


From KYA to Runtime Trust: Closing the Gap in Agentic Commerce.

No identity, no trust; no trust, no autonomous commerce.


What is an agent?

An AI agent is an LLM-based system deployed in the cloud, on a device, or on-premises, with instructions and access to tools—such as APIs, database, or Tools (e.g. MCP) —to perceive information, make decisions, and act on a user's behalf.

Agents may also delegate tasks to specialized sub-agents, creating nested or multi-agent workflows



What agentic AI means for the payment ecosystem ?




The classic **Four-Corner Model** in payments involves four key actors—Cardholder, Merchant, Acquirer, and Issuer—who facilitate secure transaction flows and settlement.

Emerging agentic commerce introduces **a fifth actor, the autonomous AI Agent**, which acts on behalf of the user to initiate and manage transactions.

This new role transforms the traditional model by **adding new interactions and responsibilities, requiring updated security, compliance, and operational standards** to support AI-driven commerce.


Overview of the emerging agentic AI commerce ecosystem

Paradigm shifting.



1. Immediate: Human-In-The-Loop

- The user actively supervises and authorizes transactions.
- The AI agent suggests options and seeks explicit approval before executing payments.



2. Delegation: When Human is not present

- The user pre-authorizes the AI agent to act autonomously under predefined conditions.
- The agent places orders, manages payments, and completes transactions **without real-time human input.**

Today's ecommerce trust baseline.

Consent integrity

How do we know that the payment information shown to the user has not been manipulated?

PCI DSS requirements address the security of the payment page and its browser-side scripts. Script authorization, integrity controls, inventories, and change- and tamper-detection mechanisms help protect the information rendered in the browser from client-side attacks.

How do we know that the merchant is legitimate and accountable?

Merchant onboarding and due diligence by the acquirer and payment network establish the merchant's identity, business legitimacy, and accountability. Network and acquirer rules provide recourse when fraud, misuse, or non-compliance occurs.

Merchant legitimacy

How do we know that this payment method is authorized for this merchant and use case?


EMV payment tokens replace the underlying card number and are constrained by token-domain controls, such as the merchant, device, channel or transaction type. These controls limit use outside the intended context.

Payment authorization

How do we know that the user approved this specific transaction?

Strong Customer Authentication, EMV 3-D Secure, and passkeys* bind the authentication event to transaction details such as the merchant, amount, payment method and context. This is commonly described as dynamic linking.

User consent




Impact of agentic commerce in trust model

How do we know that the payment information shown to the user has not been manipulated?

How do we know that the merchant agent is legitimate and accountable?

How do we know that the user approved the agent for this specific transaction?



How do we know that this payment method is authorized for this merchant agent and use case?

Emerging trust Framework

How do we know that the payment information shown to the user has not been manipulated?

AP2 and **Verifiable Intent** bind the merchant basket and transaction details into signed, verifiable evidence. The merchant, wallet, and payment network can independently check that the transaction has not been altered between the agent, merchant, and payment flow

How do we know which agent is acting, who operates it, and whether it should still be trusted?


KYA establishes an agent's identity, operator, principal, capabilities, and delegated authority during onboarding. Its trust status is then maintained through credential lifecycle management, policy checks, and continuous monitoring for behavioral drift, compromise, or misuse

How do we know that the user authorized this transaction—or authorized the rules under which it was executed?

AP2 and **Verifiable Intent** provide cryptographic evidence of the user's mandate, consent, and delegation.

Can we trust that the payment method is authorized for this agent and use case?

AP2 and **Verifiable Intent** can bind payment authorization to the agent, user mandate, merchant, amount, timing, and other policy constraints. Payment networks and issuers can additionally provision transaction-specific or **agent-specific tokens**, reducing the value of credentials used outside their intended scope.



What is Know Your Agent (KYA) ?

KYA in four steps

1. Evaluate the agent

Assess the agent, its operator, deployment, model, purpose, and controls against applicable regulations, policies, and risk requirements before onboarding.

2. Manage its identity


Assign the agent a unique, verifiable identity and use interoperable standards—such as DIDs, verifiable credentials, or signed tokens—to share and verify it.

3. Define authorization and scope


Bind the agent to explicit limits: what it may do, on whose behalf, with which tools or payment methods, for which counterparties, and within what amount, time, or geographic boundaries.

4. Monitor behavior and manage risk

Continuously observe the agent's actions, detect anomalies or policy violations, and adapt, suspend, or revoke its authorization when risk changes.




Risk of lack of oversight



What remains to be covered.


Agent oversight is required to

- **Verify agent identity and monitor behavior** to detect drift from the approved KYA profile and authorized scope.
- **Audit intent interpretation and execution** to ensure cart construction, merchant selection, and checkout decisions comply with user constraints.
- **Assess regulatory compliance** in merchant and payment-method selection, including fairness, contestability, and applicable regional rules.



Additional trust in Agentic AI commerce : FACT and ATLAS

Independent trust layer for continuous verification, oversight, and auditable trust signals



Improves fraud controls, decisioning, liability, and dispute handling.

What is ATLAS the new open standard ?

The **ATLAS Protocol Specification** defines an open, interoperable framework for independently assessing AI-agent behavior in commerce. It describes the roles, message flows, evidence, authorization, privacy controls, and signed trust signals needed to evaluate whether an agent followed the user's intent and applicable policies. ATLAS is designed to complement agent identity and payment-authorization standards such as KYA-OS, AP2, and Verifiable Intent, while keeping sensitive user data off the payment rail.

<https://hyperlab-fime.github.io/ATLAS-PUBLIC/atlas-protocol-specification-0.1draft.html>

The **ATLAS FAQ** explains how an independent Assessor can evaluate an agent's behavior, verify whether it followed the user's intent and relevant rules, and produce a compact, signed trust signal for merchants, wallets, and payment networks.

It also shows how ATLAS complements emerging standards such as KYA-OS, AP2, and Verifiable Intent—without exposing the user's private conversation.

<https://github.com/HYPERLAB-FIME/ATLAS-PUBLIC/blob/main/FAQ.md>

ATLAS: Agent Trust Layer and Assurance Standard

WORKING DRAFT July 2026

This version: <https://github.com/HYPERLAB-FIME/ATLAS-PUBLIC> (pending)

Previous versions: None — first published working draft

Feedback: [GitHub Issues](#) · Contact Fime / Consult Hyperion

Published by: **Hyperlab** — the Innovation Lab within [Consult Hyperion](#) (consulting by fime), exploring emerging standards for agentic commerce trust and assurance.

Abstract

This specification defines the **Agent Trust Layer and Assurance Standard (ATLAS) protocol** — a chained-capability-token assessment framework for agentic commerce. ATLAS standardises how authorized *Assessor agents* obtain bounded, encrypted evidence from *subject agents*, evaluate intent fidelity and policy compliance, and produce signed artifacts that can be consumed upstream and downstream without exposing raw conversations or unnecessary personal data.

ATLAS supports two assessment-initiation patterns: a **holder-mediated** path (merchant or credential provider commissions an Assessor) and a **direct** path (subject agent self-commissions an Assessor for compliance or regulatory evidence). Application trust relies on chained JWS/JWT delegation tokens and JWE-encrypted evidence over HTTPS with standard TLS. Downstream payment-rail integration uses compact `ReportToken` references assembled into a `redeem_tokens` field by the merchant processor for ISO 8583, EMV 3-D Secure, and ISO 20022.

Status of This Document

This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document.

This document was produced by **Hyperlab**, the innovation lab within **Consult Hyperion** (consulting by fime), as part of the Continuous Certification programme for agentic commerce (ATLAS). It is a **Working Draft** and does not represent a final standard. It has not been reviewed or endorsed by any external standards body.

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DEMO

Thank you



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