17:56:41 RRSAgent has joined #auto 17:56:41 logging to https://www.w3.org/2021/01/11-auto-irc 17:56:43 RRSAgent, make logs Public 17:56:44 Meeting: Automotive Working Group Teleconference 17:57:02 Meeting: In-Vehicle Best Practices 18:03:15 scribenick: ted 18:03:19 Scribe: Ted 18:03:59 Present+ Ted, Glenn, Rudi, Ashish, Adnan, Isaac, Peter 18:04:55 Present+ Arman 18:09:03 Ted: aggregate, queries... 18:09:08 … @@ 18:09:29 Glenn: I had similar thought, NHTSA is looking at accident recreation and safety features 18:09:46 … a particular OEM is working with them in providing that aggregate data 18:10:06 … it could be on a use case by use case basis where the data and insights are provided 18:11:35 … there is clear overlap in this NSF proposal as well as intersection with SmartCities and multi-modal transportation 18:11:59 … it could include other modes of transportation and external data sets 18:13:09 Ted: parallels with industry issues@@ 18:15:17 Glenn: the types of aggregate data sets... 18:17:55 Isaac: agree it makes sense to explore 18:27:00 @@ 18:27:07 Topic: Proxy reencryption 18:27:10 Isaac shares screen with diagram of key holder and other parties 18:27:20 [scribe was having technical/laptop problems] 18:27:53 Isaac: everything signed on the car would be encrypted with public key provded by owner 18:28:19 Rudi: this problem common in content protection such as DRM for restricting content 18:28:30 … handling different viewer's subscriptions 18:29:10 … I would suggest looking at best practices being used there. PKI is slow versus @@k 18:29:24 s/@@k/symetric key/ 18:29:53 … the symetric key is rotated. entitlement messages might be encrypted with PKI 18:30:06 … separate from the symetric content key 18:31:50 Isaac: that is a different approach with more complex key management. proxy reencryption also requires key managmenent but fewer just initial key pair per entity 18:33:55 [slide 2] 18:34:35 Isaac: NuCypher is trying to avoid single entity in the cloud, you can instead have multiple nodes which makes you more resilient to attacks as well 18:35:42 … owner will create a specific key pair, provide the car with public key. the car can use this key to sign additional keys and use them to encrypt the data 18:37:27 … in parallel the individual or third party on their behalf and can provide a reencryption key. next the user can share with the network the reencryption key along with policy 18:37:58 … the nodes enforcing the policy don't know anything about the data, unable to read 18:38:23 [slide 3 diagram] 18:39:02 … data consumer can request reencryption key and separately request data from the shared storage 18:39:34 Rudi: doesn't this require sharing private keys as well? 18:40:14 Isaac: no. proxy allows you to reencrypt data without knowing anything about it 18:42:43 Adnan: qualified applications each require a policy? 18:43:57 Isaac: one key is used to encrypt all the data, separately you sign reencryption keys and send to separate, trusted entity than the data storer 18:44:15 Rudi: in order to reencrypt don't you need the data in the clear? 18:44:27 Isaac: no, not with these types of resigned keys 18:44:46 … this scheme was initially used for encrypting email 18:45:17 … it allowed someone to take over, temporarily, use of a mail account while on vacation 18:47:09 Ted attempts to give a physical lock analogy 18:47:24 Isaac: better would be changing envelopes for mail 18:48:19 … everything in car encrypted with initial public key. for lock analogy, you can change lock without opening the door 18:48:31 … it is one mathematical operation 18:48:57 Rudi: to do so, you need some information about the initial private key that the public one is derived from 18:49:07 … that private key needs to be available somewhere 18:49:27 … leave the owner (Alice) possession 18:50:17 Isaac: Bob and Alice each provide their public key 18:50:33 Rudi: then the generated private key to reencrypt at risk of being cracked 18:52:03 Arman: shared key/secret 18:54:18 Ashish: so reencryption key created at start? 18:54:31 Isaac: no, at any time for additional data consumer 18:56:02 [Alice's private key and Bob's public key used to generate reencryption] 18:56:34 Arman: Alice gives Bob permission to decrypt. any information decrypted can be done based on his public key? 18:56:44 Isaac: no, needs the reencryption key 18:58:29 … there are other schemes that provide more protection 19:00:50 Arman: how do you restrict what data on the shared sever that Bob can access? 19:05:15 [continue this in two weeks and Isaac will send materials] 19:05:19 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2021/01/11-auto-minutes.html ted