The IdM card approach
Increasing privacy and security in user-centric Identity Management

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Abstract

In this document, we describe how security and privacy can be increased in user-centric Identity Management (IdM) by the introduction of a so-called IdM card. This IdM card securely stores and processes identity data of the card owner, an end user. The card represents a trusted device that supports the user in managing its digital identities and also in performing secure and privacy-enhanced service authentication and authorization.

I. INTRODUCTION

With an increasing amount of services and service providers Identity Management (IdM) is becoming crucial. Among others, IdM enables managing identity information securely in distributed or ubiquitous systems by maintaining this information at Identity Providers and by securely exchanging it to services that need for trustworthy identity information. An enormous growth is expected by [1] for the IdM market. IdMs facilitate managing information like identities, attributes, properties, and policies of its registered end users via internet. Moreover, user-centric IdMs allow users to keep some control over their personal data. That is, users control the processing of their data either directly (user’s consent is required), indirectly (management of PII is outsourced to a third party) or both.

As IdM will manage personal data of an end user and other data that is applied for authentication or authorization, the maintenance of security and privacy is vitally important for user-centric identity management. In order to assure the security and privacy across all different layers (including network or services layer) of an identity management framework, different security- and privacy-enhancing modules are needed [2]. The goal of our work presented in this document is to introduce a so-called IdM card as one important link in this chain of modules to be able to address certain challenges in today’s IdM Systems (IdMS).

Identity fragmentation is one of the most urgent challenges that need to be addressed by IdM since it is directly related to emergence of new security and privacy risks like identity theft. Furthermore, management of several passwords and usernames often leads to password fatigue and rejection by users. Other prominent challenges and possible sources of risks like data disclosure are caused by the growing number of different entities dealing with PII or other sensitive data. This leaves the door open for illegally monitoring and tracking of data.

Another challenge related to the user-centric IdMSs is proportionality, which means the challenge to balance the traditional service providers’ wish to control their customer by means of authentication and identification, against users’ interest of being in charge of deciding who and how the user’s data is handled.

The design of an IdMS for access management while taking the risks and challenges previously mentioned is the task, where our IdM card approach makes significant contribution.

The rest of this document is organized as follows: Section II introduces the SWIFT architecture as the context for our IdM card approach. In Section III we will specify requirements for the introduction of smart card in user-centric IdMS. Our IdM card approach is outlined in Section IV. This also comprises a detailed view on the contribution of our IdM card regarding the requirements from Section III. A conclusion is given in Section V along with open issues and outlook on future works.

II. BACKGROUND

The approach described in this document is one of the concepts developed by the EU project SWIFT. SWIFT project develops an IdM solution that overcomes shortcomings of existing IdM solutions and addresses challenges for future IdMS. It presents a cross-layer approach that integrates network and application layer from an IdM perspective. As a consequence of a conducted gap analysis [4], SWIFT identified that the classical role definition of IdMS is not sufficient. SWIFT proposes a solution by subdividing the role of Identity Provider (IdP) into three different roles (cf. Figure 1) and serves as a basis for SWIFT architecture.
Service Provider (SP), the Relying Party, consumes assertions over User’s identifying data to grant access to restricted resources, if some predefined conditions are met.

Attribute Provider (AttP) is a sub-role of the IdP role, which exclusively focuses on the issuance of Users’ attributes, i.e. claims on the user’s identity that are certified by the AttP.

Authentication Provider (AuthNP), another sub-role of the IdP, only assumes the responsibility of the User’s authentication.

Identity Aggregator (IdAgg) manages Virtual Identities, which are defined as the aggregation of partial identities (i.e. set of attributes) from different AttPs. The IdAgg creates a new level on the identity management hierarchy, placing itself between the SPs and the AttPs and AuthNPs [3].

For the description of the SWIFT IdM architecture and its corresponding security modules, please refer to [2],[5],[6].

III. REQUIREMENTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE IDM CARD PERSPECTIVE

On the base of the detailed analysis of security and privacy issues in modern IdM systems [8][9], we define the following requirements for smart-card-based IdMSs. They are grouped by categories: functional, security and privacy.

A. Privacy requirements

The following requirements are mandatory to guarantee end-user privacy when processing (i.e. retrieval, collection, storage, disclosure, etc.) any personal data [7] in the context of smart-card-based IdMS.

Data Minimization and User Empowerment. The processing of identity data should be minimized as much as possible and only happens for legitimate purpose. Further, the solution should enable users to keep control over their personal data (e.g. through their involvement in the specification and enforcement of access rights to their private data). In order to comply with these principles, several privacy features have to be supported, which are: pseudonymity, anonymity, unlinkability and unobservability (see [8]). However, end users should not be able bypassing the non-repudiation and accountability functions while acting under pseudonyms or anonymous identifiers.

Data Privacy. The smart card-based solution should support methods to obfuscate user’s identity data before it leaves the card. This is commonly archived by means of pseudonymity and anonymity. Primarily, both concepts are useful within scenarios in which it is required to authenticate but not necessary to identify users before granting service access. Pseudonymity and anonymity alone may not be sufficient. Smart-card-based IdMSs should give the user the possibility to decide if transactions or activities are linkable or not. Moreover, the unauthorized flow of personal information should be prohibited, e.g. when interacting with untrusted terminals. The access to or disclosure of stored personal data has to be performed according to the user’s preferences.

Location Privacy. The IdMS must not collect past and current position of a user without consent.

Privacy Preservation in each IdM Workflows. Privacy should be addressed in all processes and components involved in the identity management lifecycle. Therefore, credential issuance process must guarantee data confidentiality and the underlying IdMS should support the balance between security requirements mentioned above and the users’ privacy needs.

B. Security Requirements

High Assurance Level. Entities providing services need assurance that they offer their services only to genuine and registered users. For instance, a physical access control system need to clearly determine who is actually in front of the door, in order to apply the right admittance permissions.

Mutual Authentication. User should be able to authenticate the IdAgg and SP respectively. This requires a mutual authentication process which mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks and phishing attacks (no malicious entity should be able to impersonate a legitimate user in order to enter a facility or to access online service) especially when user’s credentials are shared among or reused by different components of the IdMS (e.g. IdAgg or SP).

Secure Storage. We stress that the relevant identity information for such a method are digital credentials, already stored on or generated by the IdM card. The access sensitive information stored on the card has to be restricted to the card owner, and the misuse of credentials (e.g., unauthorized updating of attributes) has to be prohibited.

Trustworthy Credentials. Credentials should be reliably verifiable and revocable: End users or any non-authorized entity should not be able to forge valid credentials, even if they team up. The probability for successfully forging a credential should be virtually zero. Only IdAgg (as well as IdP, AttP, and AuthNP) should be able to make genuine and verifiable assertions about a user identity. Furthermore, other security requirements should be reliably enforced, for instance message authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
Besides the authentication of users, an IdMS must support the deployment of a fine-grained protection (in terms of authorization) of physical and digital resources, as well as support for accountability.

C. Functional Requirements

Less dependency on online IdM entities. As entities, e.g., identity/attribute providers are legitimately considered as single points of failure that additionally may become bottlenecks, an increased degree of independency from such components during the service (and network) access should be supported. The IdM solution should be flexible enough to allow eligible users to authenticate and access protected services or facilities, even in case of network or components failure.

Usability and mobility support. The IdM solution should be designed while keeping the end users’ convenience in mind. The end user should be able to easily perform creation, usage and deletion of her different digital identities. The support of mobility (incl. identity portability) should allow the continuity in the service usage for roaming end users moving from domain to domain or systems to systems respectively.

Scalability and openness. Provisioning of identification data to services requires a scalable storage and management of user attributes.

IV. THE IDM CARD APPROACH

A. Features of IdM Card

The IdM card provides a high-level interface that can be used by the end user to perform various IdM tasks. Although under personal control of the end user, the IdM card represents the IdMS and is equipped with some of its functions to enable the user to authenticate to and be authorized by services. This way, the IdMS will not be directly involved in the process of authentication and attribute provisioning, which minimizes the load and avoids the IdMS to be a single point of failure.

When looking at the typical design of IdMS, it seems to be desirable to equip the IdM card with the following functions, many of them falling into the responsibility of the IdAgg:

- PIN verification function,
- Secure storage of the user’s pseudonyms, attributes, preferences, and keys,
- Secure storage and management of the user’s IdM profile (i.e., the user’s virtual identities),
- Synchronization between IdM card and IdAgg,
- Secure storage and usage of an IdAgg signature key,
- Generation of statements.

Before access is granted, the IdM card authenticates the user by PIN. All the required information for accessing a service, is stored or generated on the IdM card and available after successful PIN authentication. The IdM card securely stores user’s attributes (verified claims about the end user like address, age, etc.), preferences (user-defined attributes), keys (for cryptographic operations), and pseudonyms (for service access). Moreover, the IdM card performs various IdM mechanisms like the storage and management of various partial identities that the user has created for different purposes. Furthermore, it is able to generate authentication and authorization statements, which are needed by the SP to allow service access to the user. In order to be accepted at the SP these have to be signed by the IdAgg.

In order to sign statements on behalf of the IdAgg, the IdM card must securely store and use a signature key of the IdAgg. This key is the trust anchor of the approach and is trusted by all associated services.

The IdAgg shall employ multiple, different signature keys for the IdM cards that it issues in order to forestall the compromise of the whole system if one card has successfully been attacked. Having different keys reduces, moreover, the expected gain of an attacker. On the other hand, IdM cards shall not have individual keys to maintain unlinkability of the users. Thus, the IdM card
provides a group signature that proves the user’s affiliation to this IdAgg. Furthermore, the user is anonymous within the group of IdM card owners with the same IdAgg signature key.

It is very important that the storage functionality is not static but also allows a later update initiated by the end user and approved by the IdAgg. Attributes need to be renewed from time to time e.g. when validation periods have expired. Furthermore, a user may want to use new services for what he has to include new attributes or credentials on the IdM card. In these cases, an online update between the IdM card and the IdAgg avoids the need to issue a complete new IdM card.

The IdM card is enrolled by an IdMS provider to its users. After enrollment, it is under the control by the end user. However, the user can not influence the IdM functions that are running on the card including data like attributes and keys, especially the IdAgg’s signature key. Thus, the card is able to generate statements in the name of the IdMS.

B. IdM card Design

In order to be able to use the features described before, the end user is provided with an IdM card (e.g. a smart card or java card) where its identity data is included. We employ a Java Card as these provide enough flexibility and storage space for implementing the needed IdM mechanisms on the card.

The IdM card is under the control of the end user who can use or connect it with its own device (e.g., laptop, netbook, smart phone) or a public, stationary terminal (e.g., interactive kiosk, digital door lock) provided that the device or terminal supports the IdM features of the IdM card. This is achieved by installing a client software on the terminal that handles the user’s input and translates it into commands of the IdM card interface.

Figure 3 shows a high-level view on how the card is structured. The **Identity Manager** is the main routine of the IdM card and processes all incoming commands. Only commands defined by the Identity Manager will be processed. Other commands or a direct access to other components (e.g. the secure storage) are not permitted and will be blocked. For the purpose of generating authentication and attribute statements the Identity Manager can consult the **Statement Generation** function. As the latter relies on the user’s profile, more precisely on the attribute and credentials from it, the Statement Generation function uses the **user profile** that is stored in the Secure Storage of the Java Card. For this purpose, the Statement Generation function uses the IdAgg signature key to sign the statement. This key is securely stored in the Secure Storage and is not accessible from the outside of the card. Also the functions implemented on the IdM card do not allow reading out this key. It can only be accessed by the Statement Generation function to sign authentication or authorization statements, which only contain attributes from the user’s profile. Thus, the IdAgg signature key never leaves the IdM card.

An important privacy feature is the use of pseudonyms for the communication with services. Thereby, it is necessary that the used pseudonyms are not predictable by anyone (especially an attacker) in order to inhibit the linkability of different actions of sessions (i.e. service accesses). This functionality is provided by the **Secure ID Generator** that generates pseudonyms if desired by the user. For the case that the user likes to access the same service with the same pseudonym several times (e.g. to access the same online shop account with her shopping cart) the IdM card stores generated pseudonyms in the Secure Storage.

If the user initiates the update function to synchronize the user profile on the IdM card with the current version of it in the IdAgg, this is handled by the **Synchronization Client** in the IdM card. The Synchronization Client controls the synchronization process and encrypts data to and decrypts data from the IdAgg. The Synchronization Client communicates only with the IdAgg that issued the IdM card to assure that no illegitimate entity gets access to the user’s profile. Thereby, the user’s personal data never leaves the card (or the IdAgg) without being secured against eavesdropping and modification as the data will be encrypted or decrypted within the IdM card.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

In this document we presented the IdM card approach that enables a user to take its own IdM along, to make use of services independent from the utilized terminal and from the location where it is used. By this way, it furthers the mobility of the end user enabling service access from different locations, the support of multiple devices, and performing certain IdM tasks independent from the availability of the IdMS.
Regarding privacy and security, the IdM card provides the advantage that identity data is securely stored in a personal device always under the control of the user. The data terminal utilized by the user (personal mobile device or stationary terminal) is only needed for data transmission and for doing some operations exceeding the computation power of the IdM card. Additionally, the IdM card is not limited to store only one single identity but different virtual identities, which employ different pseudonyms for service access.

At present we are engaged in the implementation of a prototype of the IdM card and its application environment as proof of concept. Physical security of the smart card (for example the protection against side-channel attacks) is out of scope of this document.

Currently, the end user has to trust the terminal with which he is accessing the card in such a way that the client software is implemented correctly and does not intercept and store the input of the user. Thus the integrity and trustworthiness of the terminal is of concern in scenarios like physical access control where the terminal is not under control of the end user. A possible enhancement for future solutions is to equip the IdM card with a biometric user authentication function instead of the currently used PIN-based authentication. The use of biometric features strengthens the binding between the IdM card and its legitimate owner. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the end user never forgets the PIN or unintentionally passes it to other users.

Standardized smart card functions only provide basic security mechanisms. Thus, as identity management becomes more important future work is the standardization of IdM card functions like the ones described in this document.

The approach described in this document exclusively relies on X.509 public key and attribute certificates. Other kind of certificates, like anonymous credentials as well as the related trust models could provide further interesting security and privacy properties.

VI. REFERENCES