W3C

- DRAFT -

SV_MEETING_TITLE

24 Oct 2018

Attendees

Present
Regrets
Chair
SV_MEETING_CHAIR
Scribe
ryo-k

Contents


Why do crypto in TEE? -> Does not expose secrets, less chances of side channel attacks

Other use cases: distributed computing (blockchain), authentication (webauthn), content protection

Hollywood content: You can't watch content that's higher than HD if you don't have hardware robustness

Q: Is security in the browser sufficient? If not, what's the problem?

Exposing TEE as a service and run arbitrary code?

-> user can see the code, transparency

once you're in TEE, you can't get out of it unless explicitly allowed. isolated.

which level of API is going to be exposed?

exposing very fine-grained API might introduce a chance for misprogramming that exposes secrets?

mitigation: enrypted content that go into TEE -> you can't get it out unless re-encrypted

TEE can become an "oracle" that a bad actor can use

If you exposed it as a service, what prevents it from being used by a malicious actor?

Hardware Security WG

-> mostly interested in external devices, not specifically in TEE/TPMs

What's different from WebCrypto?

Is it safe? -> Web browsers are a platform for arbitrary code execution!

there is a difference that TEE is isolated from other programs/OS

q. Is it possible to detect malicious code being injected?

Enhancing WebCrypto API may be a better way to go?

Verify what kind of code that is run on the TEE?

q. Who is the attacker in this case?

The user? The OS?

Bank websites may not want script injected, but the user may want password managers to inject script

Inputs into the trusted environment is coming from an untrusted environment

If you don't give the TEE to securely prompt the user, use the network, ... what's the point of using a TEE?

use case of building a WebAuthn authenticator on a general-purpose computer that has a TEE

one of the difficulties of standardizing a spec like this comes from differences in the capabilities of TEEs

groups to propose to? -> WebAuthn, Web Incubator

Signing code

Identity

CTAP https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-id-20180227.html

Summary of Action Items

Summary of Resolutions

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$Date: 2018/10/24 12:43:37 $

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