06:38:57 RRSAgent has joined #did-vc-challenges 06:39:01 logging to https://www.w3.org/2025/11/12-did-vc-challenges-irc 06:39:01 RRSAgent, do not leave 06:39:02 RRSAgent, this meeting spans midnight 06:39:02 RRSAgent, make logs public 06:39:03 Meeting: A Lean4-Verified Protocol for Smart Cities Addressing the Three Core Challenges of DIDs and VCs 06:39:04 Chair: Mitsuhide Matsuda 06:39:04 Agenda: https://github.com/w3c/tpac2025-breakouts/issues/73 06:39:04 Zakim has joined #did-vc-challenges 06:39:04 Zakim, clear agenda 06:39:05 agenda cleared 06:39:06 Zakim, agenda+ Pick a scribe 06:39:06 agendum 1 added 06:39:06 Zakim, agenda+ Reminders: code of conduct, health policies, recorded session policy 06:39:07 agendum 2 added 06:39:08 Zakim, agenda+ Goal of this session 06:39:08 agendum 3 added 06:39:08 Zakim, agenda+ Discussion 06:39:09 agendum 4 added 06:39:09 Zakim, agenda+ Next steps / where discussion continues 06:39:09 agendum 5 added 06:39:09 Zakim, agenda+ Adjourn / Use IRC command: Zakim, end meeting 06:39:10 agendum 6 added 06:39:10 breakout-bot has left #did-vc-challenges 07:02:49 tantek-projector has joined #did-vc-challenges 07:06:15 naomi has joined #did-vc-challenges 07:07:27 chair: Mitsuhide_Matsuda 07:15:14 https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1O2-I_6aJRaEog67Yl0UMTKm2Svx9JxcCKx7gVvLD9dM/edit?usp=sharing 07:16:01 [Mitsuhide talks about DID and VC overview] 07:16:18 tmaruha4 has joined #did-vc-challenges 07:16:56 Mitsuhide: both technolgies will consists to the future smart cities 07:17:34 [page 3] 07:17:41 jkamata has joined #did-vc-challenges 07:17:51 ... challenges remain unsolved in current implementations 07:18:04 ... the first challenge is using blockchain or IPFS 07:18:18 ... ID documents in others. Behavioral tracking 07:18:28 ... typically, DID documents are stored 07:18:53 ... 2nd challenge, selective disclosure of faces exposes a lot of personal information 07:19:03 ... for example, selective disclosure mean that 07:19:21 .... portion of their driver's license, do a bit wire 07:20:05 ... 20 years old is a bar in Jpaan 07:20:16 ... your exact age becomes known to the other party to verify 07:20:29 ... some systems adopt batch issures as an operational workaround 07:20:39 ... they issue hundreds of VCs for single soft kit 07:21:01 ... GKP will solve problem 07:21:26 denkeni has joined #did-vc-challenges 07:21:27 s/GKP/ZKP/ 07:21:55 ... ZKP doesn't solve issues @1 07:22:11 ... these 3 changes are common problems in Europe, India, Africa and Japan 07:22:29 [page 4] 07:22:54 Mitsuhide: I invented AMT protocol, it calls Amateras 07:23:09 ... it secures personal information protection, not through operations 07:23:17 ... it's a cryptographic story 07:23:22 atsushi has joined #did-vc-challenges 07:23:43 ... that combines @3 07:24:01 ... using blockchain or IPFS. How does the verifier obrain the DID document? 07:24:19 ... the empty pressure 07:24:34 ... DID document by sending this information into a template 07:24:47 ... the number on the public key 07:25:16 ... by husing this DID document, according to prescirbed rules, the verifier can obrain a DID in the format DID called AMT 07:25:25 ... fixing DID docment makes key notation impossible 07:25:39 ... therefore, in the AMT protocol, single for the single holder @4 07:25:51 ... and uses over 100 DIDS throw out their lifetime 07:26:07 ... the relationship between DIDs and VCs can be proven with@5 07:26:25 ... there's no impact on life cycle 07:26:31 [page 5] 07:27:01 Mitsuhide: we include ZKP, touch generated prompts. Anonymous hash identifier 07:27:27 ... from each transaction and the national ID, My Number called in Japan 07:27:52 ... if a government discoverd, they could be suspected all fraud 07:28:17 ... they can start through the anonymous hash identifire and IDs 07:28:41 ... for each event, anonimous hash identifires are assigned for taxation 07:28:51 ... this generates different hosts 07:29:52 Denkeni: when you issue VC, it's possible to embed it the DID into the VC 07:29:59 ... the ID, holder's date 07:30:05 ... you can make sure when presenting the VCs 07:30:13 ... it's presented by the exact holder 07:31:28 @4@: For ownership verification. If a signature is embedded in the Vc, the person presenting it can demonstrate ownership 07:32:28 ... There is a DID entity, and we add a DID comment. The sub-DID comment cannot be proven without a link 07:33:10 Mitsuhide: probably the relationship between DID comm @6 07:33:37 @4@: one proof for connection between the original DID. and the safety ID that is used in the context 07:33:53 ... signature to the verified credential shells, the link between the original DID 07:34:35 [page 15] 07:35:02 [page 16] 07:35:30 Mitsuhide: there's also a PDF blueprint, but most important is former code in the lean programming language 07:35:52 ... Lean is a @10 proving 07:36:30 ... AMT specific protocol implementation is about 2500 rules 07:36:46 ... basic data model spec 07:37:22 ... AMT claims @11 07:37:41 ... you can have protocol codecs to explain the specs to you 07:37:52 ... you can check results in github acitions 07:38:05 ... verification is possilble using Lean and AI agents 07:38:25 ... you may wonder if the innovative-looking AMD protocol 07:38:37 ... AMD uses DID, VC, IDCOM and JSON scheme 07:38:40 s/AMD protocol/AMT protocol/ 07:38:52 s/AMD uses/AMT uses/ 07:39:01 s/IDCOM/DIDComm/ 07:39:34 ... for JSON scheme, we established and formalized in Lean compared to subset, and JSON's subset 07:39:48 [page 19] 07:40:08 Mitsuhide: why I was able to solve this fundamental system? 07:40:27 ... thru 14 years programming experience, I got @11 07:40:34 ... I started Lean this year 07:40:59 ... I've succeeded and formalizing unknown valiational principle 07:41:12 ... 6000 lines by next year 07:41:23 ... is planning to announce about the Lean hypothesis 07:41:25 s/@11/worked for development of administrative system for Japanese government/ 07:42:57 [page 20] 07:43:16 Mitsuhide: ZKP circuit ecosystem is partially under developed 07:43:32 ... adopting quantum resistant cryptography, 07:43:40 ... considering whether to write specs in Lean 07:43:51 ... implement the code and output 07:44:08 [page 22] 07:44:21 Mitsuhide: we can achieve online election by incorporating secured computation 07:44:36 ... it culculates and aggregates results 07:44:41 ... while keeping them anonymous 07:44:54 ... without the calling ZKP, AMT makes possilbe 07:45:04 [page 23] 07:45:25 Mitsuhide: AI in economic activities with its own will 07:45:34 ... robots weiths highly developed emotions 07:45:41 ... equivalent to human rights 07:45:48 ... AMT protocol is technology that 07:46:23 ... look forward to work 07:46:55 @20@: for auditing. the government will brute force. why can't the government just brute force everything? 07:47:29 Mitsuhide: about computational complexity 07:48:12 ... in Japan 100 million people @15 07:48:22 ... at the latest, it will be finised in 1 day 07:48:43 ... Japan has 700 local governments 07:49:17 ... you don't have to target every citizens but I'm targetting local government at the first stage 07:49:55 Jay: Does the computational complexity depend on the number of bits? 07:50:15 Mitsuihide: the length hush depends on encryption methos you choose 07:50:22 ... we might have to use PQC 07:51:33 Jay: limitation of hush 07:52:33 s/limitation of hush/loughly, how long hash are you considering to target for use?/ 07:52:34 Mitsuhide: from 68 to 128 bites with the current cryptography 07:53:03 [Mitsuhide is calculating] 07:53:40 s/hush/hash/ 07:54:37 s/@20@/Markus_Sabadello/ 07:55:29 [page 24] 07:56:15 @21@: you'd rather usee ZKP to prove the link 07:56:34 ... what the Taiwan government is doing is rather the batch issuarance 07:56:42 s/Japan has 700 local governments/Japan has 1700 local governments/ 07:56:43 ... what you are trying to do here 07:58:52 @21@: you interact with the VC as the main DID to generate ZKP proof 07:59:00 ... then you perform the VC verification 07:59:13 ... interesting. That method exists, but EU uses a different approach 07:59:26 ... instead of this method, they issue many VCs to create different attrivutes 07:59:30 ... this prevents linking 07:59:39 ... the Taiwaneese government uses badges 07:59:45 ... pls share your thoughts on the design 08:00:10 Mitsuhide: if you think about the future, differnt issures, including AI agents for example issue credentials to humans or every industry 08:00:22 ... we don't know how many issures are out three 08:00:26 s/three/there/ 08:00:39 ... and also that requires a lot of infrastructure for every issure 08:00:44 ... that might not work 08:01:07 Mitsushide: I am also considering use cases in conflict zones 08:01:15 ... without network even 08:01:23 ... we can create ID 08:01:36 ... thru bluethooth for example 08:01:51 s/create ID/create DID from locally saved VC/ 08:01:53 ... in case of earthquake or nature disaster 08:02:22 ... the verification system can perform offline verification 08:02:54 ... Earth's VC can be used on Mars too 08:03:28 @21@: I'm summarizing. there's another reason why he chooses proof system, rather than batch issurance 08:03:38 ... like EU, this proof system works even offline 08:03:59 ... if we need a batch issuance, if we have one credentials from the issuer at one moment 08:04:07 ... and if we use all the credential we have 08:04:27 ... we have to ask for the batch 08:05:05 ... it may be interesting for you to check out Google Longfeller Library 08:05:18 ... they oversell make the proof sytem proof that is smaller 08:05:29 ... the proof generalization is easy 08:05:33 ... but the verification needs more time 08:05:37 ... the model works better 08:05:58 ... Google's one has a similar idea 08:06:32 ... they apply a similar method to you 08:06:41 present+ 08:07:58 @21@: Library for mdoc. Creating proofs is easy. Verification is heavy. 08:08:37 Mitsuhide: personal cloud. what to d owith the private key 08:08:57 ... I see, making the verifier heavier 08:09:37 s/Creating proofs is easy. Verification is heavy./Changing concept where heavy load is placed, light pipeline placed at creating proofs, and verification turnes into heavy./ 08:09:55 Mitsuhide: AMT's verifier will also verify close friends and romantic partners. This means the verifier will be assigned to individuals 08:10:55 ... I haven't checked how to implement ZKP. I should ask a trusted org which library to use 08:11:48 tmaruha4 has joined #did-vc-challenges 08:12:36 denkeni: Marcus has been asking questions about contributor to hit resolution 08:12:50 ... we have similar research on this 08:13:01 ... but not as deep as you did 08:13:08 s/hit resolution/did resolution/ 08:13:23 Mitsuhide: I'm currently developing by myself and I appreciate to hear the work outside of Japan 08:13:51 denkeni: I only knew My Number system in Japan but I'm glad to hear your activity 08:15:08 Mitsuhide: I want to AMT protocol to make it standardized one, and implement it to as government system 08:15:27 denkeni: standardization of the data method will help a lot for the governemnt ot adopt that 08:15:45 ... we can continue the discussion there about your deep methods application 08:16:07 ... including security and privacy 08:16:11 s/deep methods/did methods/ 08:16:53 s/data method/did method/ 08:20:55 rrsagent, please draft minutes 08:20:56 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2025/11/12-did-vc-challenges-minutes.html naomi 08:22:44 present+ jay_Kishigami, Takimi_Mouri, Hiromu_Ogawa, Ryoya_Kawai, Michael_Wilson, Toru_Mariuhashi, Junko_Kamata, Takahiro_Aritaki, Ryo_Tsuyuki, Atsushi, Will_Abramson, Denken_Chen, Kai_Otsuki, Itoe_Kinjo, naomi 08:38:52 naomi has joined #did-vc-challenges 08:58:59 present+ Markus_Sabadello 08:59:06 rrsagent, please draft minutes 08:59:07 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2025/11/12-did-vc-challenges-minutes.html naomi 09:52:09 naomi has joined #did-vc-challenges 11:54:29 naomi has joined #did-vc-challenges 12:58:03 naomi has joined #did-vc-challenges 13:54:33 tidoust has joined #did-vc-challenges 13:54:36 RRSAgent, bye 13:54:36 I see no action items