# Second Screen CG Berlin F2F

May 17-18, 2018

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## Outline: Day 1

- Agenda review
- Open Screen overview
- Discovery
  - Review of Chrome data
  - Mandatory vs. optional mechanisms
- Transport
  - QUIC Data Channels
- Authentication
  - o J-PAKE
  - Public key based

## Outline: Day 2

- Control protocol, serialization
  - CBOR vs. Protocol Messages
- HbbTV/ATSC compatibility
- Open Screen Protocol Library
- Future use cases and APIs
- Planning

# Open Screen Protocol Background & Status


## Second Screen CG History

- Nov 2013: Initial charter
- Nov 2013 Dec 2014: Incubation of Presentation API
- Dec 2014: Presentation API transitioned to Second Screen Working Group
- Sept 2016: CG <u>rechartered</u> to focus on interoperability
- 2016-2017: Requirements, protocol alternatives, benchmarking plan
- Sept 2017: F2F at TPAC
- Jan-Feb 2018: SSWG rechartered. Phone conference, work plan
- May 2018: This meeting :-)


#### Presentation API

- 1. **Controlling** page (in a browser) requests presentation of a URL on a **receiver** device (on a connected display).
- 2. Browser lists displays compatible with the URL; the user selects one to start the presentation.
- 3. Controlling and receiving pages each receive a presentation connection.
- 4. The connection can be used to exchange messages between the two pages.
- 5. Either side may close the connection or terminate the presentation.

#### Presentation API: 2-UA Mode




#### Presentation API: 1-UA Mode




## Remote Playback API

#### <audio> or <video> element can:

- 1. Watch for available remote displays
- 2. Request remote playback by calling video.remote.prompt()
- 3. Media commands are forwarded to the remote playback device





#### Sample Code & Demos

1-UA:

https://googlechrome.github.io/samples/presentation-api/

https://googlechromelabs.github.io/presentation-api-samples/photowall/

2-UA: <a href="https://googlechrome.github.io/samples/presentation-api/cast.html">https://googlechrome.github.io/samples/presentation-api/cast.html</a>

Remote Playback API:

https://beaufortfrancois.github.io/sandbox/media/remote-playback.html

## Implementation Status: Chrome

	Desktop	Android
Presentation Controller (2-UA)	M51 May 2016	M48 Jan 2016
Presentation Receiver (1-UA)	M59 June 2017	
Remote Playback API		M56 Feb 2017

## Community Group Rechartering & Scope

Address main feedback from TAG around interoperability

Controllers and receivers on same LAN

Presentation API: 2-UA mode ("flinging" URL)

Remote Playback API: Remote playback via src= URL

**Extension** ability for future use cases

## Community Group Out Of Scope


Media codecs

**Streaming use cases:** 1-UA mode for Presentations, MSE for remote playback

Network traversal / guest mode

Interoperability with proprietary protocols (DLNA, Google Cast, etc.)

#### Open Screen Protocol



## Open Screen Protocol

Specify all network services & protocols needed to implement APIs

Can be deployed across a variety of devices and platforms

Re-use modern protocols and cryptography

## **Functional Requirements**

- 1. Discovery of presentation receivers and controllers on a shared LAN
- 2. Implement Presentation API
  - a. Determine display compatibility with a URL
  - b. Creating a presentation and connection given a URL
  - c. Reconnecting to a presentation
  - d. Closing a connection
  - e. Terminating a presentation
- 3. Reliable and in-order message exchange
- 4. Authentication and confidentiality
- 5. Implement Remote Playback API for <audio> and <video> src=

#### Non-functional

Usability

Privacy-preserving and secure

Resource efficient (battery, memory)

Implementation complexity on constrained devices

Extensibility and upgradeability

#### Open Screen Protocol - Stack

**Application Protocol** 

**Transport** 

**Authentication** 

**Discovery** 

#### Open Screen Protocol - Alternatives

**Transport** 

**Authentication** 

**Discovery** 

Custom binary, CBOR, Protocol Messages, JSON

TCP, WebSockets QUIC, RTCDataChannel, QUIC DataChannel

TLS 1.3 (via QUIC or wss) S-PAKE, J-PAKE

mDNS, DIAL, SSDP

#### Open Screen Protocol - "Modern"/"V1"

Application Protocol
Transport
Authentication
Discovery

Custom binary, CBOR, Protocol Messages, JSON

TCP, WebSockets QUIC, RTCDataChannel, QUIC DataChannel

TLS 1.3 (via QUIC or wss:) S-PAKE, J-PAKE

mDNS, DIAL, SSDP

#### Open Screen Protocol - WebSockets

Application Protocol	
Transport	
Authentication	

Discovery

Custom binary, CBOR, Protocol Messages, **JSON** 

TCP, **WebSockets**QUIC, RTCDataChannel, QUIC DataChannel

TLS 1.3 (via QUIC or **wss:**) S-PAKE, J-PAKE


mDNS, **DIAL**, SSDP


## **Evaluation & Benchmarking**

For each technology/protocol,

- Write up proposal for how it could be used
- Evaluate against requirements (performance, security, implementation)
- Write up proposal for benchmarking performance in the lab

#### "Open Screen Lab"





## What has been accomplished

- Requirements for Presentation API and hardware specs
- Evaluations of
  - o mDNS
  - SSDP/DIAL
  - o QUIC
  - RTCDataChannel
- Control protocol for Presentation API ("custom binary")
- Benchmarking plans for discovery and transport

## Major work items remaining for "V1"

- Discovery mechanisms required vs. alternative
- QUIC DataChannel
  - Mapping control protocol
  - ICE integration
- Control protocol
  - Consensus on serialization
  - Update control protocol
- Authentication mechanisms
  - Integrate J-PAKE
  - Support PKI-based authentication with TLS

## Discovery


## **Discovery Topics**

- Requirements, goals
- mDNS overview
- SSDP overview
- Implementation feedback & Chrome data
- GitHub issues
- Recommendations & next steps

#### Discovery: Requirements and Goals


- Allow Open Screen devices to discover each other on the LAN
- Publish enough data to bootstrap connections
  - IP, port, friendly name
- Responsive to receiver addition and removal
- Power efficient and scalable
- Secure: prevent device compromise

#### mDNS - Query & Response





#### mDNS - Disconnection

#### mDNS Listener mDNS Responder



#### SSDP: Advertisement





#### SSDP: Advertisement

```
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1

HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900

CACHE-CONTROL: max-age = 1800 [response lifetime]

NTS: ssdp:alive

SERVER: OS/version product/version


USN: XXX-XXX-XXX-XXX [UUID for device]

NT: urn:openscreen-org:service:openscreenreceiver:1


FRIENDLY-NAME.openscreen.org: TXkgUHJlc2VudGF0aW9uIERpc3BsYXk= [My Presentation Display]


RECEIVER.openscreen.org: 192.168.1.100:3000
```

#### SSDP: Query/Response



#### **SSDP:** Disconnection







## Discovery: Problems!

- Firewalls by OS and security software
- Routers/middleboxes configurations
- Other software/services block ports
- Enterprise policies
- ???


## Chromecast Dual Discovery




#### **Dual Discovery: Windows**



#### Dual Discovery: Mac



#### Dual Discovery: ChromeOS



#### **Dual Discovery: Summary**

#### How many would you find if you found 100 by dual discovery?

	mDNS only	DIAL only	Dual
Windows	91	90	100
Mac	96	91	100
ChromeOS	95	87	100

## Dual Discovery: Conclusions

- 1. Across platforms, mDNS is more likely to find a given device.
- 2. About 5% of failures can be attributed to network issues.
- 3. Windows has a failure rate of 10% for both mDNS and DIAL.
- 4. Adding DIAL improves reliability by 5-10%.

### Discovery: Recommendations

- 1. Across platforms, mDNS is more likely to find a given device.
- 2. About 5% of failures can be attributed to network issues.
- 3. Windows has a failure rate of 10% for both mDNS and DIAL.
- 4. Adding DIAL improves reliability by 5-10%.

mDNS should be mandatory for controllers and receivers.

SSDP should be specified as an alternative, but not moved forward as part of the core protocol.

**Evaluate additional discovery mechanisms (including SSDP) for the future.** 

### GitHub issues

<u>Issue #81</u>: [SSDP] Update implementation information

<u>Issue #57</u>: [SSDP] Update proposed use of SSDP to specifically prevent SSDP amplification attacks

<u>Issue #21</u>: Investigate mechanisms to pre-filter devices by Presentation URL Postpone to v2?

# Transport

### Transport topics

- Requirements, QUIC overview
- QUIC DataChannel background
- Application protocol mapping
- QUIC DataChannel bootstrapping and authentication
- ORTC API
- GitHub issues
- Proposals, next steps

### **QUIC Overview**


- Reliable, connection-oriented byte streams over UDP
- Multiple streams can be sent without head-of-line blocking
- Streams support message based or streaming payloads (media)
- Supports pluggable authentication handshake
- Supports alternative congestion control (BBR)
- Supports 0-RTT <u>TLS 1.3 session resumption</u>

### **QUIC Connections**



Each connection uses a separate crypto handshake. This assumes port sharing which may not be in v1. https://github.com/guicwg/base-drafts/issues/714

### **QUIC Streams**



Very lightweight; can be 0 to 2^62 bytes and spread among packets.


# QUIC protocol mapping (multi connection)

Control channel between controlling and receiving user agent	QUIC connection	
Control channel command/response	QUIC stream (id for ordering)	
PresentationConnection between controlling page and presentation	Separate QUIC connection	
PresentationConnection message	QUIC stream (id for ordering)	

# QUIC protocol mapping (single connection)

Control channel between controlling and receiving user agent	Fixed QUIC stream id	
Control channel command/response	Separate QUIC stream	
PresentationConnection between controlling page and presentation	Separate QUIC stream	
PresentationConnection message	Uses existing stream for connection	

#### **QUIC Congestion Control (BBR)**




## QUIC Handshake (1 RTT)

```
Client
                                                              Server
Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key share*
     | + signature algorithms*
     | + psk key exchange modes*
     v + pre shared key*
                                                        ServerHello ^ Key
                                                                      I Exch
                                                       + key share*
                                                  + pre shared key*
                                                                      ^ Server
                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
                                              {CertificateRequest*}
                                                                      v Params
                                                     {Certificate*}
                                               {CertificateVerify*}
                                                                      I Auth
                                                         {Finished}
                                                [Application Data*]
     ^ {Certificate*}
Auth | {CertificateVerify*}
     v {Finished}
       [Application Data]
                                                 [Application Data]
```


## QUIC Handshake (0 RTT)

```
Client
                                                       Server
ClientHello
+ early data
+ key share*
+ psk key exchange modes
+ pre shared key
(Application Data*)
                                                  ServerHello
                                             + pre shared_key
                                                 + key share*
                                       {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                + early data*
                                                   {Finished}
                                          [Application Data*]
(EndOfEarlyData)
{Finished}
[Application Data]
                         <---->
                                           [Application Data]
```


## **QUIC DataChannel**



### QUIC DataChannel - ICE




### ICE State Machine




#### **STUN Binding**

```
Request {
                                     STUN
  address: 192.168.0.7:1234
                                     Server
 username: "abcdefgh"
  signature: 0x1a2b3c4d
                      .......
                          Response {
                            public address: 69.147.64.34:3434
                            username: "abcdefgh"
                            signature: 0x2b3c4d5e
```


#### **STUN Binding**




#### **STUN Binding**



#### QUIC DataChannel ICE Bootstrapping (LAN)



#### QUIC DataChannel ICE Bootstrapping (LAN)



Q: do we need dummy STUN server for this to work?

### QUIC DataChannel authentication

- Each side obtains (or generates) an RTCCertificate
- Passes the certificate fingerprint to the other party by secure signaling
- The fingerprint is passed into the data channel after ICE connects to initiate TLS handshake
- Can extract keying material from QUIC connection for separate auth step

#### <u>ORTC</u>

```
WebIDL
           食
 [Constructor(RTCIceTransport transport, sequence<RTCCertificate> certificates),
  Exposed=Window]
 interface RTCQuicTransport : RTCStatsProvider {
     readonly attribute RTCIceTransport transport;
     readonly attribute RTCQuicTransportState state;
     RTCQuicParameters
                             getLocalParameters();
     RTCQuicParameters? getRemoteParameters();
     sequence<RTCCertificate> getCertificates();
     sequence<ArrayBuffer>
                             getRemoteCertificates();
     void
                             start(RTCQuicParameters remoteParameters);
     void
                             stop();
     RTCQuicStream
                             createStream();
              attribute EventHandler
                                             onstatechange;
              attribute EventHandler
                                             onerror;
              attribute EventHandler
                                             onstream;
 };
```

#### ORTC

```
const ice = new RTCIceTransport(new RTCIceGatherer({/* ICE options */}));
const localCert = RTCCertificate.generateCertificate(/* algorithm */);
/* Send local certificate fingerprint via signaling */
const quic = new RTCQuicTransport(ice, [localCert]);
quic.onstatechange = => {
  if (quic.state == 'connected') {
    const stream = quic.createStream();
    stream.waitForWritable.then( => write(...));
    stream.waitForReadable.then( => readInto(...));
    stream.finish();
/* Await remote certificate fingerprint from signaling */
quic.start({role = "auto", fingerprints = ["deadbeef"]});
```

## Implementation Status

Basic implementation in Chromium: <a href="mailto:net/third\_party/quic/quartc">net/third\_party/quic/quartc</a>

Supports BBR

Crypto is stubbed out

QuartcPacketTransport will only be implemented by ORTC (ref)

### GitHub issues

<u>Issue #84</u>: [QUIC] Investigate and propose use of DataChannel framing on top of QUIC

<u>Issue #83</u>: [DataChannel] Investigate use of DataChannel without all of WebRTC

<u>Issue #73</u>: [DataChannel] Define bootstrap mechanism for RTCDataChannel

Issue #82: [QUIC] Find out timeline for TLS 1.3

## Proposals

**Proposal: QUIC DataChannel as the V1 transport.** 

Specify two modes: DataChannel over UDP or ICE with host candidates.

Integrate ICE + STUN / TURN for network traversal in V2.

## Work Items (WebRTC/ORTC)

#### Work with WebRTC on:

- Use of ICE in a LAN-only scenario
- Possible implementation of Open Screen Protocol with ORTC
- Demuxing with other protocols (RTP, RTCP, DTLS, ICE)
- Implementation status

## Work Items (QUIC)

#### Work with QUIC implementers on:

- Connection multiplexing
- Message ordering with stream IDs
- Server parameters
- Use of 0-RTT connections and BBR on LANs
- Pluggable authentication (J-PAKE?)

# Authentication

## **Authentication Topics**

- Requirements & threats
- <u>J-PAKE</u> authentication (no prior key exchange)
- Public-key based authentication
- Open questions and next steps

### Requirements & Threats

- Protect integrity of the user's display selection
- Ensure presentation connections are between appropriate parties
- Ensure confidentiality and integrity of presentation URLs, ids, & messages

#### Threats

- Passive network observer (on-LAN, off-LAN, WAN)
- Active network attacker (injection, replay, spoofing)
- Side channels (timing attacks, telescopes?)

### Additional threats to consider

- Malicious or insecure content
  - Cross-origin presentation connections
  - Phishing via presentations
- Mis-configured routers/ISPs
- Compromised displays/user agents
- Device change of ownership or theft

Recommend a white paper analyzing all threats in more detail and proposing mitigations. Also document what specific data on the wire should be protected.

## J-PAKE key exchange

Requires a shared password (no prior public key exchange required).

https://github.com/webscreens/openscreenprotocol/blob/gh-pages/j-pake.md

https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/

#### J-PAKE: Round 1

### **Controller (Alice)**

```
round_1 {
   g1: bytes;
   g2: bytes;
   zkp_x1: bytes;
   zkp_x2: bytes;
}
```

### Receiver (Bob)

#### J-PAKE: Round 2

#### **Controller (Alice)**

```
round_1 {
   g1: bytes;
   g2: bytes;
   zkp_x1: bytes;
   zkp_x2: bytes;
}
```

#### Receiver (Bob)

```
round_2 {
    g3: bytes;
    g4: bytes;
    B: bytes;
    zkp_g3: bytes;
    zkp_g4: bytes;
    zkp_x4: bytes;
}
```

#### J-PAKE: Round 3

# Controller (Alice)

```
round_1 {
   g1: bytes;
   g2: bytes;
   zkp_x1: bytes;
   zkp_x2: bytes;
}
```

```
round_3 {
   A: bytes;
   zkp_x2: bytes;
}
```

#### $Ka = (B - (g4 \times [x2*s])) \times [x2]$

#### Receiver (Bob)

```
round_2 {
   g3: bytes;
   g4: bytes;
   B: bytes;
   zkp_g3: bytes;
   zkp_g4: bytes;
   zkp_x4: bytes;
}
```

 $Kb = (A - (g2 \times [x4*s])) \times [x4]$ 

## J-PAKE next steps

Propose passcode requirements, possible UI, and key derivation function.

Define J-PAKE key exchange messages as part of control protocol.

Determine whether J-PAKE can be used for recurring authentication.

### J-PAKE initial connection

- QUIC connection with self-signed keys.
- 2. J-PAKE to derive shared secret.
- J-PAKE secret verification.
- 4. Extract keying info from QUIC connection and verify with shared secret.


## J-PAKE key exchange

- 1. Complete prior steps to create a J-PAKE authenticated connection.
- 2. Server (presentation display) generates a long lived signing certificate.
  - a. For TLS 1.3 compatibility it uses this same cert for all connections.
- 3. Server sends public key to client (controlling UA).
  - a. It may have signatures attached, e.g. from display manufacturer.
- 4. Client generates a long lived signing certificate.
  - a. Tied to the public key fingerprint for the server cert.
- 5. Client sends public key of its cert to server.

### PKI based authentication

- 1. Server advertises its signing certificate fingerprint via discovery.
- 2. Server and client create a short lived (~48H) certificate for TLS handshake.
- 3. TLS certs are signed by long lived certificates exchanged earlier.
- 4. Client verifies server cert was signed by server signing cert.
- 5. Server verifies client cert was signed by client signing cert.

### After certificate exchange



## Cert structure, lifetime, scope

- Selection of cipher suites and signature algorithms
  - Hardware crypto capabilities may come into play
- Identities associated with certificates
  - Display: serial number/code + friendly name + display model
- Per-PresentationConnection certificates?
- Certificate lifetime
  - Want to ensure they are reset on factory reset or user data deletion
- Client certificates and privacy
  - Want separate certificate store for private browsing
- Certificate revocation, requirements changes, transparency logs, etc.

## PKI based authentication: Next steps

Full proposal on key exchange

Full proposal on certificate structure & scope

Comparative research from other IoT efforts (Nest, WoT, etc.)

Develop representative user interface for both J-PAKE and PKI based auth

## **Control Protocol & Serialization**


## **Control Protocol Topics**

- Overview of control protocol
- Current custom binary serialization
- CBOR alternative
- Protocol Buffers alternative
- Discussion & recommendation for serialization
- Extensions & roles
- GitHub issues

### **Protocol Overview**

- Broad Message Types (Flavor): Command, Request, Response, Event
- Presentation API Message Types
  - Presentation Display Availability
  - Presentation Lifecycle
  - Presentation Connection Management
  - Presentation Application Messages
  - Receiver Status

### Protocol Header



## Versioning

- Versioning is done using major and minor version numbers (X.Y)
- Two implementations can talk if they support the same major version
- Minor versions may extend another minor version but remain backwards compatible
- Discovery and connection process should negotiate version
  - TODO: Add this to the working specs for these processes.

## **Custom Binary Format**

#### Message Header

Byte offset		
0	+	-+
	+ PROTOCOL_ID	+
4	+	-+
	+ FLAGS	+
8	+	-+
	+ MESSAGE_LENGTH	+
16	+	-+
	+ MESSAGE_TYPE	+
24	+	-+
	+ SEQUENCE_ID	+
32	+	-+
	+ REQUEST_ID	+
36	+	-+
	+ MESSAGE BODY	+
	4	
	3.	
	+	-+

#### **Availability Request**

Flavor: R		
Type: 0	×0001	
Subtype: 0	x0001	
Byte Offse	t	
32	+	+
	+ NUM_URLS	+
34	+	+
	+ URL_1_LENGTH	+
38	+	+
	+ URL_1_CONTENT	+
	+	+
	+ URL_2_LENGTH	+
	+	+
	+ URL_2_CONTENT	+
	+	+
	+	+
	+ URL_N_LENGTH	+
	+	+
	+ URL_N_CONTENT	+
	+	+

#### **Availability Response**

	Response	
Type:	9x0001	
Subtype:	9x0002	
Byte Offs	et	
40	+	
	+ NUM_URLS	
42	+	
	+ INDEX_1	
44	+	
	+ AVAILABILITY_RESULT_1	
45	+	
	+	
	+ INDEX_N	
	+	
	+ AVAILABILITY_RESULT_N	
	+	

### **CBOR Alternative**

- Concise Binary Object Representation <u>RFC 7049</u>
- Based on JSON data model
- Design Goals:
  - Allow for very small code size
  - o Fairly small message size
  - Extensibility without version negotiation
- Open source implementations available in many languages
  - o C, C++, C#, Java, Python, Ruby, Go, JavaScript, etc.
  - Still requires type-specific encode/decode to be done

## **CBOR Samples**

```
struct {
 int x;
  float y;
{ 7, 2.8f }
   fa 40 33 33 33
{ 30000, 2.8f }
19 75 30 fa 40 33 33 33
```

23-byte strings can be encoded with single-byte tag

## **CBOR Optional Fields**

```
A = (
    x: int,
    ? y: float,
    ? z: float,
)

Value-or-null:
{int}{null|float}{null|float}
```

```
B = (
    x: int,
    ? y: int,
)
```

#### Omission:

```
{int}{int} or {int}
```

Also works for JSON map-style encoding

### **Protocol Buffer Alternative**

- Google's serialization scheme (similar to XML and JSON)
- Open source implementation also available in many languages
  - o proto2: Java, Python, Objective-C, C++
  - o proto3: adds Go, Ruby, C#
- Uses code generation for encode/decode to typed messages

```
message ProtocolId {
                                 message MessageType {
                                                                      message Header {
  enum Type {
                                    enum Flavor {
                                                                        required ProtocolId protocol = 1;
                                                                        optional int32 flags = 2;
   PRESENTATION API = 0;
                                 COMMAND = 0;
   REMOTE PLAYBACK API = 1;
                                    REQUEST = 1;
                                                                        required int32 message length = 3;
                                     RESPONSE = 2;
                                                                        required MessageType message type = 4;
                                                                        required int64 sequence id = 5;
 required Type type = 1;
                           EVENT = 3;
  required int32 version major = 2; }
                                                                        optional int64 request id = 6;
  required int32 version minor = 3; required Flavor flavor = 1;
                                    required int32 type = 2;
                                    optional int32 subtype = 3;
```

### Benchmark Data

- Benchmarks were run with prototype
   PresentationAvailability{Request,Response} messages
- CBOR used untagged serialization variant shown before
- -02 everywhere

### Benchmark Data

#### Code size

	Test+Generated	Library
CBOR	30KB	42KB
Protobufs	94KB	3.8MB lite (30MB full)

#### Message Size

	Request	Response	
CBOR	131 B	137 B	
Protobufs	258 B	282 B	

Benchmark w/ 10000 messages

	Read	Write
CBOR	14 ms	9 ms
Protobufs	12 ms	17 ms

### Discussion & Recommendation

- Performance is very similar
- CBOR is more size-efficient but possibly more error-prone
- Both are open source and available in many languages
- CBOR has decent tooling support (debugging, CDDL, validation)
- CBOR was adopted by the Web Packaging standard
- CBOR would have more efficient JavaScript support

Our recommendation at this time is to use CBOR for serialization

## Capabilities & Roles





# Open Screen Protocol Library


## Open Screen Protocol Library Outline

- Goals and rationale
- Library architecture
- Embedder API (sample)
- Dependencies, toolchains and style
- Repository & access
- Work plan

### Goals and Rationale

- Create a complete library solution to translate network protocol to Presentation API and Remote Playback API
- Platform-independent, Chromium-independent
- Allow replacement of network services (e.g. mDNS) by users

#### Architecture



## Embedder API (sample)

```
class PresentationController {
 public:
   // Requests screens compatible with |url| and registers |observer| for
   // availability changes. The screens will be a subset of the screen list
   // maintained by the ScreenListener. Returns a positive integer id that
   // tracks the registration. If |url| is already being watched for screens,
   // then the id of the previous registration is returned and observer
   // replaces the previous registration.
   uint64 t RegisterScreenWatch(const std::string& url,
                                 PresentationScreenObserver* observer);
   // Requests that a new presentation be created on |screen id | using
   // presentation url, with the result passed to |delegate|.
   // |connection delegate | is passed to the resulting connection.
   void StartPresentation(const std::string& url,
                           const std::string& screen id,
                           PresentationRequestDelegate* delegate,
                           PresentationConnectionDelegate* conn delegate);
   // ...
```

## Embedder API (sample)

```
// An object to receive callbacks related to a single PresentationConnection.
class PresentationConnectionDelegate {
  public:
    // State changes.
    virtual void OnConnected() = 0;
    virtual void OnClosed() = 0;
    virtual void OnDiscarded() = 0;
    virtual void OnError(const std::string& message) = 0;
    virtual void OnTerminated(PresentationTerminationSource source) = 0;

    // A string message was received.
    virtual void OnStringMessage(const std::string& message) = 0;

    // ...
}
```

## Embedder API (sample)

#### Controller

#### Receiver

```
controller.js:
presentationRequest.start()
   .then(connection => {
        connection.send("hello");
   });
```

#### Embedder (e.g. Chromium):

```
connection->SendString("hello");
```

### Embedder (e.g. Chromium):

### Platform API

- Porting layer of the library for platform primitives
- Similar to Chromium base/ and WebRTC rtc\_base/
- Sockets, threading, logging, network state, system power states, etc.
- Not yet designed

### Get The Source

- Get the source
  - O git clone <a href="https://chromium.googlesource.com/openscreen">https://chromium.googlesource.com/openscreen</a>
  - O git submodule update --init --recursive
- Built with gn
  - Contained in a Chromium checkout.
  - Also available from storage.googleapis.com (see README.md)
- Gerrit for code review (also see README.md)

## Open Screen Library Timeline

Jan 2018: Kickoff

Feb 2018: Hello World

June 2018: Embedder APIs

August 2018: Platform APIs,

Control protocol

Oct 2018: Authentication

2H 2018: Benchmarking, E2E testing

2019: V2 features

## Intentionally Blank :-)

### Protocol extensions

Why we need them. Sample use cases