

Secure Context

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How can we provide the devices
with **valid certificates**?

What kind of TLS server certificate should we adopt for the devices?

<https://github.com/httpslocal/usecases/blob/master/Certificates.md>

A) Public CA Certificate

- can chain up to Root CAs trusted by UA.

B) Private CA Certificate


- cannot chain up to the trusted Root CAs and it is used for internal server name.

C) Self-Signed Certificate

- is generated and signed by the device itself.

(A) Public CA certificate

e.g., PLEX's solution [1]



(A) Public CA certificate

- Pros

- There is no need to extend UA implementation.
 - UA can trust the issued certificates by default.

- Cons


- UA cannot access the device when the internet connection is down.
 - The domain name must be resolved by Public DNS.
 - The domain name and IP address of the device is disclosed globally because it must be registered in public DNS servers.
 - “CAs *SHALL* revoke all unexpired Certificates whose SAN or Subject Common Name field contains a Reserved IP Address or Internal Server Name.”
(CA/Browser Forum Guidance[2])

(B) Private CA certificate

- Pros
 - UA can access the device even if the internet connection is down.
 - “*Internal Server Name*” MUST NOT be resolvable using the public DNS.
 - The domain name of the device is not disclosed globally. There is no such kind of privacy concern.
- Cons
 - This kind of certificate is not permitted by UA.
 - If we’d like to make UA permit the certificate without manual operations, some kind of extensions are needed on UA specification and implementation.


(B) Private CA certificate

e.g., ACME Out-of-Band Challenge for TLS servers in local network.




(B) Private CA certificate

e.g., ACME Out-of-Band Challenge for TLS servers in local network.



Are there any possibilities for UA to be able to accept a private CA certificate if it is trusted by the web application and it is the root of the device's certificate?

(C) Self-Signed Certificate



(C) Self-Signed Certificate

- Pros

- UA can access the device even if the internet connection is down.
 - “Internal Server Name” MUST NOT be resolvable using the public DNS.
- The domain name of the device is not disclosed globally. There is no such kind of privacy concern.

- Cons

- There is no trust in the certificate.
- There is no way to revoke the certificate even if we find the device is imperiled.

Discussions:

What kind of TLS server certificate should we adopt for the devices?

	Public Cert.	Private Cert.	Self-signed Cert.
Pros	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No extensions required on UA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• can get access to the device even if the internet connection is down.• There is no privacy concerns related to DNS.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Same as Private Cert case.
Cons	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• cannot access the device when the internet connection is down [1].• disclose the domain name and IP address of the device globally.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• This kind of certificate is not permitted by UA [2].	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There is no trust in the certificate.• There is no way to revoke the certificate when the device is imperiled.
	<p>To resolve [1], we need some improvements on DNS protocols/systems. (Igarashi-san will talk about it.)</p>	<p>To resolve [2], we need to extend UA to permit such kind of certificates under some strict conditions.</p>	<p>Can we exclude this case ?</p>

References

- [1] PLEX
 - <https://blog.filippo.io/how-plex-is-doing-https-for-all-its-users/>
- [2] Internal Server Names and IP Address Requirements for SSL
 - <https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Guidance-Degraded-Internal-Names.pdf>
- [3] CORS and RFC1918
 - <https://wicg.github.io/cors-rfc1918/>