This document collects best practices for implementers and users of the XML Signature specification [[XMLDSIG-CORE1]]. Most of these best practices are related to improving security and mitigating attacks, yet others are for best practices in the practical use of XML Signature, such as signing XML that doesn't use namespaces, for example.
This document is expected to be further updated based on both Working Group input and public comments. The Working Group anticipates to eventually publish a stabilized version of this document as a W3C Working Group Note.
The practices in this document have been found generally useful and safe. However, they do not constitute a normative update to the XML Signature specification, and might not be applicable in certain situations.
The changes to this document since the last publication on 10 July 2012 are the following:
A diff-marked version of this specification which highlights changes against the previous published version is available.
The XML Signature specification [[XMLDSIG-CORE1]] offers powerful and flexible mechanisms to support a variety of use cases. This flexibility has the downside of increasing the number of possible attacks. One countermeasure to the increased number of threats is to follow best practices, including a simplification of use of XML Signature where possible. This document outlines best practices noted by the XML Security Specifications Maintenance Working Group, the XML Security Working Group, as well as items brought to the attention of the community in a Workshop on Next Steps for XML Security [[XMLSEC-NEXTSTEPS-2007]], [[XMLDSIG-SEMANTICS]], [[XMLDSIG-COMPLEXITY]]. While most of these best practices are related to improving security and mitigating attacks, yet others are for best practices in the practical use of XML Signature, such as signing XML that doesn't use namespaces.
XML Signature may be used in application server systems, where multiple incoming messages are being processed simultaneously. In this situation incoming messages should be assumed to be possibly hostile with the concern that a single poison message could bring down an entire set of web applications and services.
Implementation of the XML Signature specification should not always be literal. For example, reference validation before signature validation is extremely susceptible to denial of service attacks in some scenarios. As will be seen below, certain kinds of transforms may require an enormous amount of processing time and certain external URI references can lead to possible security violations. One recommendation for implementing the XML Signature Recommendation is to first "authenticate" the signature, before running any of these dangerous operations.
Implementers: Mitigate denial of service attacks by executing potentially dangerous operations only after successfully authenticating the signature.
ds:Reference elements for a signature only after
establishing trust, for example by verifying the key and validating
XML Signature operations should follow this order of operations:
Step 1 fetch the verification key and establish trust in that key (see Best Practice 2).
Step 2 validate
with that key
Step 3 validate the references
In step 1 and step 2 the message should be assumed to
be untrusted, so no dangerous operations should be
carried out. But by step 3, the entire
been authenticated, and so all the URIs and transforms
ds:SignedInfo can be attributed to a responsible
party. However an implementation may still choose to
disallow these operations even in step 3, if the party
is not trusted to perform them.
In step 1, if the verification key is not known
beforehand and needs to be fetched from
care should be taken in its
ds:KeyInfo can contain
child element, and this could contain dangerous
transforms, insecure external references and infinite
loops (see Best Practice #5 and examples below for
Another potential security issue in step 1 is the handling of untrusted public keys in
Just because an XML Signature validates mathematically
with a public key in the
ds:KeyInfo does not mean that
the signature should be trusted.
The public key should be verified before validating the
For example, keys may be exchanged out of band, allowing
the use of a
certificate and path validation as described by RFC 5280 or
some other specification can be applied to information in
element to validate the key bound to a certificate.
This usually includes verifying information in the
certificate such as the expiration date, the purpose of the
checking that it is not revoked, etc.
Key Validation is typically more than a library implementation issue, and often involves the incorporation of application specific information. While there are no specific processing rules required by the XML Signature specification, it is critical that applications include key validation processing that is appropriate to their domain of use.
Implementers: Establish trust in the verification/validation key.
Establish appropriate trust in a key, validating X.509 certificates, certificate chains and revocation status, for example.
The following XSLT transform contains 4 levels
of nested loops, and for each loop it iterates
over all the nodes of the document. So if the
original document has 100 elements, this would
take 100^4 = 100 million operations. A
malicious message could include this transform
and cause an application server to spend hours
processing it. The scope of this denial of
service attack is greatly reduced when
following the best practices described above,
since it is unlikely that an authenticated
user would include this kind of transform.
XSLT transforms should only be
processed for References, and not
only after first authenticating the entire signature and
an appropriate degree of trust in the originator of the message.
As discussed further, below, support for XSLT transforms may also expose the signature processor or consumer to further risks in regard to external references or modified approvals. An implementation of XML Signature may choose not to support XSLT, may provide interfaces to allow the application to optionally disable support for it, or may otherwise mitigate risks associated with XSLT.
Implementers: Consider avoiding XSLT Transforms.
Arbitrary XSLT processing might lead to denial of service or other risks, so either do not allow XSLT transforms, only enable them for trusted sources, or consider mitigation of the risks.
Instead of using the XML Signature XSLT transform, deployments can define a named transform of their own, by simply coining a URI in their own domain that can be used as the Algorithm. How that transform is implemented is then out of scope for the signature protocol - a named transform can very well be built in XSLT.
Choosing to name a new transform rather than embedding an XSLT transform in the signature reference has the advantage that the semantic intent of the transform can be made clear and limited in scope, as opposed to a general XSLT transform, possibly reducing the attack surface and allowing alternate implementations.
What may be lost is the general flexibility of using XSLT, requiring closer coordination between signer and verifiers since all will be required to understand the meaning of the new named transform.
The XSLT transform in the example below makes use of the user-defined extension feature to execute arbitrary code when validating an XML Signature. The example syntax is specific to the Xalan XSLT engine, but this approach is valid for most XSLT engines. The example calls "os:exec" as a user-defined extension, which is mapped to the Java lang.Runtime.exec() method which can execute any program the process has the rights to run. While the example calls the shutdown command, one should expect more painful attacks if a series of attack signatures are allowed. If an implementation of XML Signature allows XSLT processing it should disable support for user-defined extensions. Changing the Transforms element does invalidate the signature. XSLT transforms should only be processed after first authenticating the entire signature and establishing an appropriate degree of trust in the originator of the message.
Implementers: When XSLT is required disallow the use of user-defined extensions.
Arbitrary XSLT processing leads to a variety of serious risks, so if the best practice of disallowing XSLT transforms cannot be followed, ensure that user-defined extensions are disabled in your XSLT engine.
The following XPath Transform has an expression that simply counts all the nodes in the document, but it is embedded in special document that has a 100 namespaces ns0 to ns99 and a 100 <e2> elements. The XPath model expects namespace nodes for each in-scope namespace to be attached to each element, and since in this special document all the 100 namespaces are in scope for each of the 100 elements, the document ends up having 100x100 = 10,000 NamespaceNodes.Now in an XPath Filtering transform, the XPath expression is evaluated for every node in the document. So it takes 10,000 x 10,000 = 100 million operations to evaluate this document. Again the scope of this attack can be reduced by following the above best practices
An implementation of XML Signature may choose not to support the XPath Filter Transform, may provide interfaces to allow the application to optionally disable support for it, or otherwise mitigate risks associated with it. Another option is to support a limited set of XPath expressions - which only use the ancestor or self axes and do not compute string-value of elements. Yet another option is to use the XPath Filter 2.0 transform instead, because in this transform, the XPath expressions are only evaluated once, not for every node of the transform.
Implementers: Try to avoid or limit XPath transforms.
Complex XPath expressions (or those constructed together with content to produce expensive processing) might lead to a denial of service risk, so either do not allow XPath transforms or take steps to mitigate the risk of denial of service.
When an XML Signature is to be verified in streaming mode, additional denial of service attack vectors occur. As an example, consider the following XPath expression that is conforming to the [[XMLDSIG-XPATH]]: "//A//B". This XPath is intended to select every occurrence of <B> elements in the document that have an <A> element ancestor. Hence, on streaming parsing the document, every occurrence of an <A> element will trigger a new search context for the subsequent <B> element. Thus, an attacker may modify the XML document itself to contain lots of nested <A> elements, i.e. "<A><A><A><A><A><A><A><A><A><A>....". This will result in n search contexts, with n being the number of <A> elements in the document, and hence in O(n^2) comparisons in total. Even worse, if an attacker also manages to tamper the XPath expression used for selection itself, he can trigger an even more rapid Denial of Service: an XPath of "//A//A//A//A//A..." causes the number of search contexts to explode to O(2^n).
Hence, besides following Best Practice 1, it is strongly recommended to reduce the use of "wildcard" XPath axes (such as "descendant", "following" etc.) in XML Signatures to a minimum.
Implementers: Avoid using the "descendant", "descendant-or-self", "following-sibling", and "following" axes when using streaming XPaths.
The evaluation of such "wildcard" axes may cause an excessive number of evaluation contexts being triggered concurrently when using a streaming-based XPath evaluation engine. Since this may lead to Denial of Service, it is essential that an attacker can not alter the XPaths prior to evaluation (see Best Practice 1), and that the valid XPath expressions reduce the use of these axes to a minimum.
ds:KeyInfo of a signature can contain
ds:RetrievalMethod child element, which can
be used to reference a key somewhere
else in the document.
legitimate uses; for example when there are multiple
signatures in the same document,
these signatures can use a
to avoid duplicate
entries. However, referencing a certificate
(or most other
ds:KeyInfo child elements)
requires at least one transform, because the reference URI
can only refer to the
element itself (only it carries an Id attribute). Also,
there is nothing that prevents
ds:RetrievalMethod from pointing back
to itself directly or indirectly and forming a cyclic
chain of references.
An implementation that must handle potentially hostile messages
ds:RetrievalMethod elements that it
processes - e.g.
permitting only a same-document URI reference, and
limiting the transforms allowed.
The following examples are of a loop within a single RetrievalMethod and a loop with two RetrievalMethod elements.
Implementers: Try to avoid or
ds:RetrievalMethod can cause security risks
due to transforms, so
consider limiting support for it.
An XML Signature message can use URIs to references keys
or to reference data to be signed. Same document
are fine, but external references to the file system or other web sites can cause exceptions or cross site attacks. For example,
a message could have a URI reference to
ds:KeyInfo. Obviously there is no key
present in file://etc/passwd,
but if the xmlsec implementation blindly tries to resolve
this URI, it will end up reading the /etc/passwd file. If
is running in a sandbox, where access to sensitive files
is prohibited, it may be terminated by the container for
access this file.
URI references based on HTTP can cause a different kind of damage since these URIs can have query parameters that can cause some data to be submitted/modified in another web site. Suppose there is a company internal HR website that is not accessible from outside the company. If there is a web service exposed to the outside world that accepts signed requests it may be possible to inappropriately access the HR site. A malicious message from the outside world can send a signature, with a reference URI like this http://hrwebsite.example.com/addHoliday?date=May30. If the XML Security implementation blindly tries to dereference this URI when verifying the signature, it may unintentionally have the side effect of adding an extra holiday.
When implementing XML Signature, it is recommended to take caution in retrieving references with arbitrary URI schemes which may trigger unintended side-effects and/or when retrieving references over the network. Care should be taken to limit the size and timeout values for content retrieved over the network in order to avoid denial of service conditions.
When implementing XML Signature, it is recommended to follow the recommendations in section 2.3 to provide cached references to the verified content, as remote references may change between the time they are retrieved for verification and subsequent retrieval for use by the application. Retrieval of remote references may also leak information about the verifiers of a message, such as a "web bug" that causes access to the server, resulting in notification being provided to the server regarding the web page access. An example is an image that cannot be seen but results in a server access [[WebBug-Wikipedia]].
When implementing XML Signature with support for XSLT transforms, it can be useful to constrain outbound network connectivity from the XSLT processor in order to avoid information disclosure risks as XSLT instructions may be able to dynamically retrieve content from local files and network resources and disclose this to other networks.
Some kinds of external references are perfectly acceptable, e.g. Web Services Security uses a "cid:" URL for referencing data inside attachments, and this can be considered to be a same document reference. Another legitimate example would be to allow references to content in the same ZIP or other virtual file system package as a signature, but not to content outside of the package.
The scope of this attack is much reduced by following the
above best practices, because with that only URIs inside a
ds:SignedInfo section will be
accessed. But to totally eliminate this kind of attack, an
implementation can choose
not to support external references at all.
Implementers: Control external references.
To reduce risks
ds:Reference URIs that
local content, it is recommended to be mitigate risks
query parameters, unknown URI schemes, or attempts to access
XML Signature spec does not limit the number of transforms, and a malicious message could come in with 10,000 C14N transforms. C14N transforms involve lot of processing, and 10,000 transforms could starve all other messages.
Again the scope of this attack is also reduced by
following the above best practices, as now an
unauthenticated user would
need to at first obtain a valid signing key and sign
ds:SignedInfo section with 10,000 C14N
This signature has a 1000 C14N and a 1000 XPath transforms, which makes it slow. This document has a 100 namespaces ns0 to ns99 and a 100 <e2> elements, like in the XPath denial of service example. Since XPath expands all the namespaces for each element, it means that there are 100x100 = 10,000 NamespaceNodes All of these are processed for every C14N and XPath transform, so total operations is 2000 x 10,000 = 20,000,000 operations. Note some C14N implementations do not expand all the Namespace nodes but do shortcuts for performance, to thwart that this example has an XPath before every C14N.
To totally eliminate this kind of attack, an implementation can choose to have an upper limit of the number of transforms in each Reference.
Implementers: Limit number
Too many transforms in a processing chain for
produce a denial of service effect, consider limiting
the number of
transforms allowed in a transformation chain.
As shown above, it is very hard for the application to know what was signed, especially if the signature uses complex XPath expressions to identify elements. When implementing XML Signature some environments may require a means to provide a means to be able to return what was signed when inspecting a signature. This is especially important when implementations allow references to content retrieved over the network, so that an application does not have to retrieve such references again. A second dereference raises the risk that that is obtained is not the same -- avoiding this guarantees receiving the same information originally used to validate the signature. This section discusses two approaches for this.
While doing reference validation, the implementation needs to run through the transforms for each reference, the output of which is a byte array, and then digest this byte array. The implementation should provide a way to cache this byte array and return it tot he application. This would let the application know exactly what was considered for signing This is the only recommended approach for processors and applications that allow remote DTDs, as entity expansion during C14N may introduce another opportunity for a malicious party to supply different content between signature validation and an application's subsequent re-processing of the message.
While the above mechanism let the application know exactly what was signed, it cannot be used by application to programmatically compare with what was expected to be signed. For programmatic comparison the application needs another byte array, and it is hard for the application to generate a byte array that will match byte for byte with the expected byte array.
Implementers: Offer interfaces for application to learn what was signed.
Returning pre-digested data and pre-C14N data may help an application determine what was signed correctly.
A better but more complicated approach is to return the pre-C14N data as a nodeset. This should include all the transforms except the last C14N transform - the output of this should be nodeset. If there are multiple references in the signature,the result should be a union of these nodesets. The application can compare this nodeset with the expected nodeset. The expected nodeset should be a subset of the signed nodeset.
DOM implementations usually provide a function to compare if two nodes are the same - in some DOM implementations just comparing pointers or references is sufficient to know if they are the same, DOM3 specifies a "isSameNode()" function for node comparison.
This approach only works for XML data, not for binary data. Also the transform list should follow these rules.
The C14N transform should be last transform in the list. Note if there no C14N transform, an inclusive C14N is implicitly added
There should be no transform which causes data to be converted to binary and then back to a nodeset. The reason is that this would cause the nodeset to be from a completely different document, which cannot be compared with the expected nodeset.
Implementers: Do not re-encode certificates, use DER when possible with the X509Certificate element.
Changing the encoding of a certificate can break the signature on the certificate if the encoding is not the same in each case. Using DER offers increased opportunity for interoperability.
Although X.509 certificates are meant to be encoded using DER before being signed, many implementations (particularly older ones) got various aspects of DER wrong, so that their certificates are encoded using BER, which is a less rigorous form of DER. Thus, following the X.509 specification to re-encode in DER before applying the signature check will invalidate the signature on the certificate.
In practice, X.509 implementations check the signature on certificates exactly as encoded, which means that they're verifying exactly the same data as the signer signed, and the signature will remain valid regardless of whether the signer and verifier agree on what constitutes a DER encoding. As a result, the safest course is to treat the certificate opaquely where possible and avoid any re-encoding steps that might invalidate the signature.
X509Certificate element is generically
defined to contain a
base64-encoded certificate without regard to the underlying
used. However, experience has shown that interoperability issues are
possible if encodings other than BER or DER are used, and use of other
certificate encodings should be approached with caution. While some
applications may not have flexibility in the certificates
they must deal
with, others might, and such applications may wish to consider further
constraints on the encodings they allow.
XML Signature offers many complex features, which can make it very difficult to keep track of what was really signed. When implementing XML Signature it is important to understand what is provided by a signature verification library, and whether additional steps are required to allow a user to see what is being verified. The examples below illustrate how an errant XSLT or XPath transform can change what was supposed to have been signed. So the application should inspect the signature and check all the references and the transforms, before accepting it. This is done much easier if the application sets up strict rules on what kinds of URI references and transforms are acceptable. Here are some sample rules.
For simple disjoint signatures: Reference URI must use local ID reference, and only one transform - C14N
For simple enveloped signatures: References URI must use local ID reference, and two transforms - Enveloped Signature and C14N, in that order
For signatures on base64 encoded binary content: Reference URI must local ID references, and only one transform - Base64 decode.
These sample rules may need to be adjusted for the anticipated use. When used with web services WS-Security, for example, consider the STR Transform in place of a C14N transform, and with SWA Attachment, Attachment Content/Complete transform could be used in place of a base64 transform.
Sometimes ID references may not be acceptable, because the element to be signed may have a very closed schema, and adding an ID attributes would make it invalid. In that case the element should be identified with an XPath filter transform. Other choices are to use an XPath Filter 2 transform, or XPath in XPointer URI, but support for these are optional. However XPath expressions can be very complicated, so using an XPath makes it very hard for the application to know exactly what was signed, but again the application could put in a strict rule about the kind of XPath expressions that are allowed, for example:
For XPath expressions The expression must be of the farm : ancestor-or-self:elementName. This expressions includes all elements whose name is elementName. Choosing a specific element by name and position requires a very complex XPath, and that would be too hard for the application to verify
Applications: Enable verifier to automate "see what is signed" functionality.
Enable the application to verify that what is signed is what was expected to be signed, by providing access to id and transform information.
Consider an application which is processing approvals, and expects a message of the following format where the where the Approval is supposed to be signed
It is not sufficient for the application to check if there is a URI in the reference and that reference points to the Approval. Because there may be some transforms in that reference which modify what is really signed.
In this case there is an XPath transform that evaluates to zero or false for every node, so it ends up selecting nothing.
Whether this is an error or not needs to be determined by the application. It is an error and the document should be rejected if the application expected some content to be signed. There may be cases, however, where this is not an error. For example, an application may wish to ensure that every price element is signed, without knowing how many there are. In some cases there might be none in the signed document. This signature allows the application to detect added price elements, so it is useful even if the were no content in the initial signing.
An XPath evaluation will not raise an exception, nor give any other advice that the XPath selected nothing if the XPath expression has incorrect syntax. This is due to the fact that an XPath parser will interpret misspelled function names as regular XPath tokens, leading to completely different semantics that do not match the intended selection.
In this case, the XPath filter looks like it is selecting the Approval element of namespace http://any.ns. In reality it selects nothing at all since the function should be spelled "local-name" instead of "localname" and both function calls need brackets () in the correct syntax. The correct XPath expression to match the intent is:
//*[local-name()="Approval" and namespace-uri()="http://any.ns"].
Since nothing is selected, the digital signature does not provide any data integrity properties. It also raises no exception on either signature generation or on verification. Hence, when applying XML Signatures using XPath it is recommended to always actively verify that the signature protects the intended elements.
Applications: When applying XML Signatures using XPath it is recommended to always actively verify that the signature protects the intended elements and not more or less.
Since incorrect XPath expressions can result in incorrect signing, applications should verify that what is signed is what is expected to be signed.
Similar to the previous example, this one uses an XSLT transform which takes the incoming document, ignores it, and emits a "<foo/>" . So the actual Approval isn't signed. Obviously this message needs to be rejected.
This one is a different kind of problem - a wrapping attack.There are no transforms here, but notice that Reference URI is not "ap" but "ap2". And "ap2" points to another <Approval> element that is squirreled away in an Object element. An Object element allows any content. The application will be fooled into thinking that the approval element is properly signed, it just checks the name of what the element that the Reference points to. It should check both the name and the position of the element.
Applications: When checking a reference URI, don't just check the name of the element.
To mitigate attacks where the content that is present in the document is not what was actually signed due to various transformations, verifiers should check both the name and position of an element as part of signature verification.
By electing to only sign portions of a document this opens the potential for substitution attacks.
Applications: Unless impractical, sign all parts of the document.
Signing all parts of a document helps prevent substitution and wrapping attacks.
To give an example, consider the case where someone signed the action part of the request, but didn't include the user name part. In this case an attacker can easily take the signed request as is, and just change the user name and resubmit it. These Replay attacks are much easier when you are signing a small part of the document. To prevent replay attacks, it is recommended to include user names, keys, timestamps, etc into the signature.
A second example is a "wrapping attack" [[MCINTOSH-WRAP]] where additional XML content is added to change what is signed. An example is where only the amounts in a PurchaseOrder are signed rather than the entire purchase order.
Applications: Use a nonce in combination with signing time.
A nonce enables detection of duplicate signed items.
In many cases replay detection is provided as a part of application logic, often and a by product of normal processing. For example, if purchase orders are required to have a unique serial number, duplicates may be automatically discarded. In these cases, it is not strictly necessary for the security mechanisms to provide replay detection. However, since application logic may be unknown or change over time, providing replay detection is the safest policy.
Applications: Do not rely on application logic to prevent replay attacks since applications may change.
Supporting replay detection at the security processing layer removes a requirement for application designers to be concerned about this security issue and may prevent a risk if support for replay detection is removed from the application processing for various other reasons.
Nonces and passwords must fall under at least one signature to be effective. In addition, the signature should include at least a critical portion of the message payload, otherwise an attacker might be able to discard the dateTime and its signature without arousing suspicion.
Applications: Nonce and signing time must be signature protected.
A signature must include the nonce and signing time in the signature calculation for them to be effective, since otherwise an attacker could change them without detection.
Web Services Security [[WS-SECURITY11]] defines a <Timestamp> element which can contain a Created dateTime value and/or a Expires dateTime value. The Created value obviously represents an observation made. The expires value is more problematic, as it represents a policy choice which should belong to the receiver not the sender. Setting an expiration date on a Token may reflect how long the data is expected to be correct or how long the secret may remain uncompromised. However, the semantics of a signature "expiring" is not clear.
WSS provides for the use of a nonce in conjunction with hashed passwords, but not for general use with asymmetric or symmetric signatures.
WSS sets a limit of one <Timestamp> element per Security header, but their can be several signatures. In the typical case where all signatures are generated at about the same time, this is not a problem, but SOAP messages may pass through multiple intermediaries and be queued for a time, so this limitation could possibly create problems. In general Senders should ensure and receivers should assume that the <Timestamp> represents the first (oldest) signature. It is not clear how if at all a <Timestamp> relates to encrypted data.
Applications: Long lived signatures should include a xsd:dateTime field to indicate the time of signing just as a handwritten signature does.
The time of signing is an important consideration for use of long-lived signatures and should be included.
Note that in the absence of a trusted time source, such a signing time should be viewed as indicating a minimum, but not a maximum age. This is because we assume that a time in the future would be noticed during processing. So if the time does not indicate when the signature was computed it at least indicates earliest time it might have been made available for processing.
It is considered desirable for ephemeral signature to be relatively recently signed and not to be replayed. The signing time is useful for either or both of these. The use for freshness is obvious. Signing time is not ideal for preventing replay, since depending on the granularity, duplicates are possible.
A better scheme is to use a nonce and a signing time The nonce is checked to see if it duplicates a previously presented value. The signing time allows receivers to limit how long nonces are retained (or how many are retained).
Applications: When creating an enveloping signature over XML without namespace information, take steps to avoid having that content inherit the XML Signature namespace.
Avoid enveloped content from inheriting the XML Signature namespace by either inserting an empty default namespace declaration or by defining a namespace prefix for the Signature Namespace usage.
When creating an enveloping signature over XML without namespace information, it may inherit the XML Signature namespace of the Object element, which is not the intended behavior. There are two potential workarounds:
Insert an xmlns="" namespace definition in the legacy XML. However, this is not always practical.
Insulate it from the XML Signature namespace by defining a namespace prefix on the XML Signature (ex: "ds").
This was also discussed in the OASIS Digital Signature Services technical committee, see https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/dss/200504/msg00048.html.
Applications: Prefer the XPath Filter 2 Transform to the XPath Filter Transform if possible.
Applications should prefer the XPath Filter 2 Transform to the XPath Filter Transform when generating XML Signatures.
The XPath Filter 2 Transform was designed to improve the performance issues associated with the XPath Filter Transform and allow signing operations to be expressed more clearly and efficiently, as well as helping to mitigate the denial of service attacks discussed in section 2.1.2. See XML-Signature XPath Filter 2.0 for more information.
Even though XPath Filter 2.0 is not recommended in XML Signature 1.0, implementations may still be able to support it. In this case signers and verifiers may be able to follow this best practice.
Resolving external unparsed entity references can imply network access and can in certain circumstances be a security concern for signature verifiers. As a policy decision, signature verifiers may choose not to resolve such entities, leading to a loss of interoperability.
Signers: Do not transmit unparsed external entity references.
Do not transmit unparsed external entity references in signed material. Expand all entity references before creating the cleartext that is transmitted.
Part of the validation process defined by XML Schema includes the "normalization" of lexical values in a document into a "schema normalized value" that allows schema type validation to occur against a predictable form.
Some implementations of validating parsers, particular early ones, often modified DOM information "in place" when performing this process. Unless the signer also performed a similar validation process on the input document, verification is likely to fail. Newer validating parsers generally include an option to disable type normalization, or take steps to avoid modifying the DOM, usually by storing normalized values internally alongside the original data.
Verifiers should be aware of the effects of their chosen parser and adjust the order of operations or parser options accordingly. Signers might also choose to operate on the normalized form of an XML instance when possible.
Additionally, validating processors will add default values taken from an XML schema to the DOM of an XML instance.
Signers: Do not rely on a validating processor on the consumer's end.
Do not rely on a validating processor on the consumer's end to normalize XML documents. Instead, explicitly include default attribute values, and use normalized attributes when possible.
Verifiers: Avoid destructive validation before signature validation.
Applications relying on validation should either consider verifying signatures before schema validation, or select implementations that can avoid destructive DOM changes while validating.
Signers: When using an HMAC, set the HMAC Output Length to one half the number of bits in the hash size.
Setting the HMAC Output Length of an HMAC to one half the bit length of the hash function increases the resistance to attack without weakening its resistance to a brute force guessing attack.
An HMAC is computed by combining a secret such as a password with a hash function over the data to be protected. The HMAC provides Authentication and Data Integrity protection in a shared secret environment. Its security properties depend crucially on the cryptographic properties of the hash algorithm employed. It is widely understood that a collision attack (finding two messages which have the same hash value) on a hash function or an HMAC has a work factor proportional to the square root of the hash value.
Recently published research has shown that other attacks on an HMAC, such as Forgery (being able to compute a correct HMAC value without knowing the key) and Key Recovery (being able to compute the correct HMAC for any message) may also have a work factor proportional to the square root of the hash value [[HMAC-Security]]. In other words, the strength of an HMAC is no better than a brute force guessing attack on half the bits in the HMAC value. The same paper demonstrates that reducing the number of bits in the HMAC value available to an attacker, by means of the HMAC Output Length parameter, makes these attacks more difficult or impossible. Prior research has reported the same finding for other attacks on an HMAC.
Signers: When encrypting and signing use distinct keys
If the same key is used for different operations such as signing and encryption attacks are possible that can allow signatures to be forged, so separate possibly derived keys should be used for different functions.
Use of state-of-the-art and secure encryption algorithms such as RSA-OAEP and AES-GCM can become insecure when the adversary can force the server to process eavesdropped ciphertext with legacy algorithms such as RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 or AES-CBC [[XMLENC-BACKWARDS-COMP]]. In this case the attacker may be able to forge valid server signatures if the server decrypts RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 ciphertexts [[XMLENC-PKCS15-ATTACK]] and the signatures are computed with the same asymmetric key pair.
Accordingly, in situations where an attacker may be able to mount chosen-ciphertext attacks, we recommend applications should always use a different symmetric key for data confidentiality and for data integrity functionality (likewise for public key functions). When use of a single key is planned, key derivation should be used to produce different keys for these functions.
This document records best practices related to XML Signature from a variety of sources, including the W3C Workshop on Next Steps for XML Signature and XML Encryption [[XMLSEC-NEXTSTEPS-2007]].