W3C

- DRAFT -

WebAppSec Teleconference 10-Feb-2016

10 Feb 2016

See also: IRC log

Attendees

Present
bhill2, francois, MikeSmith, wseltzer, ckerschb, dveditz, gmaone, timeless, teddink, kmckinley, terri, tanvi
Regrets
Chair
dveditz, bhill2
Scribe
Brad Hill

Contents


<trackbot> Meeting: Web Application Security Working Group Teleconference

<scribe> scribe: Brad Hill

<wseltzer> present=bhill2, francois, MikeSmith, wseltzer

<dveditz> I'm not here yet

<scribe> scribenick: bhill2

<teddink> Ted Dinklocker here - I am on the clal, but not sure if my microphone will work well.

(minutes are fixed now, Dan)

(forgot to run my script after last week's call)

Agenda Bashing

bhill2: still planning to do the interest matrix discussed on last week's call

<Zakim> MikeSmith, you wanted to comment

MikeSmith: I work for w3c along with Wendy
... 1st: heads up on recent addition of CSP support to the syntax checker
... 2nd: relatively recently we deployed TLS support to w3c with HSTS and some CSP stuff and wanted to propose that on a future call we get Jose from the systems team to give some feedback
... as a site administrator on deployment of some of that stuff, esp in respect to information sources used
... Last agenda proposal: interested in hoping some CSP related specs move along, e.g. SRI and referrer policy
... anything I can do to help those move along faster

Minutes Approval

https://www.w3.org/2016/01/27-webappsec-minutes.html

also now at the usual spot: https://www.w3.org/2011/webappsec/Minutes.html

WASWG Face-to-face in May?

bhill2: 1st half of May, Bay Area South is winning with 9 votes, including likely visitor from Apple/Safari

<dveditz> bhill2: poll shows early May winning (9) followed by early April and late May (8)

wseltzer: procedural matters are that we need to get notice 8 weeks before it is scheduled to take place

<dveditz> ... silicon valley the runaway winner

wseltzer: anyone willing to host?

dveditz: Mozilla can perhaps host in Mountain View

tanvi: we can probably get enough space in Mozilla Mtn View

bhill2: I will reach out to Apple and PayPal and see if they might want to host south
... and thank you to Mozilla for volunteering and kind and fun hosting in the past of this group
... Mike West's responses indicate that 1H May in Bay Area works for him

Referrer policy affect on Origin: header

dveditz: should referrer policy impact Origin header? recently started doing so in Chrome, in particular if referrer policy is none
... if doing CORS, have to send Origin header
... other spec suggests sending it all the time, but then some servers think this is a CORS request

bhill2: we found this at Facebook, specifically with same-origin requests where null Origin header was being sent

<wseltzer> tanvi: what happens if the user decides to suppress the referrer?

tanvi: also need to decide what to do with Origin header if user sets a preference to not send referrers

dveditz: moz has that in buried prefs somewhere but no standard
... would treat it as if page set no-referrer, should probably resolve it the same
... leaving aside Mozilla's hidden preference switch, extensions, etc.
... if a page said no referrer, that page is also the one trying to get a service from a page that wants an Origin
... should be up to the page author to resolve it with referrer policy
... otherwise no meaning to ability to set no-referrer

bhill2: origin-when-cross-origin is sort of ok here
... probably should put together a table describing the states
... maybe add none-when-cross-origin

dveditz: there are 10 or so possible states, only 4 expressed by policy

tanvi: would like to extend, maybe should discuss on a github issue

dveditz: then maybe flexible enough to suppress Origin as well

bhill2: and should call out that CORS-mode requests still send origin

dveditz: also maybe indicate suppression vs. null (distinguish from redirect)
... is there a spec for the Origin header

<wseltzer> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6454

bhill2: but this RFC is not in sync with what CORS does

"require integrity" directive

(and this mozilla bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=446344)

dveditz; a recurring topic is a way to indicate that SRI is required

scribe: doesn't look like we have the editors on this call today
... I would like to reject a global flag that says "require this for everything"
... pages that say this would then break if we extend the applicability of the attribute to e.g. images
... could add keywords to directives, e.g. 'require-integrity' to script-src
... worry that sites may not want to do that
... may be sites they don't want to require integrity for
... e.g. not for same-origin

<francois> so maybe something like "script-src sri+https://cdn.example.com"?

scribe: starts to get complex, difficult to fit into CSP syntax

bhill2: we already can express this by using hash syntax, but gets unweildy
... maybe proposals to support signing keys make this simpler to express
... so, like francois' suggestion but <key>+https://cdn.example.com/
... Adding, e.g. a key in the header provides stronger injection defense
... whereas an adversary that can inject also knows the hash value

dveditz: thinks people who wanted it wanted to not forget to add it themselves
... no signing mechanism yet, though people are experimenting with it

francois: in my mind, signatures are separate from require integrity proposals
... proposed by GitHub, want to make sure they don't accidentally add things outside of policy
... or forget to add SRI hash

(francois - you are breaking up)

(garbled)

scribe: sounds a lot like CSP, restrict accidentally introduced things
... more unknowns around signatures
... require integrity may be easier to get done and can be integrated into CSP in a good way, also get reporting with it

bhill2: I think this is a great place to experiment and prototype ahead of spec text

HSTS priming vs preloading

dveditz: one of the more active threads on the list
... unless anyone has something to say, should move on

"Safe Node" vs "a better toStaticHTML"

dveditz: proposal from David Ross, "Safe Node", Mario Heidrich gave a talk at Enigma Conf on a similar idea
... toStaticHTML is in IE, was at one point w/ a WHATWG spec
... is our WG the appropriate place for it, or should we leave it to the platform group?

bhill2: happy to have the discussion on this list with the right experts but would want to see stronger prototyping and feedback cycle before I'd support an official WG draft

CSP Syntax checking and the W3 validator

<wseltzer> https://validator.w3.org/

MikeSmith: recently I deployed CSP syntax checking support in the W3C validator that checks the value of the meta http-equiv
... content attribute if the value is content-security-policy and also checks the csp header if document is delivered with a header
... using library called Salvation from Shape Security
... wasn't completely up to date with current spec, gave some patches and seems to be correct now
... e.g. support for upgrade-insecure-requests
... was important for us at w3c as we deploy TLS with otherwise millions of instances of mixed content
... aligns with current CSP3 spec and also related specs
... validator sees on order of 12-15 requests / second
... lots are requests from normal devs trying to check their content
... has potential to get a lot of awareness raised about CSP and get a lot of people using it and fixing problems
... mostly an FYI, one open issue

<MikeSmith> https://github.com/validator/validator/issues/207

MikeSmith: sergei is ambitious about not only doing syntax checking but also doing real CSP checking against document content and CSP requirements
... take a look, get in touch with me if you are interested in refining or improving it

(timeless: yes, someone has their hangouts or similar making noise)

MikeSmith: don't have information to summarize our deployment in detail

W3 deployed TLS, HSTS, and CSP with upgrade-insecure-requests-- Feedback

MikeSmith: but one thing I have from Jose - he was confused and frustrated by state of CSP spec
... had difficulty being able to determine which spec to work from
... as a normal site admin trying to do a deployment
... what should he conform to
... CSP 1/2/3
... I got it, but I'm not him
... would be good if we could setup something to that Jose could join a call and give the group feedback
... always good to get a chance to get real feedback on issues folks are facing

dveditz: would be good to send an email first so we can use that to guide discussion on the call

<wseltzer> https://www.w3.org/Webauthn/

<dveditz> thanks for coming MikeSmith

yes, thanks much MikeSmith, awesome developments

Summary of Action Items

Summary of Resolutions

[End of minutes]

Minutes formatted by David Booth's scribe.perl version 1.144 (CVS log)
$Date: 2016/02/10 19:42:30 $

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Found Scribe: Brad Hill
Found ScribeNick: bhill2
Default Present: bhill2, francois, MikeSmith, wseltzer, ckerschb, dveditz, gmaone, timeless, teddink, kmckinley, terri, tanvi

WARNING: Replacing previous Present list. (Old list: mkwst, gmaone, bhill2, wseltzer, dveditz, francois, teddink, terri, jochen, MikeSmith)
Use 'Present+ ... ' if you meant to add people without replacing the list,
such as: <dbooth> Present+ bhill2, francois, MikeSmith, wseltzer

Present: bhill2 francois MikeSmith wseltzer ckerschb dveditz gmaone timeless teddink kmckinley terri tanvi
Found Date: 10 Feb 2016
Guessing minutes URL: http://www.w3.org/2016/02/10-webappsec-minutes.html
People with action items: 

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