13:24:42 RRSAgent has joined #httpslocal 13:24:42 logging to https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-irc 13:24:55 meeting: HTTPS Local Network CG 13:26:48 yamada has joined #httpslocal 13:27:57 r_kato has joined #httpslocal 13:28:44 yamada has joined #httpslocal 13:33:29 kouhei has joined #httpslocal 13:33:37 yhirano_ has joined #httpslocal 13:33:47 wooglae has joined #httpslocal 13:33:57 McCool has joined #httpslocal 13:34:05 kminami has joined #httpslocal 13:34:29 Mizushima has joined #httpslocal 13:34:35 t_homma has joined #httpslocal 13:34:58 https://github.com/httpslocal/group/wiki/Meeting2018Oct25TPAC#agenda 13:35:06 https://github.com/w3c/wot/blob/master/PRESENTATIONS/wot-https-local-10-2018.pptx 13:36:57 skk has joined #httpslocal 13:37:02 ryo-k has joined #httpslocal 13:37:18 horiuchi has joined #httpslocal 13:37:29 Presentation material (will repost in GitHub repository later): https://s01.ninja/files/1025_httpslocal.pdf 13:37:52 starting meeting by Igarashi-san who is chair 13:38:11 Ajitomi-san is one of presenter 13:38:15 introduction 13:38:19 Mizushima-san 13:38:31 Maccool san from Intel@tokyo 13:39:11 Igarashi, Aitomi, Sakakibara, Kajiwara, Kim, Hirano 13:39:26 Horiushi, Minami, Yamada, Honma 13:39:31 present+ Hiroshi Sakakibara 13:40:14 present+ Kouhei Ueno from Google 13:40:27 present+ 13:40:28 present+ Tomoaki_Mizushima 13:41:16 present + Michael McCool 13:41:24 Explaining Agenda 13:41:42 present+ Micheal McCool 13:41:52 Present by Kajiwara-san 13:42:13 https://s01.ninja/files/1025_httpslocal.pdf 13:42:39 Why we need https-local? 13:44:01 Browser requires https for various powerful features 13:44:39 installing self singed root CA is not good solution 13:45:12 Introduce Github repo (refer slide) 13:45:28 dajitomi has joined #httpslocal 13:45:30 tomoyuki has joined #httpslocal 13:45:47 rrsagent, make minutes v2 13:45:47 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 13:45:58 Scenario Overview 13:46:06 1. direct access from UA 13:46:14 2. Machine to Machine 13:46:18 3. Cross Origin 13:46:35 Home NAS device example 13:46:35 rrsagent, make logs public 13:47:23 UC-07: Secure offline communication for Home Automation 13:47:45 igarashi has joined #httpslocal 13:48:28 Chair: igarashi, dajitomi 13:49:13 https://github.com/httpslocal/usecases 13:49:26 use case description 13:49:31 Agenda: https://github.com/httpslocal/group/wiki/Meeting2018Oct25TPAC#agenda 13:50:11 Senario: PublicCA Cert for devices accessible globally 13:50:27 e.g. Mozilla's Things Gateway 13:50:31 s/Senario/Scenario/ 13:51:04 Pros, Cons explained (refer slide) 13:51:41 Scenario: Public CA Cer for devices accessible only in the local network 13:52:16 Scenario: Private CA Cert 13:53:38 Scenario: Self-Signed Certificate 13:56:06 Move on: Missing use case? Scope too large? 13:56:40 Questions? 13:56:42 plinss has joined #httpslocal 13:57:28 McCool: use cases such as network camera 13:57:36 Mizushima has joined #httpslocal 13:57:55 .. lot of iot devices deployed 13:59:06 present+ peter 13:59:13 https://github.com/w3c/wot/blob/master/PRESENTATIONS/wot-https-local-10-2018.pptx 13:59:18 scribenick: ryo-k 14:00:08 mmc: Presenting the current state of Web of Things standardization and strawman proposal for httpslocal 14:00:14 Topic: HTTPS in Local Network from the aspect of W3C WoT WG 14:00:42 ...: WoT CR to be published in January 14:01:34 ...: We still have a window for few small features, but not much space 14:02:23 ...: Deliverables: Thing Description (JSON serialization, JSON-LD) 14:02:25 ... 14:03:20 rrsagent, make minutes v2 14:03:20 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 14:03:36 ...: (showing JSON-LD version of TD) 14:04:55 ...: slide page 4 14:05:12 ...: Use case of httpslocal - Have a directory of local device, and have it deliver TDs securely 14:07:30 igarashi: q. security scheme standardized? 14:07:58 mmc: there are 8 of them 14:08:05 ...: s 14:08:27 ...: slide page 5 14:08:54 ...: slide page 6 14:09:12 ...: security schemes are overridable in a nested object 14:09:27 ...: security schemes : oauth2, psk, digest... 14:09:45 ...: (strawman) 14:09:55 ...: slide page 8 14:10:16 ...: there are standardized work in CoAPS specification. psk, cert, public 14:11:06 ...: one option here: what if we used these with HTTPS? 14:11:12 CoAP spec: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252 14:11:59 mmc: Public key is like using a local CA. 14:12:36 ...: "psk": key pre-distribution is needed 14:12:58 igarashi: We need a scheme that works under un-managed networks 14:13:18 rrsagent, make minutes v2 14:13:18 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 14:13:43 mmc: Do our current set of parameters support the use cases? 14:14:05 igarashi: We have already discussed pre-shared key based protocols such as J-PAKE 14:14:47 mmc: This is more for machine-to-machine than for browsers 14:15:36 igarashi: psk/dtls/coaps equivalently secure as tls1.3? 14:16:02 mmc: dtls should be equivalently secure 14:17:14 ...: Next thing on rechartered WG is to have a discovery service 14:18:16 igarashi: browser vendor support for coaps? 14:18:33 john_dai has joined #httpslocal 14:19:15 mmc: actually mozilla just took out coaps. they might be going for their gateway product. google chrome does not support 14:19:29 kouhei: does psk with https mean extending TLS? 14:19:35 Mizushima has joined #httpslocal 14:19:56 mmc: psk works under coap 14:20:20 rrsagent, make minutes 14:20:20 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 14:20:27 ...: it's where the key comes from 14:21:18 rrsagent, make logs public 14:21:21 ryo-k: does that result in modifying all the tls libraries in the wild? 14:21:50 mmc: maybe the configuration files. currently this is a strawman proposal to take the definition of coaps and adapt it to https 14:24:32 Topic: Review and Discussion on Proposals [Presenters: Igarashi-san] 14:25:14 rrsagent, make minutes v2 14:25:14 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 14:25:21 Topic: Publicly Trusted Cert. and Local Network Discovery by Tatsuya Igarashi (@igarashi50) 14:26:33 igarashi: Background. We had breakout sessions / discussions throughout 5 years of TPAC 14:27:09 ...: Some solutions for using publicly trusted certificates on local servers e.g. PLEX 14:27:33 https://github.com/httpslocal/group/blob/master/20181025_F2F_TPAC2018/PubliclyTrustedCert_and_LocalNetworkDiscovery_W3C_TPAC2018.pdf 14:27:57 ...: We may use Let's Encrypt to get publicly trusted certs 14:28:36 ...: Talks on Local Network Discovery under W3C. Web and TV IG, DAS WG, Second Screen CG 14:29:14 ...: Why publicly trusted certs? (1) Not easy for consumers to install private cert 14:29:37 ...: also very risky to install private certs onto their devices 14:29:54 rrsagent, make log public 14:30:20 rrsagent, draft minutes v2 14:30:20 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 14:31:17 ...: Messy for users to manage security of many devices from different vendors. 14:31:34 ...: (3) costly for small companies to manage private PKI. 14:32:23 ,,,: Issues 14:32:53 ...: (1) scalability/privacy of public dns/CT servers 14:33:33 s/,,,/.../ 14:34:20 ...: (2) name binding issues 14:34:57 binding public domain and local network is the issue 14:35:20 ...: in case of PLEX, the server should know the URL of devices in a secure manner 14:36:36 ...: using mDNS in public DNS works only for managed networks 14:36:50 kouhei: what is the threat model for privacy issues when using PLEX? 14:38:25 igarashi: The domain name might include personal information eg. owner name, and if these are disclosed through CT logs, they are now in the public 14:40:25 ...: PLEX means assigning global names to private IP address 14:40:58 ...: They can know about your private IP address 14:41:02 sakakibara: DNS has lot of privacy information is issue? 14:41:16 kouhei: what's the point on personalizing domain names? 14:41:57 igarashi: You need a human-readable name so that users can distinguish between devices 14:42:40 hirano: the names should be unique, (how to handle uniqueness?) 14:43:07 igarashi: please look at the URL for details 14:44:15 PLEX solution: https://support.plex.tv/articles/206225077-how-to-use-secure-server-connections/ 14:45:18 hirano: PLEX solution proposed by browser vendor? 14:46:00 igarashi: No, we asked them about how they think. There is a scalability problem with CT servers 14:46:47 igarashi: PLEX solution has discovery issue 14:48:27 igarashi: introduce candidate solutions 14:48:31 igarashi: Solution proposal. About scalability issue, short-term STAR certificates may work, because they don't need to be registered to CT logs 14:49:02 ...: alternatively, using Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate defined by CABF Baseline guideline 14:49:27 ...: Not supported by all major browsers yet 14:49:46 ajitomi: this solution is for intranet? 14:50:34 igarashi: no, not limited to that 14:51:20 ...: about binding issue, extension to local network discovery can address the issue 14:52:16 rrsagent, make minutes v2 14:52:16 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 14:52:40 igarashi: (propose strawman idea figure) 14:52:50 ...: W3C is a good place for this discussion, because secure contexts/mixed content is discussed under Web Security Standards under W3C 14:53:26 ...: (slide of proposal @ TPAC2017) 14:54:29 Topic: Draft proposals for supporting local HTTPS without publicly trusted Certificates by Daisuke Ajitomi 14:55:17 ajitomi: Proposals NOT based on genuine Web PKI certificates 14:55:21 https://github.com/httpslocal/group/blob/master/20181025_F2F_TPAC2018/20181025.w3c-tpac.httpslocal.proposal.pdf 14:55:58 ...: HTTPS for Local Domains by Martin Thomson @ Mozilla 14:59:40 ...: Issues for Web PKI-based solutions. (1) The device vendor should be responsible for guaranteeing the authenticity of the device, not the user 15:00:19 igarashi: there should be a different guideline for local devices. local devices need necessarily not comply to webtrust 15:00:40 ajitomi: (2) Readability/memorability of domain names 15:01:05 ...: .local indicate that they are local network devices 15:01:19 Martin's proposal: https://docs.google.com/document/d/170rFC91jqvpFrKIqG4K8Vox8AL4LeQXzfikBQXYPmzU/edit 15:01:20 ...: Martin's proposal 15:02:03 ...: challenge for local domains - names are not unique 15:02:14 ...: solution - extending the origin makes this possible 15:02:23 ...: web origin consists of scheme host port 15:02:40 ...: proposed solution "extending origin" 15:02:43 ...: adding additional property to that tuple guarantees uniqueness 15:03:58 ...: (showing UI figure in page 6) 15:04:44 igarashi: if there is lot of printers in a room, this can be an issue 15:05:21 igarashi: some kind of discovery api would be necessary if there are multiple devices of same vendor exists 15:05:41 hirano: maybe discovery api out of scope for https in local domains? 15:07:38 igarashi: the proposal does not talk about uniqueness of local domains. 15:08:43 kouhei: it addresses the uniqueness of local domains by extending the "origin" by adding SPKI hash 15:09:50 ajitomi: (shows the URL with SPKI hash, talks about TBD details) 15:09:51 martin proposed URL example: https://_NPNE4IG2GJ4VAL4DCHL64YSM5BII4A2X.printer.local 15:10:20 ...: Has drawbacks, like key changes, address changes, ... 15:10:53 @2: How does the browser find out which IP address "printer.local" ? 15:11:07 igarashi: they may be discovered through mDNS 15:11:13 hirano: communication encrypted? 15:12:09 ajitomi: the way to install private CA on the browser is not mentioned 15:12:14 rrsagent, make minutes v2 15:12:14 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 15:12:41 ajitomi: Ajitomi-san's proposal 15:12:46 Ajitomi-san's proposal: https://github.com/dajiaji/proposals/blob/abstract_proposal/draft_proposal_supporting_local_https_communication.md 15:13:13 ...: Two access patterns, normal access and cross-origin access pattern 15:13:36 (btw, the m2m case and direct access case in my slide corresponds to the "normal access case" in his slides 15:14:19 ...: 3 candidate solutions. PAKE-based approach, OAuth/ACE based approach, Device vendor issued certificate 15:15:06 ...: 1. User's approval, 2. webauthn-like trust model (app layer solution), 3. trust model (tls-layer solution) 15:15:23 ...: 1. Use PAKE based on user's approval 15:15:54 kminami has joined #httpslocal 15:16:17 ...: Add type: "pake" parameter to fetch API. In this case, a confirmation UI is shown 15:17:15 ...: before 2 and 3, describe WebAuthn's trust model 15:17:40 ...: There is a trust relation between FIDO server and Authenticator / RP and FIDO server 15:18:27 ...: This trust model can be matched 15:19:37 regrets+ Tomoyuki_Shimizu 15:20:16 ...: approach 2: calls fetch API with rpk + raw public key or fingerprint / pkix + SPKI based fingerprint 15:21:15 rrsagent, draft minutes v2 15:21:15 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 15:21:49 ...: 15:23:16 igarashi: In the WebAuthn case the authenticator device is guaranteed to be secured, but we cannot assume that local device is secured in this case 15:24:25 ajitomi: (approach 3) use private CA certs based on device attestation and user approval 15:24:51 ...: needs same kind of extension to fetch API 15:25:13 ...: browser regards this value (spki fingerprint) as a temporary trust anchor 15:26:08 horiuchi: in this case, authorization server needs to know that resource server is in local network. how does it do so? 15:26:43 ajitomi: addressed in last TPAC, please check slide 15:26:50 Topic: Wrap-up 15:27:24 igarashi: one of the big issue is that we need to distinguish between managed and unmanaged network 15:27:28 igarashi: Martin's idea is for managed network 15:27:35 ...: we mostly worked on unmanaged network 15:31:34 kouhei: think the use cases are sufficient, but what are the technical constraints? 15:33:22 igarashi: next steps: we need to clear the scope. continue discussion on GitHub / follow-up F2F meeting 15:33:41 horiuchi has joined #httpslocal 15:33:53 rrsagent, make logs member-visible 15:34:29 rrsagent, make logs public 15:34:41 rrsagent, make minutes v2 15:34:41 I have made the request to generate https://www.w3.org/2018/10/25-httpslocal-minutes.html tomoyuki 15:43:08 rrsagent, bye 15:43:08 I see no action items