Re: TPE Handling Out-of-Band Consent (including ISSUE-152)

If David's characterization  of what Ronan is seeking is correct, I'd suggest the practice would be incompatible with DNT:1

On Mar 22, 2013, at 9:48 AM, David Singer <singer@apple.com> wrote:

> 
> On Mar 22, 2013, at 3:19 , Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org> wrote:
> 
>> David, 
>> 
>> what I see is the question who bears the risk of error. Ronan says: we 
>> activate our data-vacuum-cleaner and expect the browser not to interfere 
>> because 24 hours later we may be able to show out-of-band consent. If we 
>> are unable, we will de-identify in some way. 
>> 
>> This basically raises the question how one can opt-out of an unknown 
>> state. I think there are two ways depending on who takes the higher 
>> risk: 
>> 
>> 1/ Ronan's vacuum-cleaner makes sure they have the consent they need and 
>> indicate that by storing an exception and getting DNT:0 behavior. If 
>> they have stored exceptions where they had no consent, the watchdogs 
>> will go after them. Risk is on their side.
> 
> I don't think Ronan is asking for an exception from the users he wants to track.  I may have it wrong, but I think he wants to say:
> 
> "I might have out-of-band consent from you; I am going to collect the data, and within 53 weeks I will separate the data of those for whom I do not have consent, and discard it, and retain after that the data for those who did give consent; there is no way other than finding the original consent agreement for you to know which class you are in, or change your mind, and nothing online in the transaction or site will give you a clue where this consent might have been given."
> 
>> 
>> 2/ The browser basically allows for all collection and tracking 
>> technologies even under DNT:1 and at some point someone may go to some 
>> URI to find out whether there was consent. Or perhaps not even that. 
>> Risk is on the user's side. 
>> 
>> I think in Ronan's scenario, they should signal "C" and take the risk of 
>> overstating while cleaning out their base ASAP. On the long run, they 
>> will have to think about how to handle DNT:1 users and whether they want 
>> to leverage the DNT signal for their system which would remove the 
>> uncertainty. Because they could determine at any moment in time whether 
>> they have consent or not. They could just look it up in the browser in 
>> real time via the API. 
> 
> The claim, as I understand it, is that they cannot look it up in anything close to real-time.
> 
> I think the potential for abuse of what I have written above is rather concerning. Even a hypothetical situation where they signal "possible consent", and offer a URI where the user can find out whether the site thinks that they have consent, and allows the user to change their mind, feels…uncomfortable…and that's not what is being asked for, as I understand it.  This is what Shane suggests (well, he suggests merging "I claim I have consent (C)" with "I might have consent, let me check" (for which I would suggest a different character)):
> 
> On Mar 22, 2013, at 6:42 , Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> 
>> The working group appeared to agree to use the “L” for not listening based on this week’s call (“!” will be used to signal something different).  How about stick with “C” but name it “Conditional” with a resource link to explain what that means in your context?
> 
> 
> A 'debugging' UI should be possible, even if it's not often used.  The conformance people at industry associations should be able to 'crawl' their members's online presence and confirm that they seem to be upholding the standards of the association and the reputation of the industry for transparency and accountability.  I don't see how to get there with this problem, yet.
> 
> 
> David Singer
> Multimedia and Software Standards, Apple Inc.
> 
>

Received on Friday, 22 March 2013 17:46:24 UTC