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14:38:27 <JoeHallCDT> scribe is me
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14:38:42 <JoeHallCDT> on by default, more than MTI, something other than certs
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14:38:59 <JoeHallCDT> Sean: we can have religious wars about things…
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14:39:23 <JoeHallCDT> … whatever it is in the area that you're going to try to bind a key to a container, just do it
14:39:57 <JoeHallCDT> more than certs: don't care, religious argument, moving on
14:40:20 <JoeHallCDT> Sean: on by default, and more than MTI are subtely the same thing
14:40:32 <JoeHallCDT> Jon P. more than MTI means something about how IETF process works
14:40:56 <JoeHallCDT> … on by default is slightly different from there is no encryption optoin
14:41:08 <JoeHallCDT> Culen: and a third is "there's no way to turn encryption off"
14:41:17 <JoeHallCDT> Sean: we can say MTI is great but we can say MTU
14:41:28 <JoeHallCDT> … we can eat our own dogfood and not do kabuki theatre
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14:41:44 <JoeHallCDT> … turning it off in walled garden doesn't work
14:42:06 <JoeHallCDT> Bernard aboba: complaints I've heard about difficulut in using security, is because of lack of implementation experience
14:42:18 <JoeHallCDT> … when dev team is not able to do their work, bugs get fixed
14:42:36 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: negotiating security options has been difficult, the fewer options the easier it is
14:42:49 <JoeHallCDT> Joe H: we have a history of no adequately dealing with downgrade attacks
14:43:00 <JoeHallCDT> Sean: new attacks have made it obvious that we made the wrong choice
14:43:20 <JoeHallCDT> Eliot: what is it? encryption
14:43:34 <JoeHallCDT> … well there is another room over there that talks about if you have a cert
14:44:12 <JoeHallCDT> Andrea: encryption on by default is what we want for sure, auth by default is hard to do by default… what do we use?
14:44:25 <JoeHallCDT> Russ: you can't get authentication with nothing
14:44:42 <JoeHallCDT> Andrea: why haven't we been using TLS all these years? maybe not the encryption but the cert auth.
14:45:07 <JoeHallCDT> … the fact that you can get the encryption without dealing with auth is a good thing
14:45:30 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: are we talking about making a process change to IETF specs? or creating guidelines (BCP) that we think you should do x?
14:45:56 <JoeHallCDT> … what we don't want, is IPSec, tcpcrypt, TLS, CMS to be MTI and then we have bloat bloat bloat
14:46:27 <JoeHallCDT> woman from cisco: if it's on by default, you can still turn it off
14:46:35 <JoeHallCDT> Coop: what are the different choices that we're talking about?
14:46:45 <JoeHallCDT> … building a protocol and design is different from process
14:46:53 <JoeHallCDT> Russ: it's more about will the IESG send it back?
14:47:07 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: what process change do we want? because we're not buidling a protocol here.
14:47:35 <JoeHallCDT> McManus: layers and switches create a market problem where people deploy them in the easiest way possible.
14:47:42 <JoeHallCDT> … if crypto is baked in, that can be a win
14:47:55 <JoeHallCDT> Sean: want to get to where it's on, it's secure and the user doesn't have to check
14:48:33 <JoeHallCDT> some guy: on by default catches a minor subset of people that don't
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14:48:41 <JoeHallCDT> … no one has the MTU scope
14:48:58 <JoeHallCDT> … so if there is not insecure version defined, that's how we get to MTU at IETF
14:49:18 <JoeHallCDT> Dave Crocker: if there is no alternative than MTU than folks will just work around it.
14:49:23 <JoeHallCDT> … have to make it more deployable.
14:49:50 <JoeHallCDT> some guy: can't have utopian view… his enterprise depends on DPI and stuff
14:49:57 <JoeHallCDT> … not going to turn it off due to other concerns
14:50:20 <JoeHallCDT> Rogers: some of these blocks of companies and countries will swing the pendulum the other way...
14:50:30 <JoeHallCDT> and ban businesses if they don't do things this way
14:51:02 <JoeHallCDT> s/some guy/Doug Montgomery/
14:51:39 <JoeHallCDT> Rogers: real world user problem is that there is a lot of crap in the pipe
14:52:00 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: don't see why you need DPI to do these things.
14:52:08 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: middleboxes are used to do those things, so...
14:52:24 <JoeHallCDT> Dave Crocker: some organizations have made decisions to look at stuff in the middle...
14:52:39 <JoeHallCDT> … the other problem is stuff is hard to deploy… maybe we want "easier to implement"
14:52:48 <JoeHallCDT> … these are separate topics
14:53:01 <JoeHallCDT> Rogers: in WebCrypto… there is a bit of crypto snobbery going on
14:53:13 <JoeHallCDT> … my requirement as a developer is to "just be secure"
14:53:32 <JoeHallCDT> … but people implement all the options in the wrong manner
14:53:43 <JoeHallCDT> … we're also thinking in a browser context
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14:54:07 <JoeHallCDT> … defacto expectation that in the mobile context SSL is mandatory
14:54:41 <JoeHallCDT> Joe H. we're forcing developers to use the same mechanisms as attackers
14:55:04 <JoeHallCDT> some guy2: when we get a real IoT, there will be law enforcement pressure to snoop
14:55:25 <JoeHallCDT> Joe H.: may be that we force them to use attackers' methods
14:55:44 <JoeHallCDT> … anything less than that 1) we have the "IETF is trying to break security" blow up...
14:55:53 <JoeHallCDT> … and 2) can't tell if the attacker is good or bad
14:56:08 <JoeHallCDT> Melinda: exentsive work on firewall/NAT traversal
14:56:21 <JoeHallCDT> … some of which include explicit signaling about ports and such
14:56:28 <JoeHallCDT> … no deployment due to burden
14:56:40 <JoeHallCDT> … people rely on STUN and TURN and ICE that are in some sense an attack
14:56:53 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: doesn't agree at all
14:57:23 <JoeHallCDT> Joe H.: is there a problem that we think we can solve if we can't be explicit or implicit?
14:57:42 <JoeHallCDT> McManus: passive agressive
14:57:55 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: on by def, MTI/MTU…
14:58:03 <JoeHallCDT> … we're exploring implications of actually doing this
14:58:27 <JoeHallCDT> Dave Crocker: if we just decide to make this requirement then we're done...
14:58:42 <JoeHallCDT> … of course, we're not because that's far from implementation reality
14:58:53 <JoeHallCDT> some guy3: we want to make downgrade detectable
14:59:06 <JoeHallCDT> Joe H.: how to you tell who downgraded?
14:59:36 <JoeHallCDT> Rogers: we don't want a warning triangle permanently
14:59:44 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: let's talk about IPSec for a minute
15:00:13 <JoeHallCDT> rogers: in mobile, we have an error interface to the small cell, then IPSec tunnelling back to the core network
15:00:20 <JoeHallCDT> … and you can just grab the keys
15:00:48 <JoeHallCDT> Alissa: one protocol at a time is going to come through and the decision has got to get made
15:01:01 <JoeHallCDT> Berndard: the distinction is not something that hasn't been on and turning it on...
15:01:14 <JoeHallCDT> … if you turn IPSec on in some organizations, all hell will break loose
15:01:15 <drogersuk> air interface encryption, not error interface
15:01:34 <JoeHallCDT> … but for clean slate, that's easier as there's no path dependence
15:01:39 <drogersuk> box is a weak point, physical access and so on
15:01:51 <JoeHallCDT> some guy4: on by default is only one option
15:02:12 <JoeHallCDT> … IPSec on by default, how do we do that?
15:02:25 <JoeHallCDT> Lear: at different levels, the answers come out differently
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15:02:33 <JoeHallCDT> … esp. deployed vs. green field
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15:02:45 <JoeHallCDT> … the Cooper draft [something]
15:03:08 <JoeHallCDT> … from an enterprise security perspective, I ask will that be a conduit for something getting out
15:03:35 <JoeHallCDT> … what is the risk of on by default?
15:03:54 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: what is on by default? we're talking about mandatory to use?
15:04:18 <JoeHallCDT> Russ: we're trying to figure out for legacy stuff, changing the defaults and for new things, shipping it by default
15:04:50 <JoeHallCDT> McManus: is mandatory to offer a twist on this disucssion?
15:05:02 <JoeHallCDT> Dave Crocker: this implies and active decision by the user
15:05:11 <JoeHallCDT> Mnot: well, it could be that the product choice makes the decision
15:05:29 <JoeHallCDT> … this came up in Berlin… can we correct this?
15:05:49 <JoeHallCDT> Lear: there are some working groups that are going to on by default and MTU… e.g., SKIM (sp?)
15:06:12 <JoeHallCDT> some guy3: great example there… what are you going to do when people implement something different?
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15:06:25 <JoeHallCDT> Alissa: if you can't interoperate, then you have a problem
15:06:53 <JoeHallCDT> some guy3: but interoperability is across organization and firm… that may not be particularly relevant for certain services
15:10:02 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: in the case where it is on by default but the off button exists...
15:10:14 <JoeHallCDT> … the discussion will get interesting
15:10:45 <JoeHallCDT> Lear: if something can be made mandatory (passes the sniff test), common sense dictates that this is what you do
15:11:01 <JoeHallCDT> … on other extreme, if existing toolset doesn't support it, you can't do it
15:11:09 <JoeHallCDT> … so we can document things like this and these boundaries
15:11:17 <JoeHallCDT> … suppose we're going to mandate client certs for everything
15:11:27 <JoeHallCDT> … preposterous, but we can ask how do we get there?
15:11:38 <JoeHallCDT> … what engineering-wise can we do to raise those bars
15:11:59 <JoeHallCDT> Andrea: wants to bring back the layering discussion
15:12:13 <JoeHallCDT> … OBD is great, but must be backwards compatible
15:12:32 <JoeHallCDT> … sure client certs would be a disaster… unless it were very very easy to do
15:12:55 <JoeHallCDT> … that was what was behind the Session ID in tcpcrypt
15:13:07 <JoeHallCDT> … can be used for things like client certs when we get there as a society
15:13:26 <JoeHallCDT> Crocker: let's take eliot's point and look at the highest point of departure...
15:13:45 <JoeHallCDT> … it would have to have benefits for this meeting, we know it has problems being more widely deployed
15:14:02 <JoeHallCDT> … if we can get wider deployment, it's easier to say this needs to be used all the time
15:14:40 <JoeHallCDT> (discussion as if that's technical work)
15:15:06 <JoeHallCDT> Rogers: a lot of people are using the technical excuse (blame the techies) for bad business decisions
15:15:36 <JoeHallCDT> Doug Montgomery: in the extreme that you don't design an insecure mode...
15:15:46 <JoeHallCDT> … has to be painless or there will be no deployment
15:15:55 <JoeHallCDT> … has to be dead easy, scales and robust or it won't get deployed
15:16:04 <JoeHallCDT> Sean: put your money where your mouth is
15:16:26 <JoeHallCDT> DM: the things that we're deciding to secure and lock up are used by businesses
15:16:50 <JoeHallCDT> … you have to raise the perceived value of security,
15:16:59 <JoeHallCDT> … risk is a local perception
15:17:13 <JoeHallCDT> … who's risk? enterprise vs. the individual are very different
15:17:48 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: pervasive monitoring is an attack. full stop.
15:18:37 <JoeHallCDT> Rogers: do we cut off things that might help millions of people
15:19:03 <JoeHallCDT> some guy3: it's about context… contexts are different
15:19:14 <JoeHallCDT> … but the controls should be there to choose to do things
15:19:31 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: always-on-TLS can be always-on with a null cipher!
15:20:17 <JoeHallCDT> Andrea: programmers find security to be hard bc of auth… it's hard and far from generic
15:20:33 <JoeHallCDT> … if we could decide what is the always-on, we can get far
15:21:23 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: on by default means "secure by default"
15:21:55 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: what do you think WebRTC is?
15:22:05 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: hmmm… doesn't have security without IdP
15:22:50 <JoeHallCDT> Jon: opportunistic confidentiality is a non-trivial improvement
15:24:18 <JoeHallCDT> Cullen: what's going to make a difference?
15:24:29 <JoeHallCDT> … what would make a difference is not designing the protocol to not support insecure shit
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15:24:53 <JoeHallCDT> … is the bottom opportunistic encryption, and auth enc is higher
15:25:07 <JoeHallCDT> lear: [missed that]
15:25:19 <JoeHallCDT> cullen: there are old protocols and new protocols, two classes
15:25:29 <JoeHallCDT> Alissa: other is chance of deployment given a change
15:25:36 <JoeHallCDT> … no clear way to figure that out
15:26:08 <JoeHallCDT> lear: probably circumstances where the high bar doesn't need to be auth enc… what meets that bar?
15:26:14 <JoeHallCDT> … when key mgmt can be solved
15:26:33 <JoeHallCDT> … when we know that can't be solved, that's a problem
15:27:19 <JoeHallCDT> Russ: maybe what you said is: in the negotation… if you can reach auth enc, do it… if you can't fall back to OE
15:27:34 <JoeHallCDT> Bernard: this gaurantees that unauth enc will be used
15:27:52 <JoeHallCDT> crocker: tone in the room doesn't seem to be concerned with real world problems in deployment
15:32:18 <JoeHallCDT> (going to slow down scribing due to hands that hurt)
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15:35:04 <JoeHallCDT> some guy3: don't be afraid of authenticated or unauthenticated encryption
15:35:43 <JoeHallCDT> Mike P: how do you decide to drop from AE to OE?
15:42:13 <JoeHallCDT> (stop scribing, sorry)
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16:07:20 <wseltzer> RRSAgent, make minutes
16:07:20 <RRSAgent> I have made the request to generate http://www.w3.org/2014/03/01-onbydefault-minutes.html wseltzer
16:07:30 <wseltzer> RRSAgent, make logs public
16:08:53 <wseltzer> Meeting: STRINT breakout, On By Default
16:08:59 <wseltzer> RRSAgent, make minutes
16:08:59 <RRSAgent> I have made the request to generate http://www.w3.org/2014/03/01-onbydefault-minutes.html wseltzer
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