- From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:51:27 -0700
- To: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
- Cc: Vijay Bharadwaj <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com>, Web Cryptography Working Group <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 11:47 AM, Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com> wrote: > On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 10:54 PM, Vijay Bharadwaj > <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com> wrote: >> >> One thing we might want to think about - what should happen >> if a user who has thus finalized his RSA encryption key wants >> to get a new certificate with the same key? > > Another idea would be to add a method that generates a > proof-of-possession for a certificate request. For RSA keys, this > would be a specialized sign operation that only signs specific kinds > of input. > > Wan-Teh I'm slightly nervous about this because the variety of Proof-of-Possession protocols that exist. Whether <keygen>'s use of SPKAC, Mozilla's use of CRMF, or the various GlobalPlatform proofs, it seems like there's quite a bit of divergence there. But yes, it's certainly a possibility.
Received on Friday, 7 September 2012 18:51:55 UTC