

How Sites Can Manage HTTPS When Users Don't

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
**W3C Workshop
on Transparency & Usability of Web Authentication**

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
Simplifying Users' Tasks & Decisions


Users currently burdened with tasks related to:

1. Addressing
(place)

2. ~~HTTPS~~
(~~security~~)


*Our proposal removes
users' HTTPS tasks*





Goals


- **Reduce users' cognitive overhead**
- **Free users to focus on location (place)**
- **Complement 'anti-phishing' research**




Browsing to a Secure Site: **What's Expected of Users Today**


Two methods by which to ensure a secure connection

- § **Request a secure connection to a site**
- § **Verify security after the connection is established**




Current process: Method A: Request






Current process


Method B: Verify







Our Proposal Removes Tasks & Decisions

Method A: Request




Method B: Verify







Using our SSR Proposal: Users' Tasks & Decisions

Method 1: Trusted Source



Method 2: Untrusted Source






Why Don't We Have the Simpler Model?

Browsers have needed user input to activate HTTPS

- **Browsers *must* default to HTTP**
- **Security-activation agreement problem**
 - **No secure means of discovering whether a site offers HTTPS**



Our Proposal:


Sites Publish their Security Requirements

The Service Security Requirements (SSR) record


Example requirement:

All web connections must use HTTPS, minimum SSLv3

- **Securely published and universally accessible**
- **SSR is a record stored in the DNS**
- **DNSSEC provides the security for the record itself**



Query root zone DNS server



Alice


Browser
key_{root} = 0x23D

A: I don't know `www.w3.org`, but...


.org	= 134.58.14.3
key _{.org}	= 0xA51

Signed with key_{root}

Q: What is the address of:
`www.w3.org`



DNS + DNSSEC + SSR: Query .org zone DNS server




A: The w3.org DNS server is:

w3.org	= 134.58.14.3
key _{w3.org}	= 0xA51


Signed with key_{.org}

Q: What is the address of:

www.w3.org



DNS + DNSSEC + SSR: Query w3.org zone DNS server



Root = 123.42.12.1
 key_{root} = 0x23D
 .org = 234.238.53.142
 key_{.org} = 0xA51
 w3.org DNS server = 134.58.14.1
 key_{w3.org} = 0x38F
 www.w3.org = 134.58.14.3
 www.w3.org has SSR record

Alice

 Browser
 key_{root} = 0x23D


A:

www.w3.org = 134.58.14.3
 www.w3.org has an SSR record

Signed with key_{w3.org}


Q: What is the address of:

www.w3.org



DNS + DNSSEC + SSR:

Return responses to client




.org = 134.58.14.3
key_{.org} = 0xA51
Signed with key_{root}

A:
w3.org = 134.58.14.3
key_{w3.org} = 0xA51
Signed with key_{.org}


www.w3.org = 134.58.14.3
www.w3.org has an SSR record
Signed with key_{w3.org}

Q: What is the address of:

www.w3.org



Query w3.org zone DNS server for SSR




A: The `www.w3.org` SSR record:

HTTPS required:
SSLv3 or TLS v1
HTTP forbidden


Signed with key_{w3.org}


Q: What are the security requirements for:

`www.w3.org`



DNS + DNSSEC + SSR: Initiate HTTPS connection






The SSR Record's Capabilities

**Enables sites to raise security level of users' configurations
(*exactly what Chuck Wade requested*)**


- **Require protocols & protocol options**
 - Cipher, keylength, etc.
 - E.g. HTTPS using SSLv3 and AES-256
- **Forbid protocols & protocol options**
 - E.g. no HTTP, no SHA1
- **Securely redirect**
 - E.g. `etrade.com` → `secure.us.etrade.com`
- **Restrict subdomains**
 - E.g. acceptable subdomains are `login.w3.org`, `www.w3.org`



Value of Simpler Model

Requirements presented yesterday by Ian Fette (CMU)


- **Concepts at users' level of understanding**
 - ✓ Removes HTTPS tasks (which are not at user level)
- **Minimal interaction with user**
 - ✓ Removes interaction
- **Should be hard to make mistakes**
 - ✓ SSR records prevent users' mistakes managing HTTPS
- **Works wherever the user is**
 - ✓ Yes, if we can seduce those browser folks (wink, wink)
- **Consider disabilities**
 - ✓ Disabled users no longer need to see locks



SSR Design Questions

Open questions:

- **Secure redirection: use S-NAPTR or build into SSR?**
- **How should we define a service?**
 - **Yes! It can be used for services other than the web.**
- **What other abilities could/should SSR provide?**
- **How to best meet the needs of browser developers?**



Questions & Discussion

Questions?

Comments?

Ideas?