See also: IRC log
<scribe> Agenda: https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2017Apr/0028.html
no new suggestions
dveditz notes that there is discussion on list of serializing of suborigins, but right people probably not on the call today, better left to list and github issue discussion for now
<jochen___> we still don't have two implementations of everything
<estark> Chrome doesn't have 3 of the policy values implemented
<jochen___> yes!
<jochen___> and estark :)
<jochen___> Firefox needs to implement the CSS bits
estark: still need to implement new policy values and firefox needs to do css things
approved, https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2017Mar/0042.html
please ask your AC rep to re-join
dveditz: no objections on list or call so time to complete this
deian: on implementation side,
    hired someone to work on the implementation full time, would
    like to bring him to work on the spec too, if possible
    ... Abdul, a masters student started hacking on the chrome
    implementation a few weeks ago, want to talk to chrome team
    about exposing behind a flag
    ... still refactoring after talking to Eduardo about his
    isolation proposal, a bigger overhaul than I thought it would
    be
    ... in original spec, top level pages could drop privileges
    even if they couldn't be tainted
    ... now that's no longer possible so you can only do
    interesting things in iframes, in long run this may be better
    as covert channels are less in out of process iframes
    ... if someone can help me bikeshed it in the next few weeks
    that would be nice
bhill2: to clarify on bikeshedding? actual discussion bikeshedding?
deian: yes, as in we are talking
    with Eduardo, so we are looking for design review on use cases,
    etc.
    ... would be nice to have a uniform way to interpose on
    postMessage the way we have with Fetch, since this is needed
    for suborigins as well
<jochen___> currently trying to refactor how suborigins hooks into postMessage: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-suborigins/pull/67
<jochen___> comments welocme
deian: would also be nice to extend the secure contexts notion to be able to disable certain features / APIs in a confined iframe similar to as with http
<ArturJanc> for disabling certain APIs in COWL world maybe you can lean on the Feature Policy
deian: one thing we'd like to do
    is not allow websockets, for example, since overhauling to work
    with information flow seems like too much for now
    ... I should look at feature policy
bhill2: working on Chrome you say, still working on Firefox?
deian: yes, a little slower, there is a team on CMU working on it
<jochen___> \o/
bhill2: might be interesting to
    find a way to have a more extended discussion with COWL,
    Suborigins, Feature Policy teams about common mechanisms for
    these different approaches
    ... let's propose that kind of meeting on the list to try to
    illuminate the core platform features that these things have in
    common
mkwst: this will be relatively
    short, not much of an update
    ... on chrome, we are upstreaming tests to WPT
    ... we've also found one issue that Emily is working on, we are
    not doing CSP reporting correctly, should be reporting before
    but are reporting after
    ... patch in place that should land relatively soon, similar
    with redirects
    ... I think we have interoperable implementations
    ... we should verify that, but from a spec POV we are good and
    should move to PR once we have tests to back up that
devditz: does spec expect reporting to be synchronous?
mkwst: (summarized) we want CSP
    to be useable for detecting links that are not upgraded, while
    also supporting automatic upgrade
    ... so reporting and enforcement are separate steps
dveditz: I'm reasonably sure that in Firefox the reporting and blocking are bound up in the same code
mkwst: in a lot of our tests we
    rely heavily on the DOM event so we don't have to go up to the
    server, but that doesn't work so well in firefox
    ... it would be really good to get that event implemented so we
    could more easily write reusable tests for WPT
dveditz: I keep trying to make
    that a priority but it unfortunately isn't at the time
    ... anecdotally, we got reports of someone who can't login to
    an old linksys router due to upgrade insecure requests, but
    somehow chrome works fine
mkwst: we've had robust conversations recently with the WebAuthN WG to bring FIDO work into a web-facing API
<dveditz> in this particular case it didn't kill the gear, Firefox lost a user
mkwst: we're coming to the
    conclusion that it would be good if WebAuthN was structured as
    an extension of the CredMgr spec
    ... we've rewritten it in a way that doesn't change it for
    developers but makes the extension mechanism more clear
    ... and more useful for the types of extensions that would be
    useful for WebAuthN and other things people are thinking
    about
    ... we've made some API changes
    ... user mediation is now an enum vs. a boolean
    ... previously allowed for potential of UI, but not required
    mediation
    ... now you can do silent, potential UI but accepts silent, and
    a require user mediation as policy states for that
    ... we also added an async constructor for all credential
    types, new create method to navigator.credentials
    ... need this for WebAuthN because they can only be created in
    an async fashion by talking to an external device
    ... also gives user agents an opportunity to interject and do
    things like password generation while interacting with the
    user, which requires an async mechanism
    ... navigator.credentials.create will return a promise
    ... Domenic is probably on call and manages password mgr
dominic: we've had some reports
    of usability issues around use of Fetch
    ... some website expect a JSON object, others process passwords
    before sending it along
    ... by not exposing the credentials this is broken, and hiding
    the credential from the website doesn't provide that much extra
    security in XSS scenarios
    ... e.g. by switching form fields. After discussing with our
    security team, cred mgr API is a path forward to stronger
    credentials and it is good to make this sacrifice against XSS
    protection
    ... in order to move the web forward faster towards better
    credential types by by not hindering adoption of cred mgr with
    this restriction
JohnWilander: question about javascript access to credentials, could that be done by registering a function to apply without exposing it
<deian> cowl :)
<dveditz> :-)
<jochen___> the other problem was that ppl weren't able to change the server side
(can someone help the scribe with the proper spelling of the speaker's name, I was attempting to crib from irc nicks in the room and got it wrong)
mkwst: passwords are bad and we
    want to get rid of them, better to help users use password
    managers and better credentials than trying to protect use of
    passwords from XSS
    ... as lcamtuf noted in postcards from a post-xss world, it's
    totally possible to exfil data, fixing those seems for now more
    costly than it was worth
JohnWilander: betting on
    passwords going away doesn't seem like it will happen before I
    retire
    ... especially with two-factor, there will still be a password
    and then something else
mkwst: yes
    ... webauthn has the notion of authenticators that are first
    factors in and of themselves
    ... you can imagine something more capable than a security key
    today that could use biometrics or magic that can provide
    identity in addition to device and user presence
    ... even if you don't buy that, I still think that the goal of
    increasing the usability of password managers is a win
    ... they are defended against phishing in ways that are more
    important that defending against content injection at
    legitimate sites
<mkwst> JohnWilander: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-credential-management/pull/76 <--
JohnWilander: can we discuss on the list this particular tradeoff? so it is recorded
mkwst: see that pull
    request
    ... we have a model that works for the credentials we know
    about today, but want to think about and get feedback so
    extension points support things we may want in the future
    ... more eyes would be super helpful
<wseltzer> PR 384, Strawman of an integration between WebAuthn and Credential Management
mkwst: more eyes from WebAppSec on that PR would be awesome
<mkwst> bhill2: Edge 15 released.
<mkwst> ... CSP2. Nonces! frame-ancestors!
<jochen___> and unprefixed Web Auth (?) cf jakob rossi
<mkwst> ... Crispin Cowan left Microsoft. We should encourage MS to continue their engagement with this group.
<mkwst> plh: I can help with that. Happy to poke people.
fb.me/recovery
<mkwst> bhill2: Credential recovery mechanism launched recently.
<mkwst> ... https://fb.me/recovery
<mkwst> ... This seems like a more secure solution than other recovery mechanisms out on the market today.
<mkwst> ... Would love to work with other companies!
(spec is at: https://github.com/facebook/DelegatedRecoverySpecification)
mkwst: would like to resurface discussions about associated origins
<battre> https://developers.google.com/digital-asset-links/v1/getting-started
mkwst: both apple and google have
    ways to do this for credential sharing
    ... would be interesting to figure out if there is appetite for
    doing things like that more broadly
    ... is there a cowpath to be paved here?
    ... seems like there is some level of commonality
mike, there is also this from FIDO days: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.0-ps-20141009/fido-appid-and-facets-ps-20141009.html
<battre> https://developer.apple.com/reference/security/shared_web_credentials
mkwst: also prior work in DBOUND,
    so =JeffH would want to discuss
    ... though it seems like what apple and google have come up
    with is pretty different
dveditz: possible interest at Moz, we keep building and disbanding password manager groups as priorities change
qa/
JohnWilander: I do think it's on
    me to continue the thread I started
    ... should probably fork off the whole thread on shared
    credentials
<jochen___> I'm here
dveditz: Suborigin has had active list discussions lately
mkwst: jochen has taken over for joel, seems like talking about it next month would be a good idea
<estark> I've been meaning to send around a rough spec for Isolate-Me (wicg.github.io/isolation/index.html), maybe if we put that on the agenda for next time it'll force me to actually send it out
bhill2: I think dev ususally has a conflict with this time, but maybe we can give him enough notice or give everyone else enough to shift this call an hour or a day if needed to get both him and jochen on the call
dveditz: clear site data?
<adrianba> we still have people from Microsoft who are members of this group - i'll figure out who is going to pick up the engagement from crispin
<dveditz> thanks, adrianba
<deian> thanks all
<mkwst> wseltzer: https://www.w3.org/2017/04/19-webappsec-minutes.html is throwing a 404. Does RRSAgent just take some time?
This is scribe.perl Revision: 1.152 of Date: 2017/02/06 11:04:15 Check for newer version at http://dev.w3.org/cvsweb/~checkout~/2002/scribe/ Guessing input format: Irssi_ISO8601_Log_Text_Format (score 1.00) Succeeded: s/thaat/that/ Present: JohnWilander battre jochen___ gmaone dveditz ArturJanc plh_ mkwst terri deian bhill2 wseltzer estark No ScribeNick specified. Guessing ScribeNick: bhill2 Inferring Scribes: bhill2 Agenda: https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2017Apr/0028.html WARNING: No meeting chair found! You should specify the meeting chair like this: <dbooth> Chair: dbooth Got date from IRC log name: 19 Apr 2017 Guessing minutes URL: http://www.w3.org/2017/04/19-webappsec-minutes.html People with action items:[End of scribe.perl diagnostic output]