13:55:01 RRSAgent has joined #bpwg 13:55:01 logging to http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-irc 13:55:03 RRSAgent, make logs public 13:55:03 Zakim has joined #bpwg 13:55:05 Zakim, this will be BPWG 13:55:06 Meeting: Mobile Web Best Practices Working Group Teleconference 13:55:06 Date: 07 October 2008 13:55:09 ok, trackbot; I see MWI_BPWG(CTTF)10:00AM scheduled to start in 5 minutes 13:55:34 Chair: francois 13:55:40 Agenda: http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-bpwg-ct/2008Oct/0011.html 13:56:22 MWI_BPWG(CTTF)10:00AM has now started 13:56:29 + +2 13:56:32 zakim, +2 is me 13:56:32 +tomhume; got it 13:57:56 jo has joined #bpwg 13:58:11 zakim, code? 13:58:11 the conference code is 2283 (tel:+1.617.761.6200 tel:+33.4.89.06.34.99 tel:+44.117.370.6152), jo 13:59:10 +??P16 13:59:27 zakim, ??p16 is me 13:59:27 +jo; got it 14:00:52 +Francois 14:01:23 rob has joined #bpwg 14:02:04 + +0207287aabb 14:02:24 Zakim, aabb is me 14:02:41 +rob; got it 14:03:25 SeanP has joined #bpwg 14:04:16 Bryan has joined #bpwg 14:04:49 + +1.630.414.aacc 14:04:59 zakim, aacc is me 14:05:27 andrews has joined #bpwg 14:05:28 +SeanP; got it 14:06:53 sean: jo 14:07:10 s/sean: jo// 14:07:14 scribe: jo 14:07:50 + +0789972aadd 14:08:04 zakim, aadd is andews 14:08:04 +andews; got it 14:08:12 zakim, andews is really andrews 14:08:12 +andrews; got it 14:08:35 Topic: Report from W3M Project Review 14:09:14 francois: I presented guidelines to W3C team to raise their attention to CT so they knew about it 14:09:44 ... no solutions to the problems, unfortunately - good because it seems that we are heading in the right direction 14:10:11 ... main concern is about security and breaking of https, much concern about this 14:11:07 ... similar frustration expressed as we have - want to write something with more subtle control/communication but not chartered to do this hence POWDER might be a good direction for the future 14:11:36 ... nothing further to report - they had no practical solutions to add to what we have done 14:11:41 zakim, mute me 14:11:41 jo should now be muted 14:11:51 Topic: HTTPS Link Rewriting 14:11:54 -> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-bpwg-ct/2008Sep/0013.html Tom's initial comments on HTTPS 14:12:04 -> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-bpwg-ct/2008Oct/0012.html Tom's further thoughts 14:12:22 francois: we got a lot of lc comments on this, and Tom summarised some thoughts 14:12:59 tom: broad agreement that it breaks end to end security, need to make sure that users have control, but how this is done is tricky 14:13:36 ... also need to ensure that content providers are aware of what is going on, but puts the burden on CPs to look out for that 14:13:56 francois: so in the end, there is no real way to forbid link re-writing 14:13:59 q+ 14:14:08 -tomhume 14:14:20 ack jo 14:14:21 ... we need to emphasise that we don't recommend it 14:14:33 +??P1 14:14:43 zakim, ??P1 is tom 14:14:43 +tom; got it 14:15:51 jo: can we just confirm the views of those on call ref forbidding HTTPS rewriting 14:16:28 andrews: we currently allow our proxy to re-write links, they generate an interstitial, and the choice can be kept for future pages 14:17:04 ... I agree that it is undesirable, but pragmatically speaking a lot of services won't work if we don't do it. So the important thing is to advice the user and give them the choice 14:17:19 q+ to second what Andrew's just said 14:17:34 seanp: yes that how the implementation works and we have done the same for other customers 14:18:05 ... not ideal, but there is more than just banking sites - e.g. login to email, facebook etc. 14:18:45 ... it's up to our customer (operator) to decide whether they want it or not. Would not want to violate transformation guidelines but if the customer wants it we'd have to do it 14:18:50 ack rob 14:18:50 rob, you wanted to second what Andrew's just said 14:19:17 q+ to say that Vodafone UK uses a "black list" of financial institutions that we will not intercept 14:19:20 q+ 14:19:29 rob: agree with Andrew and Sean - if guidelines were to forbid it then all deployments would not conform to this one point 14:19:49 ack a 14:19:49 andrews, you wanted to say that Vodafone UK uses a "black list" of financial institutions that we will not intercept 14:19:50 ack andrews 14:20:17 andrew: we have an "exclude" list and we do not intercept that traffic 14:20:35 ... we don't want to expose ourselves to potential problems 14:20:47 ack tomhume 14:20:53 ... the ones we do allow we explain to the customer what we are doing and give them a choice 14:21:21 tom: do we have any figures for what percentage of customers that make the choice to proceed as opposed to those who don't 14:21:33 s/don't/don't?/ 14:21:54 seanp: don't think we keep track of it I could try to find out 14:22:10 rob: we don't track it as we don't know what the choices are 14:22:20 francois: why would that help Tom? 14:22:33 tom: if a lot [bubble bubble] 14:23:20 francois: paraphrasing what I think Tom was trying to say: 14:23:44 +1 14:24:05 ... if a lot of users refused it then we could forbid it, whereas if a lot followed the link then it seems to be a "desirable" feature 14:24:43 ACTION: patterson to find out if novarra has figures on whether users choose to proceed at the HTTPS interstitial page 14:24:43 Created ACTION-858 - Find out if novarra has figures on whether users choose to proceed at the HTTPS interstitial page [on Sean Patterson - due 2008-10-14]. 14:24:51 francois: a couple of extra points 14:25:37 ... ref opera mini, [although we know it is out of scope], it can't be secure as it needs to be decrypted in their server, so can't be end to end 14:26:38 ... secondly, there is a fear that parties are trying to push client certificates for secure connections and these kind of certificates are supposed to ensure the end to endedness of the connection 14:27:07 ... and so in order to continue the proxy might ask the client to supply their certificate which would be even worse 14:27:09 q+ 14:27:13 ack rob 14:27:40 rob: pushing client certificate - it won't work for the Web site to push it 14:28:05 francois: link rewriting can't work with client certificates 14:28:25 ... but if the proxy possesses the client certificate then it can act on behalf of the end user 14:28:42 ... and the fear is that they might do that 14:29:00 ... afaik client certificates are not commonly deployed 14:29:05 q+ 14:29:09 ack jo 14:30:15 q+ 14:30:26 jo: what are the more general guidelines for servers to assess whether they are talking to who they think they are talking to in any case 14:30:27 ack andrews 14:30:51 francois: maybe I should take an action to write something on this 14:31:28 andrews: the nature of the security is just that the end user can check the server certificate, so there is nothing to stop a man-in-the-middle attack 14:31:46 ... user still thinks they are connected to a secure service 14:32:42 jo: suggest that francois wrties to wsc wg to see if they have some preferred text 14:34:03 andrews: ref client certificates - user must have given permission and should not do that for some types of transaction - and for that reason we do not want to interfere with transactions of this kind because of the liability issues 14:34:18 s/wrties/writes/ 14:34:45 francois: thomas (WSC) recommended that we talk to the IETF TLS working group 14:34:54 ... so I could send them an email 14:35:56 ACTION: daoust to contact IETF TLS group and advise them of what we are thinking and ask for guidance on what to recommend to Content Provider about detecting the presence of a man-in-the-middle proxy 14:35:56 Created ACTION-859 - Contact IETF TLS group and advise them of what we are thinking and ask for guidance on what to recommend to Content Provider about detecting the presence of a man-in-the-middle proxy [on François Daoust - due 2008-10-14]. 14:36:24 rob: there is no way for a Via header to appear unless the HTTPS session has been intercepted 14:36:56 francois: there is a tiny difference between a proxy being used in proxy mode vs linked mode 14:37:32 ... we need to be clear that although the Proxy is actually the client when intercepting https it must still insert via headers 14:38:15 ACTION: JO to add clarification to HTTPS rewriting to make it clear that the via header MUST be added 14:38:15 Created ACTION-860 - Add clarification to HTTPS rewriting to make it clear that the via header MUST be added [on Jo Rabin - due 2008-10-14]. 14:38:43 ACTION-860 [this especially ref HTTPS] 14:39:15 francois: there is no other way to encrypt data for responses 14:40:15 ... so should we put something in scope for future work, we need something more fine-grained to allow transformation and secure links. XML encryption and signature could be something in the future 14:40:53 +1 to something in the future in some possible world :-) 14:41:36 francois: to summarise, I am going to contact IETF and Jo will add some clarification ref the via header 14:42:27 PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Accept the thrust of Tom's submission on this, and editor to make sure that the wording is beefed up to make it clear that this is a horrible bad thing but if you _must_ do it the user MUST know and MUST have a choice 14:43:17 PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Accept the thrust of Tom's submission on HTTPS, and editor to make sure that the wording is beefed up (e.g. by saying that if a proxy rewrites HTTPS ... rather than saying a proxy MAY) to make it clear that this is a horrible bad thing but if you _must_ do it the user MUST know and MUST have a choice 14:43:42 +1 14:43:43 +1 14:43:47 +1 14:43:47 q+ 14:43:51 ack SeanP 14:44:35 seanp: understand the reasoning, what we have already seems fairly close to sufficient, we seem to be saying we realise you need to do this, but don't do it, which looks odd 14:44:40 q+ 14:44:49 ... we already have warnings etc. 14:45:00 ack andrews 14:45:04 ... stronger warning would not hurt 14:46:12 andrews: I think the current wording is right, perhaps we could add a para before the existing wording emphasising the seriousness of doing this - i.e. breaking the trusted link. the current wording is right and precise and would not want to change existing phraseology 14:46:53 francois: I think we are all going in the same direction - we don't propose to say don't do it, but if you do ... 14:47:23 ... we did get a lot of LCC that we should not ignore, so it is not being read the way we wrote it so more clarification is needed 14:47:27 q? 14:47:49 ... we might add a few normative statements e.g. about invalid certificates 14:48:33 +1 to "editorial magic" 14:48:46 ... maybe Jo can find some wording to make it clearer to the public at the same time as satisfying us as to what we want to say 14:49:12 andrews: yes, all for editorial magic, being it on! 14:49:18 s/being/bring/ 14:49:47 +1 14:50:04 PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Accept the thrust of Tom's submission on HTTPS, and editor to make sure that the wording is beefed up (e.g. by saying that if a proxy rewrites HTTPS ... rather than saying a proxy MAY) to make it clear that if you _must_ do it the user MUST know and MUST have a choice 14:50:08 +1 14:50:10 +1 14:50:12 +1 14:50:14 +1 14:51:20 +1 to the resolution + Francois' comments 14:52:08 +1 14:52:26 RESOLUTION: Accept the thrust of Tom's submission on HTTPS, and editor to make sure that the wording is beefed up (e.g. by saying that if a proxy rewrites HTTPS ... rather than saying a proxy MAY) to make it clear that if you _must_ do it the user MUST know and MUST have a choice 14:53:13 s/ RESOLUTION/RESOLUTION/ 14:53:20 List of comments on HTTPS: LC-2026, LC-2027, LC-2085, LC-2028, LC-2029, 14:53:20 LC-2030, LC-2015, LC-2031, LC-2016, LC-2032 14:53:20 LC-2001, LC-2033, LC-2004, LC-2024 14:54:12 Topic: LC-2078: claim of conformance in a Via HTTP header 14:54:18 -> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-bpwg-ct/2008Oct/0009.html 14:54:20 Topic: LC-2078 Claim of Conformance in Via HTTP header 14:54:56 francois: comments about what claim of conformance is constituted by including this in a via header 14:55:22 ... I think the main use case is to advertise transforming functionality, conformace is not implied 14:55:30 +1 to rewriting to clarify this 14:56:06 ... I realise that you are unlikely to include such a comment if you are wildly uncoformant 14:57:10 s/uncoformant/unconformant 14:57:20 PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Rewrite section 4.1.6.1 to clarify that inclusion of a via comment of the form indicated is not a conformance claim, but is an indication that the proxy is "non-transparent" or can be so 14:58:14 PROPOSED RESOLUTION: Rewrite section 4.1.6.1 to clarify that inclusion of a via comment of the form indicated is not a conformance claim, but is an indication that the proxy may restructure or otherwise modify content 14:58:22 +1 14:58:25 +1 14:58:26 +1 14:58:28 +1 14:58:30 +1 14:58:38 RESOLUTION: Rewrite section 4.1.6.1 to clarify that inclusion of a via comment of the form indicated is not a conformance claim, but is an indication that the proxy may restructure or otherwise modify content 14:59:32 -rob 14:59:34 -tom 14:59:34 francois: thanks and au revoir 14:59:36 -andrews 14:59:36 -Francois 14:59:37 -SeanP 14:59:41 [meeting adjourned] 14:59:51 -jo 14:59:53 MWI_BPWG(CTTF)10:00AM has ended 14:59:55 Attendees were tomhume, jo, Francois, +0207287aabb, rob, +1.630.414.aacc, SeanP, +0789972aadd, andrews, tom 14:59:57 s/Topic: LC-2078 Claim of Conformance in Via HTTP header// 15:00:09 RRSAgent, draft minutes 15:00:09 I have made the request to generate http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-minutes.html francois 15:01:16 sorry I have been on another cll 15:01:24 present+ Bryan[IRC_Only] 15:01:25 I tried to follow but was not able 15:01:55 RRSAgent, draft minutes 15:01:55 I have made the request to generate http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-minutes.html francois 15:02:10 thanks 15:08:49 rob has left #bpwg 15:30:40 RRSAgent, bye 15:30:40 I see 3 open action items saved in http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-actions.rdf : 15:30:40 ACTION: patterson to find out if novarra has figures on whether users choose to proceed at the HTTPS interstitial page [1] 15:30:40 recorded in http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-irc#T14-24-43 15:30:40 ACTION: daoust to contact IETF TLS group and advise them of what we are thinking and ask for guidance on what to recommend to Content Provider about detecting the presence of a man-in-the-middle proxy [2] 15:30:40 recorded in http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-irc#T14-35-56 15:30:40 ACTION: JO to add clarification to HTTPS rewriting to make it clear that the via header MUST be added [3] 15:30:40 recorded in http://www.w3.org/2008/10/07-bpwg-irc#T14-38-15 15:30:43 Zakim, bye 15:30:43 Zakim has left #bpwg