification Standards

Slides -- https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1hhcDys1nrHtBeAX89RQiWvYWB4bwojVOKH0aIaPXaIM/edit#slide=id.g49d4bd67a0_3_65

shigeya: Let me talk about structured IDs, little different from user identity

<wseltzer> [presentation starts at slide 13]

shigeya: you know about bar codes (slide: bag of mints -- comes from GS1)
... GS1 - they do the UPC - GS1 has a database...
... GS1 standards - identify, capture, and share - slide 16

Slide 16

shigeya: There are multiple formats to identify, capture, and share... barcode is only one of them, can be expressed in URLs.
... GS1 has identification keys - domains... trade items (GTIN), logistics (SSCC), Assets (GIAI), and locations (GLNs)
... Companies assign GLNs to locatins like factories... examples of GS1 identifiers.
... These are all expressible as URNs... urn:epc:id:...
... These are not DIDs, but they kind of look the same, different domain.
... There are also physical representations - barcodes, RFID, there are different formats/syntaxes.
... So let's look at applications... GS1 Lightweight Messaging Standard for Verification... RESTful interface to resolve GS1 IDs... use case - US Drug Supply Chain.
... We're interested in using Verifiable Credentials for this.

Slide 21

shigeya: Here are some difficulties with resolution services - Object Naming System... DNS based pat of GS1 key to server mapping... not used other than for research purposes.
... GS1 Discovery Services - centrlaized - map keys to servers, suspended until well-defined demands from industry.
... but lately, there is renewed interest in mapping between identifiers and associated data, together with verification of identifiers.
... GS1 is the standard on product and business entity identification,DID focuses on digital identity, we need a cyber-physical link other than humans.
... DIDs could be used in the "id" fields in DID related standards.
... There is a good intersection between DIDs and GS1 work.

Pam: You talked about resolution and mapping - are those different things in your taxonomy?

shigeya: Mapping and discovery is ... different.
... RFID is ... RFID leaks information... but information record is somewhere else, stored on the server, that information may be on a single server or multiple servers... discovery service integrates all these data flows together.

Laws and Borders: Self-Administered Identifiers and NextPats

Slides -- https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1f9BW7lFdqcMZsZ08V1Mm0PV9J3aNC28q0JGRzgNneNE/edit

Pindar: What can this technology do to make things faster, safer, cheaper... what can it not do?

<wseltzer> Pindar's slides

Pindar: What about NETizen eXpatriates -- people that want to transact across borders.

Slide 2

Pindar: There are more people on this circle than the rest of the planet... lots of people
... 50 billion machines coming down the pipeline.
... The Right to Work Online -- cannot be done w/o this technologies...
... I work w/ displaced people - there are more people displaced today than after WW2... 70M

Slide 3

Pindar: These people are away from their home countries... global climate change makes it worse... legal certainty - do they have it... these people are going to grow to 700M in the future
... There is a potential billion person market here covering ... what about the lawful approach (there are non-lawful approaches to solve these problems)

<wseltzer> "We're all migrants, we just don't know it yet"

Pindar: Examples of this, after WWI, if your country no longer existed, passports doesn't work. How can we create a "Right to Work Online"? It's not a Sovereign view, it's not about borders, it's about topology.
... How many people are in My Number? 10% of Japan.
... Aadhaar is over 1 billion users... great stats, interesting ruling on constitutionality.
... Aadhaar has issues, but it's deployed.
... 50B devices online - we need to be concerned about scale.
... There are other mechanisms in China - Social Credit System, Real Name Electronic ID, Fintech, Common CLOUD.... identities issued by governments to citizens.
... There is the Belt and Road Initiative - when you cross borders, law is defined by borders - when you cross 65-68 legal jurisdiction... Hong Kong is looking at digital roots.
... We have 3-5 times more internet capacity into Hong Kong than all of China combined - how is this leveraged?
... What is the competitive landscale, market structure, business models... what are the fundamental tensions between geography and topology?
... We are mixing fire and ice - government issued - year 1648... in Hong Kong year 2047 -- self administered
... No nation below mathematics... physical border in borderless world... self-administered IDs...
... Here's the belt and road blockchain - only deals w/ corporate identifiers, legal in switzerland, identifier system for corporates, self administered IDs, the most important thing is Self-Administered IDs, why do you need them?
... Companies don't have a right to anonymity - they have to be registered, they have to pay tax.
... We need a golden source of data, we need to know where law applies, that's one of the things that Hong Kong is famous for...
... As a technical community - consistency - Hong Kong - golden copies, grounded by government institutions, use it, assign copies of data, have less legal responsibility and liability.
... to scale cloud services, need identifiers system to allow different cloud systems to scale.
... This is why we call them Self-Administered Identifiers - corporates/individuals... Sovrerign states - Fire... dynamic violence.
... in our Internet view - borderless... ice... cryptographically strong static violence...
... We need to understand consent - freeze, not move - different property that does not require rule of law -
... legal certainty - many of us that do contracts don't see the light of day - computing engine of court system - interpret run legal code... computational code - cryptographic consistency - we can have a different type of discussion.

<wseltzer> [slide 16]

Pindar: Fundamental assumptions - distance != cost, centralized != trusted, time != money
... What are assumptions implicit in our discussions... - digital trade and digital work online is different.

<wseltzer> [slide 18]

Pindar: We've had Cyber Monday / Black Friday - different by an order of magnitude.
... Singles day is way bigger.

Trusted ID

Tom: We've been doing work in Kantara - a Trusted Identity

<wseltzer> Tom Jones and Mary Hodder's slides

Tom: What you see when you look at this, Authentication of a User has to be different ... Decentralized Identity on steroids - pieces of identity are spread throughout space.
... How to bring things back together again... talks to strong enough idea that we're trying to present to this group.
... Authentication and Authorization - separate and needs to stay separate.
... WebAuthn comes up more like Authorization...
... The idea is that in this use case, pretty high assurance that someone is over 21 if they need to buy some alcohol or some other restricted element online.
... We're going to talk about these 4 actors - consumer that wants restricted resource, supplier that has resource, verifier of claim of majority (sort of like Verifiable Credentials meaning), this verifier can validate binding between user and claim.
... I'll try to use validate when I say that and verified when I say verified claim.
... What about the right of a regulator agency?
... One of the most interesting cases is DEA position on drugs...

@@@: When you say regulatory agency, do you mean provider of claim?

JohnB: What requirements are there?

MaryHodder: For state of California, board of brewery, had to do a deep identity verification for brewing... tap room, physical location, sell things through website and people can come in and pick up... brewing operations, they spot check, they don't look at our records for every single sale.
... Often people flash a license... employees ar edoing that check, there is no recording except through website purchases... no one is even providing this.
... They are literally clicking a button, which is not good, flashing license... but there is no real recording/requirement that feds and state of california require for alcohol purchases.

Tom: If you are buying alcohol, you can have different requirements for different types of purchases.
... The specific rules differ by state - online use case, they will try to find rules that will work for all states.
... Last part - provider of late binding tokens and client-side code.
... Smart card, TPM, etc. precondition is that you have a consumer that has a late binding token that has it, they have an over 21 claim, and finally they have a consumer that already established an ID with some supplier.
... They are already online... that's where we are ... two different use cases to look at this - supplier sends request through user asking for a claim... user has a claim... user sends it back.
... It's not verified - typically, supplier ... use late binding token to be attached to claim, late binding token is attached.
... If you are an OpenID person, this is just front-channel authentication... at this point, we have provided a service to supplier, we expect supplier to receive validated claim.
... This is small, 5-10 cents - standard practice - fraud detection circuit.
... Second scenario, something that looks like a back channel - consumer himself has to go and get validated claim.
... Gets validation, gets claim, supplier gets it.
... This is traditional advertising model... bound to session.
... Fail paths - fairly obvious, user doesn't get verified, or fails validation at supplier
... The real point is that the user gets to decide what attributes he sends based on what he's doing at the current moment.
... Examples of what could be used, client side code
... users shouldn't expose stuff to websites ... so we need a way for websites to identify themselves... trust federations apply to what we're talking about... alcohol... drugs, different rules, different conditions.

ChristopherA: The VC and DID community has been using the "Over 21" story over the last couple of years.
... There are major differences in some places - for example item 6 - we're not trusting that the user makes the choice, the absolute minimum inormation should be given.
... Data Minimization story there.
... There is a separate selective disclosure story - there shouldn't be a backchannel where the bar can correlate information.
... This is in our whitepaper on data minimization an dselective disclosure and how they're different... in the VC group, and DID group, we've decided to drop this story... over 21 is too complicated, doesn't always apply, it's problematic. We've gone to university alumni and university degree.

Tom: I understand that this is a broader scope - take the claim, moves to higher plain,

ChristopherA: We would be happy to share with you on this stuff.

wseltzer: Thank you very much Tom and Mary!

<wseltzer> [15 min break]

Avoiding Mistakes and Minefields

<weiler> scribenick: weiler


jeffh: I want to throw out ideas and be provocative.

<wseltzer> JeffH's slides

[protocol & system design time]

scribe: need to carefully define terminology and use it consistently. WebAuthn spent much time on this.
... best to fi this at design time.
... In directory days (95-96 ---> 1998) "names" and "identifiers" were often swapped.
... e.g. names are fungible and non-unique and identifiers are unique and persistent.
... In implementing this ina RDMS, we threw out the X.500 idea that DN's are real names. We jammed UUIDs in the DN for people entries. and never revealed it.
... so when users entered a name in a form, we did not map that to a DN and do the lookup - we did searches instead.
... The thing that made this work was that the UMich LDAP implementation was fast.
... At COMPONENT implementation time...

[cites "Most Dangerous Code in the World"]

<wseltzer> https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/abstracts/ssl-client-bugs.html

scribe: Much of this has been fixed.
... at DEPLOYMENT time:
... are underlying techs secure (see above). need a carefully designed deployment architecture.
... I asked advice from deployers of federated systems....

[slide on Deployment Time]

scribe: Failing to check results.
... Assuming that a 'principal name' is an email and not checking it.
... eduPersonAffiliation don't mean the same thing at all sites.
... different sites may have different rules; danger in assuming commonality.
... other federation members may not follow BCP's.
... users get confused.
... Overall: trust does not scale (across arbitrary policy domains)
... SP800-63-3 is an attempt to define these for USG agencies and might be a model for how to have uniform policies across relatively disparate orgs.
... Consider a simple design with simple use cases, expecting it to evolve.
... Build something malleable. and that has utility.

[slide: flexitility]

tony: you said 'take things small' - there is a limit to how small you can go...

jeffh: do something useful.

tony: even small could be useful, but has no context

jeffh: e.g. use U2F - doesn't get rid of passwords. We learned a lot that we took into FIDO2, where we're tryign to satisfy the passwordless case. that's an example.

tony: what if we just defined the message payload, no transports.

jeff: what do you do with that? write an academic paper.
... I think you start with a basic use case

jim: re: reference to publication (NIST) - is this something w3c buys into?

jeffh: in commercial world, it's a good example to pay attn to .

dirk: i like the distinction in phases. focusing on spec writing: any juicy examples of terrible specs. and also good examples?

jeffh: OpenID1 is an example of something we learned from. I compare it and SAML in a doc from 2008 - I characterize OpenID1 as a chunk of forged metal.
... you cannot profile it or change it around. It only works one way.
... you learn from that. OAUTHv2, OIDC have many components - they're more like molten metal. a Profile is a mold; you can reshape them to do something new.

Dirk: OpenID1 was concevied by a small set of people. do you need to have a larger group?

jeff: as you iterate, you bring new use cases in. if you have something that can be extended (is malleable) to fixe new use case, that's a good thing.
... you're unlikely to be able to satisfy all use cases.

mike jones: I agree re: the centrality of iteration as well as "do something small". build the smallest deployable unit, so that you learn.

scribe: if you reach that kernel, like open ID1, which morphed into 2, you learn things.
... most humans are not capable of entering idetifiers as URLs. So you find email addresses, which people understand, despite the downsides.
... I agree re: "have core fucntionaltiy" and have extension points.

e.g. encryption in @@

jeffh: identity federation based on HTTP was invented in 10s -100s of different places
... at stanford, we invented one. In 1999 Burton group consultant said "let's get into a room" to merge two competing standards
... In hindsight, that became OASIS security services technical committee. something else became OpenID1.
... then OpenID2.
... then OAUTH to authorize services to talk on a users' behalf.
... then MS and Google came in with new use cases and that led to OAUTH2

[draws on paper]

scribe: early rat race, narrow funnel. it's hard to get the planet to decide on one design.
... Best example are automobile controls. that wasn't standardized until 1920s.
... I remember a gas pedal in the middle. Right hand drive.

<Zakim> burn, you wanted to mention standards as process of attrition

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFzDaBzBlL0]

dan: standards is a process of attrition. once you build something that is of value to the group, it can be good to declare victory on that piece. at some point you'll find that there aren't enough people to keep going (for now).
... it's easy to overextend on requirements.
... when you don't have agreement.

Jeff: this is an argument for modular design
... other example is LDAP. We aren't working on it any more, but we all use it. It's sedimented. You only mess with them when you need to. e.g. tuning of TCP.
... TCP works. Until you find issues, like buffer bloat.
... but things sediment down and you don't need to pay attention.

Seeking Clarity (around DIDs and other breakout items)

mike Jones: I reinforce your story re: independent invention signifying time for a standard. When JWt finished, there were four different

scribe: formats. we took that as a sign that we should talk to each other.
... coming into the present day. there are a bunch of people here working on DIDs and at RWOT there were people saying "I built DIDs" and people
... were asking "how did you represent keys", what use cases did you solve, etc.
... which showed they didn't have interop.
... if you want a DID thing that works, you need to make some choices. Need one way to do X.
... if you want interop. engineerings in bldg 28 next door looked at DIDs and wondered what to build. it's time to do that.

Kim Duffy: i apologize that at RWOT that didn't come across

scribe: our pre-standards groups have not done a great job communicating the use cases (like educational credentials). We are actively working on that. we're trying to clarify confusions.

christopher: there's a distinction between DID itself and @2 and specifics of indivudal methods. different
... companies have chosen different architectures, crypto, curves.
... I heard "given the blockchain you're using, what did you use?".
... another issue had to do with VC, not DIDs - format for signing VCs.

<kimhd> @weiler -- that's not what I said

<kimhd> I'll correct

christopher: there has not been consensus because W3C limited scope of WG to data format only.

mike: as an outsider, I think it's time to make choices. I think you have to have algo agility, but basic data structures need to be picked.

daniel: to be practical, I think we need to specify how keys are declared. I think we can narrow it down.
... that might be a place we can make progress.
... resolving them the same will never work.
... since they're constructed for different purposes.
... they don't resolve the same because they're serving differernt purposes.

chris: @4 we are not ready to accept that new academic research.

kim: the proposal for the DID WG has only to do with data model and syntax. The cards were a little misleading. the interop part we want to standardize is the data model and syntax.

<kimhd> ^ Correction

wendy: I'm hearing challenges re: the right level of modularity. I heard @4. It needs to be big enough to be useful. I'm hearing from VC WG frustration at scope of charter.
... drawing the right boundaries where we're okay with a group setting a scope - and thinking about other modules we need to build. As we move to next phases of discussion, we have lots of cards to work through.
... I want to do some breakout gardening.
... for our time after lunch.
... on the wall on the R, there are items where confusion has been expressed. We could ask the room if there's confusion you want us to address today.
... there are other places where we have general consensus. and there are cards that show a deep division. would be great
... to address the source of that division. and questions re: chartering of work.

<aaronpk> scribenick: aaronpk

chris: is it possible to go parallel rather than sequential now?
... a bunch of ppl are leaving at 4, some sooner, there's a bucnh of momentum around chartering a DID WG
... we'd like to address the objections
... so spending a lot of time on others is going to stop us from coming to some closure on the DID WG charter

wendy: there is a lot of interest in addressing the questions of the DID WG
... and i think we want to address the presentation of that
... and some of the controversy that came up
... the co chaaikrs of the cg result from a confusion of what they are proposing
... so it's only fair to let them share what they are proposing if we're asking the group to give input on whether that's a good direction
... .and i know manu is actively listening and participating even though he cuoldn't join us was offering to share some of his input
... on the roadmap that the DID proponents have for moving their work forward
... unfortunately manu reports his audio can't connect

<kimhd> it sounds fine

manu: so i can't hear what you're saying at all

<wseltzer> manu, can you speak?

manu: i'm going to go ahead

<wseltzer> manu++

manu: i wanted to clarify some of the items around the DID WG proposal
... for those not aware, the work on DIDs has been happening for about 3 years

<manu> https://www.w3.org/community/credentials/participants

manu: in the group called the credentials CG

<manu> https://w3c-ccg.github.io/

<manu> https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-wg-charter/

manu: community is composed of 225+ people who meet weekly, calls each week are between 20-30 people joining, so healthy and active group, and run experiements around verifiable credentials and things of that nature
... about 8 months ago we put together a DID WG charter, highly focused on data models specifically
... but as i mentioned, the CCG is front-running that work and doing experiements around protocols and resolutiosn and the open questions
... one of the things that became claer over the last year, given we have 15 different DID methosd right now
... there's a desire to greate a W3C WG around the data model, that's the small step that we believe is appropriate to take at this point
... we did circulate a questionnaire about 4 months ago to the W3C membership and a number of other large organiztaions

<manu> Member confidential slide deck on DID progress: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1iMH4m_3OQbnyTr-Vrhe2PRECbiWOMjeeym-oL2dyhC0/edit

manu: this is a member confidential slide deck on DID progress

<manu> public one here: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/18cDpqkPhlGKcOlgnbt2_2PbFoNv0vryXopp5rIG8A0o/edit#slide=id.gc6f80d1ff_0_0

manu: there is a public one that i'll also share here
... the outcome of this survey, we asked if the charter was appropriate
... we got 80 responses, a large sample set
... of those 80, we asked how many of them would support and join, not just support, a DID working group

<manu> https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-wg-charter/

manu: that's scoped to the charter we produced
... it is data model only. out of 80, 60 said they would join the WG
... for those of you who are not familiar with the process, that's well above what is needed to create a WG
... this is the primary thing that we're trying to accomplish at the workshop
... to socialize that this charter is out there and has 60+ W3C members in support of it
... and to socialize it

<Zakim> wseltzer, you wanted to discuss modularity and constraints, utility and to discuss W3C process

manu: so it's not a done thing but it's a socialized charter
... there are things not in the charter, we don't talke about DID Auth, we don't talk about DID resolution
... we're trying to pick a small set of work, then after that go on to the next step
... which could be resolution or auth
... i'm going to stop there

wendy: thanks manu

<ChristopherA> Thanks Manu!

wendy: regarding the w3c process, the components are support, willingness to work, lack of formal objections
... or all of the objections to the work have been addressed to the satisfaction of the w3c director
... so a goal of socializing the work is to get support and address the concerns that others might have
... so i like the suggestion of breakout and making this more of a discussion, i'd love to find a way to have manu participate in that discussion
... but figuring for those who are concerned about this work, or don't think its the right direction, what would help you to address those concerns, and what else do you need to hear
... if there's an understanding gap or what would need to change

mike: mike jones microsoft. i want to reflect on some of the excellent observations that jeff made
... about the ability to iterate and standardize
... at least as the charter was just described by manu, it describes a data structure but doesn't define how to do resolution or authentication
... and thinking in terms of minimum deployable unit you need to have all three of those things to have a functionining DID
... so it seems counterproductive to define a data structure without defiing how to deploy it in practice

kaliya: as a person who can't get into the techinical weeds, one of the things i've continued to hear is we have to scope it so narrowly that what you've said is out of scope and causes problems
... so if we can figure out how to expand the scope to address those things that seems like a path forward

tony: defining a data structure is too small at this point in time
... trying to understand the cardinatlity of the data structure, how to use the data structure, it will create confusion out there and create more confusion around the use of the data structure
... so i do belive that there needs to be more discussion on these aspects before moving forward

sam: mike your concerns about just the data structures aren't enough to be deployable... didn't we hear from jeff that we need to pick from those and people can build things around it, and then people can build on that later
... it's timely to do the data structure work, and peopel can build things that aren't standard

mike: i could be wrong, but i believe that these are interdependent, that you have to understand in these cases how it's going to be used to know what you have to represent
... it's sedgwicks' algorithms book that the opening phrase is data structures are algorithms, they imply usage

chris: tho i will be the first to say that i feel overly constrained by the no protocols no crypto in the verifiable claims group, we did come up with something fairly solid
... so i would find it acceptable to take that same approach with DIDs and only focus on that side of things
... if i were to extend it i wouldn't extend it as far as you've said
... i dont like the name DIDAuth, i would like to have a simple two party proof of control as a sort of minimum viable test of a DID
... i do no t believe we should talk about DID resolution or universal resolving becasuse i think that's going to be up to the marketplace
... we already demonstrate that works now, there will be market realities to push people together
... definining a minimum viable proof of control will help verifiable claims a bunch, it will demonstrate the DID spec does what we promise, then we will talk with people who will do three party and more complex structures on the back of that as separate future working groups

wendy: time check, lunch is coming.

daniel: in terms of the technical piece, i was curious when you bring up resolution it infers other things
... resolutions infer other things, we're working on batching that sticks things in bitcoin. other schemes don't do that
... the idea that we standardize resolution, we'll run a plugin that resolves each one, you can't really standardize the resolution steps because they are inherently different just like you can't standardize tthe math in a cryptographic scheme
... so that's how you should in your mind associate a DID method's logic and what we can standardize

<Zakim> kimhd_, you wanted to ask clarifying questions in case no one addresses it

kim: one thing that's coming up, i'm hearing what's different rules for what's requiered to make a WG

<daniel> You're next

kim: you're mentioning some criteria of what i've heard before
... christopjher said we need to have a focused data model and syntax. we've been incubating a lot of these standards, we have a roadmap.
... one thing that mjight be helpful is to push for some clarity on what we need for working group formation so we dont' feel like we're reacting to what feel like arbitrary rule changes

<wseltzer> https://www.w3.org/2018/Process-20180201/#WGCharterDevelopment W3C Process re charter development

mike: i'm not describing rules for WG formation, i'm describing in my experience as a stnadards developer what you need to do to have the work product of the standards output to succeed

chris: if we were adding one simple proof of control that everyone could support would that be enough?

<Zakim> manu, you wanted to say JWTs are a data format, that's it -- how is that any different?

mike: that's a step in the right direction, i don't have preconceived boundaries on what the particulars are
... the particulares may be different for all of them but you have to write down one or two of them to have interoperable implementations

manu: i'm disappointed with the line of argumentation that some of a vocal minority in the JWT community (mostly from Microsoft) are making... that Working Groups focusing on Data Models only are not useful
... JWTs are a data model full stop
... in that sense, it's strange to me that doing a data model is not enough for a WG
... it's a very strange argument
... the second thing is there are a number of companies that are building and deploying verifiable creds to real customers today
... this is not a theoretical exercise, there are organizations involved i nthis work, and i'll note that those taking exception to the WG are not building these systems
... so as someone who is leading a company writing this code that having a DID spec in place even if only a data model is going to help greatly that ensuring this market as it's growing has something to build off of
... there are other pieces coming in place down the road but we are taking a very staged appropach to what we're doing

wendy: we are going to break for lunch
... take an hour for lunch and come back at 1:20

<wseltzer> [1 hour lunch]

<brentz> scribenick: brentz

weiler: we've done some shuffling of the schedule

. . .we are thinking of doing the roadmap presentations first

scribe: any objections? No? Good.

. . . First up will be Mathias Brossard
. . . he is not here. First up will be Mathias

Mathias: Currently doing IoT work. What does attestation have to do with EAT?

<wseltzer> Mathias's slides

. . . seems like most of us aren't familiar with attestation
. . . [describing slide] trying to create building blocks for IoT. One of the services would be for attestation.

scribe: the attestation is that you are speaking with the device you think you are, iun a way you can trust.
... [slide 2]
... these are not the only attestation suppliers. As in the example of the supply chain, sometimes you need to know the identity of the things you are dealing with.
... There is a working group around RATS, EATS is the container.
... smaller devices may be limited to 64 kB of RAM.
... [slide 3] different systems have different ways of expressing claims.
... encodings, assigning keys, running sets of PKIs, for the policies that will be validated, these are all part of the trust model.
... my device may be making claims, but we may want those claims aggregated with others.
... when authenticating to a system, the device can attest that it meets the appropriate security level.
... [slide 4] when you are talking ot a 3rd party, can you just trust them? don't you want to go further?
... If they have the proper credentials, but the software has been altered, that is only one possible problem that attestation may address.

ChrisBoscolo: are there any 3rd party audits available? is there a way for outsiders to know that the process for making the chips is secure?

Mathias: there are certifications for that.

ChristopherA: Quick DID and VC architecture roadmap
... two efforts we are tracking [Slide 1]
... VCs allow for multiple sources of information. In order for many of the use cases with VCs, we feel we also need DIDs.

<wseltzer> ChristopherA's slides

ChristopherA: Hopefully the VCWG will be wrapping up in a few months.
... There is a need for other things to be incubated [slide 2]
... this is where we allow the flexibility. DID Methods are not ready to move into specification.
... there has been lots of discussion about what should be in or out of the DID Document
... [slide 3] Once we can use VCs with DIDs, there are a lot of use cases and special examples that can be explored.
... there are many questions around protocol and consent that are unanswered.
... Doubt we will get to the bottom few in the next several years.
... how do we turn this into a service of value.
... lots of discussion about DID Auth, there is a Rebooting Web of Trust whitepaper that outlines these.
... [slide 4] OCAP solves a number of problems around ambient authority.
... Credential requests and exchanges are out of scope.
... cryptographic proofs is a big confusing area, we don't just use signatures anymore.
... zero-knowledge proofs allow for new and exciting things that add real value.
... zkp is tough because it is academically and implementationally challenging.
... [slide 5] giant diagram roadmap
... further down the page are things far in the future.
... one of the tasks of the ccg is to update this roadmap, this will happen in january.

<Zakim> manu, you wanted to note that all of this is future work once we get DID WG (data model in place) and that all of this stuff isn't happening in a vacuum, we're being very careful

manu: just to clarify, this is a roadmap, it is future-looking. What we need is a working group specifically for data model and syntax.
... the other thing to note is that therte are a variety of things being worked on in the ccg.
... these things are not happening in a vacuum, a lot of work is going on around these things.

Dirk: how do all of these pieces hang together? the verifiable credentials and DIDs, how do they hang together?
... Would the credential be issued to a DID?

ChristopherA: Yes the claim would be issued to the DID. There are correlation issues with using an identifier this way.
... the process of a verifier getting the information they need during presentation might be iterative, leading to trust between two parties.

Dirk: so, if I only have one DID that satisfies this information, I have to disclose that one?

ChristopherA: yes, there is some correlation leakage there.
... with BTCR there is a very anonymous scenario where DIDs are uses more selectively.

Dirk: If I want to prove my birthdate to two people, do I need to share my DID?

ChristopherA: No, the Sovrin solution allows for pairwise DIDs and zero-knolwedge proofs about the claims you are sharing.

Dalys Sebastian: how does DID resolution work from an application developer point of view?

<wseltzer> s/???/Dalys/

ChristopherA: there are a couple of different approaches. Markus did a resolver that did VeresOne, BTCR, Sovrin DIDs as a first step.
... it was a plugin architecture that allowed for expansion.
... interoperability between DIDs is difficult between methods because the root of trust for resolution is different for different cases.
... a developer may have a resolver and they would need to choose the plugins they need to use.
... you may have a number of credentials from a number of parties.

<Zakim> JoeAndrieu, you wanted to reiterate that proof of control is just a single factor

JoeAndrieu: fetishization of proof of control of a DID leads to poor understanding. There is potentially a lot more to a proof than a single attribute.

<Zakim> kimhd, you wanted to comment on did resolution

ChristopherA: VCs can only prove that someone said something, not that what they said is true.

kimhd: each DID method must say how to resolve it, along with the CRUD operations.

ChristopherA: but all of the methods have something in common. With BTCR there is a lot of magic happening on the back end, developers don't care about that.
... they only care that the resolver did the right thing.
... one more thing, these aren't standards yet.

Greg is up and has no slides.

weiler: we are out of time.

greg: i won't take much time. We have lots of money to invest. There needs to be a bridge between standards and implementation.
... one example of our investments is in the Brave token. They need an identity solution or there will be a lot of felonies committed.
... Policy context could serve to guide this work. This is the most political protocol I have ever seen.

5 Year Roadmap: Authenticators

greg: encourage you to not be politicized, but be aware that the work you are doing will be weaponized.

John Bradley: Our standards are pretty much wrapped up.

scribe: we are in our initial deployment phase.
... we now have authenticators out there
... the latest version of Windows 10 has support for the new tech.
... Google and Android support it.
... FIDO is working with them.
... Shout out to the apple folks who just released their initial support.
... our next work is divided between FIDO and Web Authn
... we are looking at additional extensions to better deal with the user experience for lost keys.
... looking at alternative algorithms in the coming years. possibly threshold signatures.
... right now Web Authn is about proving possession of a TLS certificate, once all else is stripped away.
... theoretically this could be extended to be proof control of a DID
... we have a few projects over the coming years, but now we're dealing with deployment issues.
... Web Authn as a first factor for log in can be done with hotmail.
... there may be a version of chrome on a future version of Windows that can use the platform authenticators
... hopefully there will be more sorting out and user experience improvement.

tony: there are many authenticator key companies out there. Were do you see this going in the next 5 years?

John Bradley: there will probably be pressure on those at the lower end of the spectrum due to fingerprinting possibilities.

scribe: roaming authenticators may be more specialized into certain roles for banking, etc.
... a lot of the enterprise smart card stuff should move to external authenticators
... there are shared device use cases that require external authenticators.
... there will be room for multiple vendors in the space.

Mike Jones: ambush question, missed it

John Bradley: there may be some minimal set of things we'd need to decide on using in order to make use of the DID documents as part of Web Authn.

<wseltzer> s/ambush question, misssed it/you mentioned some gaps in DID for use with WebAuthn

scribe: from a standards point of view, even if someone has managed to get it to work, that may not be quite right.

manu: there is an experiment we did with Web Authn keys in a DID document, using hardware keys to sign.
... we need to start somewhere in a DID working group.
... there are many experiments we could do, but there is a base layer we need to get down.

John Bradley: did you hack the DID into the RPID?

manu: no, we did a 10 line change to the google source code.

John Bradley: so the RPID was the url you were looking at, not the top level DID.

scribe: other questions?

Dalys_Sebastian: Were the verifier and the issuer of the same origin in web authn?

John Bradley: as long as they are in the same origin and have a TLS certificate it may work.

Tony: this is level one, there are things that need to be fixed in level two.

John Bradley: Manu ran into issues with this in web payments, big security problems with iframes in origins. bad things in java script. don't do this.

<pindarhk> Sorry I will need to be excused in about 30 minutes to head back to HKG. Apologies in advance.

manu: promising experiment, not a good browser to actually use.

jzcallahan: Manu asked us to talk during this session.
... from Veridium, specializing in biomentric authentication within a company.
... gratified that there has been a separation of discussion between authentication and identity verification
... Gartner says these fields are colliding.

<wseltzer> jzcallahan's Veridium slides

jzcallahan: becoming conflated. We've focused on the enterprise. A platform that supports numerous native and non-native authenticators.
... now, smart phones eliminate the need for special hardware. Coming soon, our devices will get really good at knowing we are use.
... what's coming, in addition to the biometric, need anti-spoofing measures.
... Kaliya doesn't understand the slide

Kaliya doesn't understand the slide

jzcallahan: don't worry about placement.
... It is imperative to add liveness. Biometrics are not passwords.
... an attacker who presents a facsimile should not succeed.
... the context of the biometric authentication is important.
... using different factors: time, common movement, etc.
... [IEEE 2410-2017 slide]
... what we discovered in the marketplace, mobile to mobile mode needed to be updated to support server-side.
... m2m is good for authentication, basically equivalent to FIDO.
... will be FIDO certified in the future.
... In other cases, for account recovery, using Shamir secret sharing with one piece on the device and another on the server, allows server-side protocols to avoid storing the biometric fully on the server.
... the idea is we want to cover global needs
... instead of going through a KYC process (which may involve biometrics)
... you can do different things [slide: initial onboarding]
... doesn't require subsequent biometric enrollment
... reduce friction but support KYC/AML
... there are places this is required. Once biometric check is done, it can be thrown away.
... there are only a limited number of cases that require central storage.
... SSI Biometrics would allow for roaming KYC.
... make the credentials standard requires SSI
... how could we do biometric authentication in a Web Authn context.
... [slide: Biometric DID Auth]
... this is a proof of conecpt for how these things could be tied together.

<wseltzer> jbradley: that's easily phishable

<wseltzer> ... it fails at the QR code

jzcallahan: failed at the QR code
... you have a cloud agent acting on your behalf
... Sovrin and uport could be used on the back end.
... allows KYC vendors to monetize their process.

Jill: can your system account for simple dynamic things?

jzcallahan: We don't want to handle the whole KYC thing, we want to stay in our lane and provide biometric credentials.
... KYC is the gate, the ongoing AML is where the costs lie.
... we are paying close attention to the VC work.

Jill: client onboarding happens first, but you need to update who your customer is, that's what KYC means.

jzcallahan: we don't want to do our own transaciton monitoring, we want to provide the biometric claim that exists as part of the rest of the ecosystem.

Marie: I am from Gemalto, digital strategy team.

<wseltzer> Marie's slides

Marie: PSD2 regulation discussion
... [slide 1] two objectives.
... banks are very protective of their customers and the data
... this is not currently optimally done.
... lots of data breaches and account takeover. goal is to reach same level of assurity with e-commerce as with chip cards.
... [slide 2] European banking organization created SCA
... essentially 2FA

<wseltzer> Marie: PSD2 takes effect Sept 2019 for any banks or retailers in Europe or doing business in Europe

Marie: but also requires dynamically linked data
... [slide 3] shop authenticates user out of band
... issuer decides everything in this model

<wseltzer> [slide 4]

Marie: not in line with what retailers need
... retailers want control
... this will affect the bottom line

<wseltzer> [slide 5]

Marie: they are looking for alternatives

<wseltzer> [slide 6]

Marie: merchant will authenticate the user.
... and decide at which step this must happen, and where to add the friction.
... credit cards are determining the framework.
... FIDO and Web Authn seem like a good solution.

<pindarhk> I'm sorry that I didn't get to personally meet everyone. If you come by Hong Kong, please do drop me a line at EMAIL_HIDDEN :)

Marie: thanks to FIDO, there is a standard that anyone can verify

John Bradley: not everyone can verify the signature

Marie: This may not be doable today, but this presentation is about the 5 year road map

wseltzer: possibly a gap in the standards if that can't be solved.

John Bradley: I was just in France. Once we get the capabilities in the iframe, using the web payments API, that will use the bank as the RPID so the key that is registered can be validated.

Marie: the point of those slides is to introduce the PSD2.

John Bradley: yes, I think we can make good progress here, but there are privacy issues.

wseltzer: we have been working at W3C on this question between the Web Authn and Web Payments WGs, we are sending a charter for joint discussion of this work.

Marie: Is there a 3d Secure implementation in the Web Payments group?

John Bradley: yes

Pam: One question about your diagram. Who's directory server is it?

Marie: Visa, mastercard.

Pam: there may be a missing participant, where is the payment processor?

Marie: it is connected to the directory server.

tomj: should a relying party be required to accept authorizarions from unrelated parties?
... this could create a real problem for this group.

<weiler> tonj: banks need to be fiduciaries for the customer, not the merchant

Greg: I was in Paris with Visa, just talking about this. banks need to be fiduciaries for their customers.
... in Europe this is different than in the US.
... with PSD2, privacy rights are treated like human rights, in US they are contract rights.
... the contract orientation and the elevation of terms of use means it is very difficult for self sovereign identity to triumph.

wseltzer: thank you Marie. There are snacks. let's break. we will reconvene after the break. maybe some breakouts. not much time left.
... only a half hour left. mostly for breakout groups.

Final Remarks and Breakouts

wseltzer: we have smart people and a lot of work to do. possibly not a good sense of exactly what is next.
... lots of interest in interop, a DIDWG charter, etc.
... we can continue the discussion with the mailing list from this workshop.

<manu> -1 on new CG for DIDs

<manu> -1 on another workshop :) (except continuing work in RWoT, CCG, etc.)

wseltzer: we want to continue to develop solutions to these hard problems.

weiler: limited time available
... looking for 2 to 4 conversations.
... who wants to choose a topic?
... vote for confusion resolution
... open ID connect DID?
... 2
... translator for Ethereuem openid?
... no
... a login with DID button?
... no
... Selective permissionless delegation?
... no
... these are not giving us discussion ideas.
... the ones with the most agree and disagree are the chartering discussions
... one of the breakouts is the DID WG chartering.
... who doesn't want to go to that one?

Dirk: we've talked a lot about solutions, not sure what problems we are trying to solve.

weiler: chartering and use cases, is there a third?

ChristopherA: is there anybody else interested in the true anonymous use cases?

weiler: that's three.

<wseltzer> [breakouts, followed by adjournment. We'll capture outputs and report back on the participants' list.]

Summary of Action Items

Summary of Resolutions

[End of minutes]

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Present: jfontana JoeAndrieu burn Brent_Zundel ChristopherA kimhd weiler hober aaronpk achughes Karen Shigeya Suzuki
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Agenda: https://www.w3.org/Security/strong-authentication-and-identity-workshop/schedule.html#tuesday-december-11th

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<dbooth> Date: 12 Sep 2002

People with action items: 

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