

# 3P Credential Creation in Webauthn

Lisbon Plenary  
2020-02-05

Use case

**Gadgets!!**

Buy this gadget.

Buy

*gadgets.  
com*



Use case

# Your PISP

You gonna buy dis?

Price: \$45

FoP: BoA \*\*\*\*\*1234

Buy

*pisp.com*

*boa.com*



Use case


**Gadgets!!**

You bought it!

Buy more stuff







# Your PISP

You gonna buy dis?


Price: \$45

FoP: BoA \*\*\*\*\*1234

Buy



Is the real user authorizing this transaction?




# Your PISP

You gonna buy dis?


Price: \$45

FoP: BoA \*\*\*\*\*1234

Buy



Is the real user authorizing this transaction?





# Requirements

- No pre-existing trust between PISP and “bank”
- “Bank” wants to directly authenticate endpoint.
- No additional network connections (other than to pisp.com)

# Proposal:

“Bank” directly creates FIDO credential at client,  
but *scoped to PISP...*

*...at KYC-time.*

# Your PISP

Welcome to your brand  
new PISP!

Let's get started!

Name:

Bank:

Acct#:

Go



*pisp.com*

https://www.boa.com

# Bank of A!

Hey Bob, pisp.com sent  
you here, let's make  
sure it's you!


Shoe size:

CVV:

DoB:

It's really me!

*boa.com*



https://www.boa.com

# Bank of A!

Hey Bob, pisp.com sent you here, let's make sure it's you!

Shoe size:

CVV:

DoB:



create() for  
*pisp.com*

https://www.boa.com

# Bank of A!

Hey Bob, pisp.com sent you here, let's make sure it's you!

Shoe size:

CVV:

DoB:



Learns public key and credential id

# Your PISP

Welcome to your brand  
new PISP!

You are all set!

FoP: BoA \*\*\*\*\*1234

Yay!



*pisp.com*

Credential can be  
used by PISP.

Credential ID was  
forwarded by  
"bank" during  
redirect.

at transaction time...





# Gadgets!!

Buy this gadget.

Buy

*gadgets.  
com*

# Your PISP

You gonna buy dis?

Price: \$45

FoP: BoA \*\*\*\*\*1234

Buy



```
fido.get({  
  credId: credId,  
  rpId: pisp.com,  
  challenge: hash(  
    txId, price, ...  
  ...})  
})
```

# Your PISP

You gonna buy dis?

Price: \$45

FoP: BoA \*\*\*\*\*1234

Buy





FIDO  
assertion

*pisp.com*

*boa.com*







Trusts credential and can verify assertion because it knows public key



**Gadgets!!**

You bought it!

Buy more stuff

*gadgets.  
com*

# Proposal:

RP A can create a FIDO credential **for RP B.**

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Whoa! - what about tracking/correlation???



# Proposal:

RP A can create a FIDO credential **for RP B**. But:

- RP A can't exercise the credential afterwards. Only RP B can.
- Credential must not be resident-key.
  - This ensures that no *new* channel is created between A and B

# Proposal:

RP A can create a FIDO credential **for RP B**.

Can be done through extension or simply by relaxing the spec.

# Benefits of the proposal

- Meets the requirements
  - No pre-existing trust between PISP and “bank”
  - “Bank” wants to directly authenticate endpoint.
  - No additional network connections (other than to pisp.com)
- No change in CTAP/authenticators needed
  - (just change in platform)
- “No resident-key” requirement has side effect of precluding DoS attacks

# What's next?

- Feedback from WG
- PR to webauthn spec