




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
# Authenticators

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# Convergence



# Biometric Traits and Modes




### Scenario 1



Legitimate employee attempts to log in to access corporate data from office in Southern California using work desktop at 9:00 a.m. PST

**Risk-based authentication analyzes:**

User ID	Password	Device Fingerprint	Location	Geo-velocity	IP Address	Login History
Valid	Valid	Corporate-issued computer, normally utilized by user	Location of company, from where user normally works	No distance traveled, accepted geo-velocity range	Valid	During normal working hours



### Scenario 2



Legitimate employee attempts to log into corporate email in San Francisco on smartphone at 8:30 p.m. PST

**Risk-based authentication analyzes:**

User ID	Password	Device Fingerprint	Location	Geo-velocity	IP Address	Login History
Valid	Valid	Recognized device associated with user	Not normal location, but near enough geographically	Distance traveled appropriate for user's last login time	Valid	During abnormal working hours



### Scenario 3



Attacker attempts to log in to access corporate data from the UK using a personal computer at 2:30 a.m. PST

**Risk-based authentication analyzes:**

User ID	Password	Device Fingerprint	Location	Geo-velocity	IP Address	Login History
Valid	Valid	Unknown device, no association to user	Abnormal Location and not near to standard location	Distance travel inappropriate for user's last login time	Valid	During very abnormal working hours





# IEEE 2410-2017 platform configuration options (ISO 24745)

Storage	Matching	
	Mobile	Server
Mobile	✓ (FIDO UAF, WebAuthN)	✓
Server	✓	✓
Shares (both mobile and server)	✓	✓



# IEEE 2410-2017 platform configuration options (ISO 24745)


Storage	Matching	
	Mobile	Server
Mobile	✓ (FIDO UAF, WebAuthN)	✓
Server	✓	✓
Shares (both mobile and server)	✓	✓



# IEEE 2410-2017 platform configuration options (ISO 24745)

Storage	Matching	
	Mobile	Server
Mobile	✓ (FIDO UAF, WebAuthN)	✓
Server	✓	✓
Shares (both mobile and server)	✓	✓

# INITIAL ONBOARDING & ENROLLMENT





# Six Principles for Self-Sovereign Biometrics

Contributors: John Callahan (JC), Heather Vescent (HV), Kaliya Young (KY), Darrell Duane (DD), Shannon Appelcline (SA), Asem Othman (AO), Adrian Gropper (AG)

Reviewers: Joe Andrieu, Manu Sporny, Kim Hamilton Duffy, Christopher Allen, Christian Lundkvist, Drummond Reed, Kyle Den Hartog, Markus Sabadello, Vishal Gupta


## ABSTRACT

Biometrics are widely used for identity proofing, identity verification and authentication, but many implementations are vulnerable to breaches and exploitation. For example, centralized repositories of biometric data, lack of privacy and control, and reliance on blockchains that are not designed for this purpose. This paper describes

1. Biometrics Should Be Stored at the Edge
2. Biometrics Should Never Be Stored on a Blockchain
3. Biometrics Can Be Accessed *Via* a Blockchain
4. Biometrics Should Be Under A User's Control
5. Biometrics Traits Should Be Reliable
6. Biometrics Are Part of an Ecosystem

## Biometric DID Auth Flow A: mobile store and mobile match

In this flow, the IBV is stored on the mobile device, typically with the assistance of a TPM, such as iOS Secure Enclave. This is a typical flow for hardware-specific biometrics, like TouchID and FaceID on iOS devices, where biometric data is never transmitted. This configuration is supported by IEEE 2410 and FIDO UAF. The mobile-mobile configuration corresponds to DID Architecture 1 and DID Architecture 2 <sup>19</sup>. In both architectures, the AuthN Materials (i.e., the private key) are protected by



# Biometric DID Authentication with IEEE 2410-2017

